Singleton and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 4088 (1 November 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2017/3655
Re:Benjamin Singleton
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Linda Kirk
Date:1 November 2018
Place:Canberra
The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision dated 8 June 2017.
........................................................................
Senior Member Linda Kirk
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – whether the Applicant suffers from Chronic Pain Syndrome (CPS) – whether the Applicant suffers a permanent impairment resulting from CPS – the acceptance of an ‘injury’, as defined in ss 5A and 5B of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act), both precedes and defines the ambit of Comcare’s duty to consider compensation for injuries resulting in permanent impairment under s 24 of the SRC Act – on the basis of the medical evidence, the Applicant’s CPS is not determined to be an ‘injury’ for the purposes of the SRC Act – reviewable decision affirmed.
Legislation
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4, 5, 14, 24, 27, 28
Cases
Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535
Comcare v Broadhurst [2011] FCAFC 39
Comcare v Canute [2005] FCAFC 262
Comcare v Farrell [2016] FCAFC 115
Telstra Corporation v Hannaford (2006) 151 FCR 253
Whittaker v Comcare (1998) 86 FCR 532
Secondary Materials
Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of Permanent Impairment (Edition 2.1)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Linda Kirk
1 November 2018
BACKGROUND AND CLAIM
Mr Benjamin Singleton (‘the Applicant’) was born in April 1972.[1] He served in the Australian Army between 7 June 1989 and 11 July 1993. He submitted a claim for workers’ compensation to the Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Service (MCRS) on 13 July 1992.[2] The claim concerned a ‘left-hand shoulder AC joint’ injury suffered on 2 December 1991. The MCRS accepted liability for ‘left acromio-clavicular joint strain’ on 13 January 1993. The Applicant was discharged from the army on medical grounds (relating to his left shoulder injury) on 6 July 1993.[3]
[1] Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFIC) dated 12 April 2018 at paragraph 1.
[2] T Documents, T3.
[3] Respondent’s SFIC dated 10 May 2018 paragraphs 4-6.
The Applicant submitted an application for an increase in disability pension with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) on 24 June 1996.[4] He claimed that his left shoulder had worsened so that he could not move his arm most of the time or carry anything in his left hand. He claimed that he could not find permanent employment as anything that he was qualified to do he could not do ‘due to [his left] shoulder’.[5] The MCRS accepted liability for an interim payment of compensation for permanent impairment in relation to the Applicant’s left shoulder on 28 January 1998.[6] A final assessment of 10 per cent was made on 17 February 1998.[7]
[4] T Documents, T16; Respondent’s SFIC paragraph 7.
[5] Respondent’s SFIC paragraph 7.
[6] T Documents, T35; Respondent’s SFIC paragraph 8.
[7] T Documents, T36; Respondent’s SFIC paragraph 8.
The Applicant commenced employment with the Australian Federal…
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- AGLC
- Singleton and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 4088
- Case
- [2018] AATA 4088
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine three key issues: first, whether the applicant had sustained an injury recognised as CPS; second, if so, whether this CPS injury resulted in a permanent impairment; and third, if a permanent impairment was established, the degree of that impairment according to the relevant guide. The applicant provided evidence detailing the incident where he injured his right shoulder, the subsequent medical treatment, and the significant impact of his ongoing chronic pain on his daily activities, including personal care, household tasks, and recreational pursuits.
In its reasoning, the Tribunal considered the legal principle that the acceptance of an "injury" under sections 5A and 5B of the SRC Act precedes and defines the scope of Comcare's duty to consider compensation for permanent impairment under section 24. Applying this principle to the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that the applicant's CPS was not determined to be an "injury" for the purposes of the SRC Act. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that Comcare was not liable to pay compensation under sections 24 and 27 of the SRC Act in relation to the applicant's alleged chronic pain syndrome.
The Tribunal affirmed the reviewable decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the amount of compensation payable in respect of the right shoulder and, there being no separate injury, it follows that the reviewable decision must be affirmed.[123]CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS(1)Did the Applicant sustain an ‘injury’ recognised as ‘complex pain syndrome’?[123] Respondent’s Submissions at paragraph 43.Was liability correctly accepted by the Respondent? The first issue for determination requires the Tribunal to consider whether liability was correctly accepted by the Respondent in its determination dated 8 November 2016. In Hannaford, the Full Court of the Federal Court considered whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) is empowered to make findings of fact that are contrary to those found by the original decision-maker under s 14 of the SRC Act, in circumstances where the AAT is undertaking a review of determinations under s 16 and s 19 of the SRC Act. Conti J, in Hannaford, with whom Heerey J and Dowsett J agreed, stated the following at [273]-[274]: … it should be concluded, upon the correct construction of the SRC Act, and in particular of the provisions thereof upon which I have focused attention in these reasons, that the AAT is empowered to make subsequent findings of fact in relation to the circumstances the subject of decision-making under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, and also under ss 21 and 27 of the SRC Act, where the determination of the first instance decision-maker (here of course Telstra) made under the auspices of s 14 of the SRC Act remains in operation in the sense that it has not been the subject of any inconsistent outcome in the context of a subsequent review by the AAT. The statutory scheme allows for progressive and evolving decision-making giving effect to the provisions of ongoing review of relief or entitlements in the nature of course of workers compensation, being review which allows for adjustment or change in the light of events and circumstances which may subsequently happen. The statutory scheme hence reflects a flexible scope for adjustment by way of decisions in the nature of awards to be made subsequently to the determination of s 14 liability, whether that determination be made in isolation, or in the context of decision-making concerning consequential relief that may be required in the light of evolving circumstances. It is therefore a scheme which allows progressively for ongoing relief, and is thus not comparable of course with the process of curial resolution of the traditional common law entitlement of an injured employee for damages as a consequence of the negligent conduct of an employer. The opening words of s 14(1) ‘[s]ubject to this Part…’ are consistent with the flexibility inherent in the ensuing codification of the various facets of compensation envisaged. Conti J concluded at [274]:I would therefore conclude, contrary to the decision of the primary judge, that the AAT below was duly empowered, upon the true construction of the SRC Act and in the events which happened:(i) to make findings of fact that effectively undercut the necessary findings of fact made in the initial or original decision of Telstra under s 14 of the SRC Act to accept liability in respect of Mr Hannaford’s claim for compensation; and(ii) to do so in circumstances where the AAT was undertaking its review of whether any compensation should be payable or further payable, for instance under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, and/or under ss 21 and 27 of the SRC Act; and(iii) to do so in the circumstances further where Telstra’s s 14 decision remained in force to the extent that it had not been actually reversed, and had not been the subject of any adverse review per se by the AAT.In short, it matters not, upon the true construction of the SRC Act, that there has never been any reconsideration of the determination of Telstra of 8 May 2002 whereby liability under s 14 thereof for Mr Hannaford’s claim originally made on 1 May 2002 had been accepted.