FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 55
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles established in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs and subsequent cases, which articulate the conditions under which an administrative review body must consider particular claims made by an applicant. The court held that the AAT's jurisdiction under section 500(1)(ba) of the Act was to review the delegate's decision, not to exercise judicial powers. The court found that the AAT was not obligated to consider Ms Hong's Falun Gong claim unless it was clearly articulated and supported by established facts or evidence. Given that the claim was not sufficiently raised in the materials before the AAT, the court concluded that the AAT did not err in dismissing the appeal.
The court further held that there was no legal unreasonableness in the AAT's decision. The court noted that the AAT's findings were open to it, and the AAT had provided examples illustrating the basis for its conclusions. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the AAT's decision.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as assessed or agreed. The entry of these orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the appellant’s claim that the credibility finding was legally unreasonable, counsel for the Minister submitted that the finding was at least open to the Tribunal to make. Counsel submitted that the Tribunal’s finding in this regard was illustrated by what the Tribunal described as an “example”, which was that when the appellant was asked in cross-examination whether she knew about the knives, sling shots and other weapons, she replied that the bullets were made of plastic.ConsiderationThe Falun Gong point As we have indicated, the appellant made two submissions in relation to the Falun Gong point. The first was that the principles identified by the Full Court in AYY17 at [18], which we have set out at [48] above, are not applicable to the review of the delegate’s decision under s 501CA(4). The second submission was that, assuming that the principles identified by the Full Court in AYY17 were applicable, the appellant had established a factual foundation for the Falun Gong point. AYY17 concerned the review obligation of the Immigration Assessment Authority under Part 7AA of the Act relating to fast track reviewable decisions. It was accepted by the Full Court in AYY17 that the duty to consider claims and issues arising from material before the Authority was the same as that which applies to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under Part 5 of the Act. In this case, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review the delegate’s decision not to revoke the cancellation of the visa was conferred by s 500(1)(ba) of the Act, which is in Part 9. There is no provision within Part 9 that casts an express duty on the Tribunal to review a decision of a delegate of the Minister under s 501CA(4) that corresponds to s 348(1) of the Act in relation to Part 5-reviewable decisions, or to s 412(1) of the Act in relation to Part 7-reviewable decisions, but the duty is to be implied from the terms of s 500(1)(ba). The review was in the Tribunal’s General Division, and as such, the powers of review in Part IV of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) applied: cf, s 24Z of the AAT Act. Those powers included the powers in s 43 of the AAT Act to exercise all the powers and discretions that were conferred on the Minister’s delegate as the person who made the decision. The nature of the review by the Tribunal was informed by the provisions of the AAT Act, and by s 500 of the Act. The requirements of s 500 of the Act included that the application for review to the Tribunal had to be accompanied by the document notifying the delegate’s decision, and one set of the documents that s 501G(2) required the Minister to give the appellant with notification of the decision (s 500(6C)). The general position under the AAT Act is that the Tribunal conducts hearings: s 34J, s 35. Under s 39, the Tribunal is required to ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case. Under s 40, the Tribunal has power to take evidence on oath or affirmation, as it did in this case. Parties before the Tribunal are generally entitled to be represented by another person (s 32(1)), and in this case both the appellant and the Minister were legally represented before the Tribunal. The procedure of the Tribunal is within the discretion of the Tribunal, and the proceeding is to be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit: s 33. Under s 33(1AB), a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal, and any person representing such a party, must use his or her best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to fulfil the objective in section 2A, which is as follows –2A Tribunal’s objectiveIn carrying out its functions, the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that:(a) is accessible; and(b)is fair, just, economical, informal and quick; and(c)is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matter; and(d)promotes public trust and confidence in the decision-making of the Tribunal.