Comcare v Farrell

Case [2016] FCAFC 115


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Comcare v Farrell [2016] FCAFC 115

Appeal from: Farrell v Comcare [2015] FCA 1337; (2015) 148 ALD 527
File number: ACD 140 of 2015
Judges: JAGOT, BROMBERG AND MURPHY JJ
Date of judgment: 16 September 2016
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Tribunal failed to make a critical finding of fact about the respondent’s “permanent impairment”– whether the Tribunal misconstrued s 24 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) ss 44(1), 43(2B)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(1), 5A(1)(b), 14, 14(1), 24, 24(1), 24(2), 24(5), 54

Cases cited:

Broadhurst v Comcare [2010] FCA 1034; (2010) 189 FCR 561

Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47; (2006) 226 CLR 535

Farrell and Comcare [2015] AATA 268

Farrell v Comcare [2015] FCA 1337; (2015) 148 ALD 527

Fellowes v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2009] HCA 38; (2009) 240 CLR 28

Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753; (1999) 56 ALD 84

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

Newport v Australian Postal Corporation [2015] FCAFC 194

Whittaker v Comcare [1998] FCA 1099; (1998) 86 FCR 532

Date of hearing: 11 August 2016
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P J Hanks QC with Mr P Woulfe
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Thawley SC with Mr A Anforth
Solicitor for the Respondent: Blumers Personal Injury Lawyers
Table of Corrections
23 September 2016 In [16], “…” replaces “no”.
23 September 2016 In [40], “Barnsley” replaces “Bradley”.

ORDERS

ACD 140 of 2015
BETWEEN:

COMCARE

Appellant

AND:

DONNA FARRELL

Respondent

JUDGES:

JAGOT, BROMBERG AND MURPHY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 SEPTEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the primary judge made on 30 November 2015 be set aside.

3.In lieu thereof, it be ordered that in the appeal below:

(a)The appeal be dismissed.

(b)The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

4.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. Comcare contends that in allowing an appeal on a question of law from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) the primary judge erred in his conclusion that the Tribunal had failed to make a critical finding of fact (the fact finding issue) and misconstrued the applicable legislation (the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)) (the SRC Act) (the legislation issue).

    The fact finding issue

  2. The respondent, Ms Farrell, sought…

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Details
AGLC
Comcare v Farrell [2016] FCAFC 115
Case
[2016] FCAFC 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Comcare appealed against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had dismissed its application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Secretary for the Department of Employment, relating to the assessment of permanent impairment for the purposes of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The AAT had concluded that the delegate had erred in the assessment of the impairment of Ms Farrell’s wrist, finding that the Tribunal had not erred in concluding that the range of movement of the wrist was able to be assessed under table 9.9 of the relevant schedule.

The legal issues in the case centred on whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the AAT failed to make a critical finding of fact about the respondent’s “permanent impairment” and whether the AAT misconstrued section 24 of the SRC Act. The court considered the function of the AAT in making findings of fact and whether the primary judge had erred in his interpretation of the AAT’s function.

The court held that the AAT had not erred in its conclusion that the range of movement of Ms Farrell’s wrist was able to be assessed under table 9.9. The court found that the AAT had properly exercised its fact-finding function and that the primary judge had erred in concluding otherwise. The court held that to conclude otherwise would be to interfere with the fact-finding function of the Tribunal in a manner impermissible in an appeal limited to questions of law. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and dismissed the appeal before the AAT. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and that the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge made on 30 November 2015 be set aside.

3. In lieu thereof, it be ordered that in the appeal below:

(a) The appeal be dismissed.

(b) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Once the correct statutory context is identified, it is apparent that it was within the Tribunal’s fact finding function to conclude on the basis of Professor Barnsley’s evidence that Ms Farrell’s impairment was able to be assessed under table 9.9, dealing with the range of movement of the wrist. To conclude otherwise, on a proper appreciation of the task vested in the Tribunal by the provisions of the SRC Act, would be to interfere with the fact finding function of the Tribunal in a manner impermissible in an appeal limited to questions of law.Conclusions For the reasons given above, the appeal must be allowed, and orders made to ensure the decision of the Tribunal stands.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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