Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 55

Appeal from: Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1085
File number(s): NSD 1435 of 2018
Judge(s): LOGAN, BROMWICH AND WHEELAHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 5 April 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court – where mandatory visa cancellation made pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal failed to consider a claim made by the applicant – whether the alleged claim was sufficiently raised on the material, evidence and submissions before the Tribunal – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal’s decision was legally unreasonable – no jurisdictional error identified – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 2A, s 24Z, s 32, s 33, s 34J, s 35, s 39, s 40, s 43

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476, 500, s 501CA

Cases cited:

Applicant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473

Applicant S v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96; 248 FCR 456

Benjamin v Repatriation Commission [2001] FCA 1879; 70 ALD 622

Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143

Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd [1985] HCA 61; 62 ALR 53

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496

Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 214 CLR 496; 77 ALJR 1088

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Hospital Benefit Fund v Minister for Health (1992) 39 FCR 225

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 92 ALJR 780

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; 233 FCR 136

Jebb v Repatriation Commission (1988) 80 ALR 329

Kasupene v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1609

Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 186; 54 FLR 334

Maioha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 216

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151; 362 ALR 48

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DRP17 [2018] FCAFC 198

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

National Archives of Australia…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, Ms Hong, challenged a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had dismissed her appeal against the cancellation of her visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge had erred in concluding that the AAT had not failed to consider a specific claim made by Ms Hong and whether the AAT's decision was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the AAT had not properly considered her claim related to her practice of Falun Gong, a spiritual and meditation practice, and that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable.

The court considered the principles established in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs and subsequent cases, which articulate the conditions under which an administrative review body must consider particular claims made by an applicant. The court held that the AAT's jurisdiction under section 500(1)(ba) of the Act was to review the delegate's decision, not to exercise judicial powers. The court found that the AAT was not obligated to consider Ms Hong's Falun Gong claim unless it was clearly articulated and supported by established facts or evidence. Given that the claim was not sufficiently raised in the materials before the AAT, the court concluded that the AAT did not err in dismissing the appeal.

The court further held that there was no legal unreasonableness in the AAT's decision. The court noted that the AAT's findings were open to it, and the AAT had provided examples illustrating the basis for its conclusions. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the AAT's decision.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as assessed or agreed. The entry of these orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the joint reasons for judgment of Bromwich and Wheelahan JJ (joint judgment). I regret that I am unable to share the conclusion of the other members of the Court as to the disposition of this appeal. For the reasons which follow, I would allow the appeal. In expressing my reasons, I gratefully adopt the account of the background to this appeal and the summary of the issues, reasons of the learned primary judge and the submissions of the parties offered in the joint judgment. I repeat only so much of the same as is necessary to explain my reasons. In so doing, I adopt, for consistency, the abbreviations employed in the joint judgment. The “evasiveness finding” As to “the evasiveness finding”, I respectfully agree, for the reasons given in the joint judgment, that there is no merit in the appellant’s submission that the Tribunal’s decision on the review was unreasonable, because it was based on an unreasonable conclusion that the appellant was evasive in her evidence.The Falun Gong point Ever since Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 (Dranichnikov), a plethora of cases at intermediate appellate level have expounded upon the subject of when an emanation of the executive undertaking the review on the merits of an administrative decision has a duty to consider particular claims and arguments made by an applicant. These cases, which notably include AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89 (AYY17), hold that an administrative review body such as the Tribunal only has a duty to consider such of an applicant’s claims as are the subject of clearly articulated argument, relying on established facts or clearly emerge from the materials before the Tribunal. That body of intermediate appellate authority is rehearsed in the joint judgment. I prefer to approach the merits of the Falun Gong point via a path which commences with the terms of the Act and then proceeds by reference to Dranichnikov and other authorities at ultimate appellate level. In this case, the source of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was s 500(1)(ba) of the Act. That conferred on the Tribunal jurisdiction to review decisions of a delegate of the Minister under s 501CA(4) not to revoke a decision to cancel a visa. That conferral adopted a model the constitutional propriety of which was affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1930) 44 CLR 530. Paraphrasing for present relevance an observation made, at 544 – 545, of the Board of Review in that case, the Tribunal appears to be in the nature of administrative machinery to which an applicant can resort to have his contentions reconsidered. It does not exercise judicial powers but is merely in the same position as the delegate of the Minister himself. It is another administrative tribunal which is reviewing the determination of the delegate. This understanding can be seen to prevail to this day in the observation made in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123, at 1127, [18] in respect of a like jurisdiction once exercised by the Refugee Review Tribunal that its “core function” is to “review the decision”. The same may be said of the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal under s 500 of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the appellant’s claim that the credibility finding was legally unreasonable, counsel for the Minister submitted that the finding was at least open to the Tribunal to make. Counsel submitted that the Tribunal’s finding in this regard was illustrated by what the Tribunal described as an “example”, which was that when the appellant was asked in cross-examination whether she knew about the knives, sling shots and other weapons, she replied that the bullets were made of plastic.ConsiderationThe Falun Gong point As we have indicated, the appellant made two submissions in relation to the Falun Gong point. The first was that the principles identified by the Full Court in AYY17 at [18], which we have set out at [48] above, are not applicable to the review of the delegate’s decision under s 501CA(4). The second submission was that, assuming that the principles identified by the Full Court in AYY17 were applicable, the appellant had established a factual foundation for the Falun Gong point. AYY17 concerned the review obligation of the Immigration Assessment Authority under Part 7AA of the Act relating to fast track reviewable decisions. It was accepted by the Full Court in AYY17 that the duty to consider claims and issues arising from material before the Authority was the same as that which applies to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under Part 5 of the Act. In this case, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review the delegate’s decision not to revoke the cancellation of the visa was conferred by s 500(1)(ba) of the Act, which is in Part 9. There is no provision within Part 9 that casts an express duty on the Tribunal to review a decision of a delegate of the Minister under s 501CA(4) that corresponds to s 348(1) of the Act in relation to Part 5-reviewable decisions, or to s 412(1) of the Act in relation to Part 7-reviewable decisions, but the duty is to be implied from the terms of s 500(1)(ba). The review was in the Tribunal’s General Division, and as such, the powers of review in Part IV of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) applied: cf, s 24Z of the AAT Act. Those powers included the powers in s 43 of the AAT Act to exercise all the powers and discretions that were conferred on the Minister’s delegate as the person who made the decision. The nature of the review by the Tribunal was informed by the provisions of the AAT Act, and by s 500 of the Act. The requirements of s 500 of the Act included that the application for review to the Tribunal had to be accompanied by the document notifying the delegate’s decision, and one set of the documents that s 501G(2) required the Minister to give the appellant with notification of the decision (s 500(6C)). The general position under the AAT Act is that the Tribunal conducts hearings: s 34J, s 35. Under s 39, the Tribunal is required to ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case. Under s 40, the Tribunal has power to take evidence on oath or affirmation, as it did in this case. Parties before the Tribunal are generally entitled to be represented by another person (s 32(1)), and in this case both the appellant and the Minister were legally represented before the Tribunal. The procedure of the Tribunal is within the discretion of the Tribunal, and the proceeding is to be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit: s 33. Under s 33(1AB), a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal, and any person representing such a party, must use his or her best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to fulfil the objective in section 2A, which is as follows –2A Tribunal’s objectiveIn carrying out its functions, the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that:(a) is accessible; and(b)is fair, just, economical, informal and quick; and(c)is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matter; and(d)promotes public trust and confidence in the decision-making of the Tribunal.