FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Raibevu v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 35
Appeal from: Raibevu v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 2052 File number: NSD 231 of 2019 Judges: PERRAM, MARKOVIC AND CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 10 March 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – visa cancelled on character grounds – refusal of Assistant Minister to revoke cancellation decision – whether Assistant Minister committed jurisdictional error by having only selective regard to sentencing remarks – whether Assistant Minister’s decision affected by legal unreasonableness
HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – application to introduce new arguments on appeal – where grant of leave would undermine the purpose of the conferral of appellate jurisdiction – duty of appellant’s legal representative in relation to the orderly and timely preparation of the appellant’s case – whether appellant had legal assistance at first instance notwithstanding no notice of acting had been filed on his behalf – absence of explanation for failure to advance arguments in judicial review proceedings at first instance – proposed grounds of appeal lacking in merit – leave to introduce new grounds refused
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – application for leave to introduce on appeal issues arising under the Constitution not previously argued – whether acceptance of proposed grounds would sound in the relief sought – proposed grounds having no utility – proposed grounds having insufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave
Legislation: Constitution, Ch III
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 189, 474, 501, 501CA, 501G
Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) Div 1
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 126
Cases cited: AAD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1433
Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees’ Union of NSW (1908) 6 CLR 469
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 73 ALD 321
Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 480; 190 ALR 543
Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 55
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1997) 189 CLR 51
Knight v Victoria (2017) 261 CLR 306
Lyons v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1381
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 81
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391
SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 10 February 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and…
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court identified several key legal issues in the case. First, it considered whether the appellant's legal representatives had a duty to ensure that his case was properly prepared and presented at the first instance. The court found that the appellant had legal representation at the first instance, but that his legal representatives had not filed a notice of acting. The court held that this did not necessarily mean that the appellant's case was not properly presented, but that the appellant's legal representatives had a duty to ensure that his case was properly prepared and presented. Second, the court considered whether the proposed grounds of appeal had merit. The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal were lacking in merit because they were based on new evidence that had not been presented at the first instance and because they were speculative in nature. Finally, the court considered whether the proposed grounds of appeal were constitutional in nature and whether they had sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal were not constitutional in nature and that they did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave to appeal.
The court held that the appeal should be dismissed and that leave to introduce new arguments on appeal should be refused. The court found that the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal were lacking in merit and that the grant of leave to introduce new arguments on appeal would undermine the purpose of the conferral of appellate jurisdiction. The court also found that the appellant's legal representatives had a duty to ensure that his case was properly prepared and presented at the first instance, but that this did not necessarily mean that his case was not properly presented. The court held that the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal were speculative in nature and that they were not supported by the evidence. The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave to appeal.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed. The court held that the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal were lacking in merit and that the grant of leave to introduce new arguments on appeal would undermine the purpose of the conferral of appellate jurisdiction. The court found that the appellant's legal representatives had a duty to ensure that his case was properly prepared and presented at the first instance, but that this did not necessarily mean that his case was not properly presented. The court held that the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal were speculative in nature and that they were not supported by the evidence. The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to rely on ground 2 of the amended notice of appeal filed on 17 June 2019 is refused.
2. Leave to rely on ground 3 of the proposed further amended notice of appeal is refused.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As amended, the proposed ground is as follows:Ground 3: The respondent failed to examine entirely the operation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations3The appellant seeks leave to rely on a new ground three that was not articulated before the primary judge that the decision by the respondent on 24 July 2018 not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant’s Class AO Subclass 802 (Child) visa was affected by jurisdictional error. The non-revocation decision by the respondent pursuant to section 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was vitiated by jurisdictional error from [25]-[29] of the decision record, as the respondent failed to consider entirely from [25]-[29], an integer of the appellant’s claims that he will face a lifetime on the sexual offenders scheme in Fiji within the category of ‘the extent of impediments if returned. Further, the respondent failed to consider entirely the appellant’s claims of harm within the concept of non-refoulemement and the international obligations framework, thereby denying the appellant procedural fairness and/or, the respondent constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction, and/or failed to carry out the statutory task required by section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). There are three pages of “particulars”. It is not necessary to extract them here. The essence of the argument, as advanced in oral submissions, was that the Minister had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider and conclude that upon his return to Fiji, Mr Raibevu would be identified as a sex offender and would be legally obliged in any event to report his sexual offending to authorities there. It was asserted that his name would be placed on a register of sex offenders and he would be subject to controls on his civil liberties by virtue of that status. It was submitted that by reason of his sexual offending, the authorities in Fiji may cancel Mr Raibevu’s visa. It was submitted that the adverse effects of the sex offenders regime in Fiji was an “essential integer” of the claims Mr Raibevu had made to the Minster as to why the cancellation decision should be revoked. In support of these submissions, Counsel sought to rely on new evidence to prove the existence of the sex offenders’ regime and its likely impact on Mr Raibevu. It is well established that where a tribunal exercising powers of merits review fails to make a finding on “a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying on established facts”, that may amount to a constructive failure to carry out the review required of the tribunal and so constitute jurisdictional error: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 73 ALD 321 at [24] (Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at [95]). And, as the Court said in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 (Black CJ, French and Selway JJ (at [63), and see generally [55], [58] – [61], [68]):… It follows that if the Tribunal makes an error of fact in misunderstanding or misconstruing a claim advanced by the applicant and bases its conclusion in whole or in part upon the claim so misunderstood or misconstrued its error is tantamount to a failure to consider the claim and on that basis can constitute jurisdictional error. The same may be true if a claim is raised by the evidence, albeit not expressly by the applicant, and is misunderstood or misconstrued by the Tribunal. Every case must be considered according to its own circumstances. …