AAD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1433

Appeal from: AAD16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2399
File number: VID 1105 of 2017
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 21 September 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from judgment of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application to introduce grounds of appeal raising arguments not raised before primary judge – all other grounds abandoned – appellant legally represented throughout – no evidence given of reason for failing to advance arguments previously – grounds assumed to have prima facie merit – grounds not raising matters of general importance – consideration of stakes for protection visa applicant should leave be refused – application of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – leave to introduce new grounds refused – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 37M

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36, 36(2A), 476

Cases cited:

AOL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 979

Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387

Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 480; (2002) 190 ALR 543.

Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172

Metwally v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; (1985) 60 ALR 68

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Israelian (2000) 206 CLR 323

MZYTT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 141 ALD 301

O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 205

Date of hearing: 16 March 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr AF Solomon-Bridge
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

VID 1105 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AAD16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH  J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s application for leave to rely on the grounds proposed in paragraph 4 of the appellant’s submissions filed on 2 March 2018 is refused.

2.The appeal is dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC).  The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 9 December 2015.  By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the appellant a protection…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1433
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of AAD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought leave to introduce new grounds of appeal in relation to a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection regarding the refusal of a protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia had previously dismissed the applicant's appeal, and the matter was now before the High Court on appeal. The applicant, represented by legal counsel, sought to introduce new grounds for appeal that had not been raised before the primary judge. All other grounds of appeal had been abandoned.

The central legal issues before the court were whether leave should be granted to introduce new grounds of appeal and, if so, what the implications of such a decision would be. The court had to consider the stakes for the applicant if leave were refused and the principles governing the introduction of new grounds of appeal. The court also had to assess whether the new grounds had prima facie merit and whether they raised matters of general importance. The court noted that the applicant had been legally represented throughout the proceedings and had not provided any evidence to explain why the new grounds were not raised previously.

The court determined that leave to introduce the new grounds should not be granted. The court found that the new grounds did not have prima facie merit and did not raise matters of general importance. The court also considered the stakes for the applicant if leave were refused and found that they were not sufficiently high to warrant the introduction of new grounds. The court applied section 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in reaching its decision and concluded that the appeal must be dismissed. The court noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s application for leave to rely on the grounds proposed in paragraph 4 of the appellant’s submissions filed on 2 March 2018 is refused.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, applied for a protection visa on the basis that he was of Tamil ethnicity and was imputed with the political opinions of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He claimed to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his membership of a social group, namely that of failed asylum seekers returning to Sri Lanka having departed the country illegally. He alleged that he would be imprisoned for months awaiting security checks and may be subject to torture as a failed asylum seeker with perceived ties to the LTTE. Alternatively, he claimed that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm because, among other things, he would be charged with and imprisoned for certain offences created by the Immigrants and Emigrants Act of Sri Lanka relating to his illegal departure from the country. The appellant's application for the visa was refused, and he subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed his appeal.

The appellant's appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was dismissed, and he now seeks leave to appeal to this Court, arguing additional grounds that were not raised before the primary judge. The appellant has been legally represented throughout the proceedings. In this appeal, the appellant seeks leave to introduce new grounds of appeal that were not previously raised before the primary judge. The appellant's application for leave to rely on the new grounds proposed in paragraph 4 of the appellant's submissions filed on 2 March 2018 is refused.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons given below, leave to introduce the new grounds should not be granted. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION To be eligible for the visa it was necessary for the appellant to satisfy inter alia either the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act (the Refugee Criterion) or the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (the Complementary Protection Criterion). The Refugee Criterion requires that the visa applicant be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (Convention). Article 1A of the Convention provides that Australia owes protection obligations to a person who:… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. The Complementary Protection Criterion requires that the visa applicant be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because:… the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; …. Section 36(2A) of the Act defines “significant harm” to include “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” or “degrading treatment or punishment”: s 36(2A)(d) and (e). Section 5(1) defines “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” and “degrading treatment or punishment” as, respectively:•an act or omission by which pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person and is either severe or could, in all the circumstances, reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature; and •an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. In support of his application for the visa he claimed to satisfy the Refugee Criterion on the basis that he was of Tamil ethnicity and was imputed with the political opinions of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He further claimed to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his membership of a social group, namely that of failed asylum seekers returning to Sri Lanka having departed the country illegally. He claimed that he would be imprisoned for months awaiting security checks and may be subject to torture as a failed asylum seeker with perceived ties to the LTTE. In the alternative, the appellant claimed that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm because, among other things, he would be charged with and imprisoned for certain offences created by the Immigrants and Emigrants Act of Sri Lanka relating to his illegal departure from the country.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the application under section 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for leave to introduce new grounds of appeal. The appellant, legally represented throughout, sought to introduce grounds of appeal that had not been raised before the primary judge. All other grounds of appeal had been abandoned. The court found that the new grounds assumed to have prima facie merit did not raise matters of general importance. The stakes for the protection visa applicant were considered in determining whether leave should be granted. The court noted that the appellant had not provided evidence explaining why these arguments were not raised previously. The court reasoned that the refusal of leave was justified as the new grounds did not pertain to matters of significant public importance or legal principle that would warrant allowing the introduction of new grounds of appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as the application for leave to introduce new grounds was refused. The court adhered to the requirement of section 37M that only exceptional circumstances would justify allowing the introduction of new grounds of appeal. The court did not find such exceptional circumstances present in this case.