HSCK v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HSCK v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 313

Review of: HSCK and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2023] AATA 3095
File number(s): VID 929 of 2023
Judgment of: BUTTON J
Date of judgment: 28 March 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of the Minister not to revoke mandatory cancellation of visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Tribunal decision made before decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37 – whether constitutional limitation identified in NZYQ engaged – whether decision of Tribunal affected by jurisdictional error – application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 3A, 5H, 36, 189, 196, 197C, 499, 501

Ministerial Direction No. 99 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA

Cases cited:

AJN23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 130

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; [2004] HCA 37

Bale v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 646

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1

DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2021) 285 FCR 1; [2021] FCAFC 97

DLJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 273 FCR 66; [2019] FCAFC 236

Hodgson v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1141

Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 47; [2019] FCAFC 55

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123; [2018] HCA 34

Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 196; [2024] HCA 2

KQHR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1205

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506; [2021] HCA 17

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80; [2022] HCA 26

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 38

NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 1005; [2023] HCA 37

RZSN v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1731

Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 246 FCR 146; [2016] FCAFC 177

WKMX v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2021) 285 FCR 463; [2021] FCAFC 55

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

XXBN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 74

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 91
Date of hearing: 6 March 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr A…
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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 313
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of HSCK v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, HSCK, sought to challenge the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of his visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the AAT's decision was affected by a jurisdictional error, particularly in light of the High Court's recent decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the constitutional limitation identified in NZYQ was engaged by the facts of this case and whether this limitation should have affected the AAT's consideration of the legal consequences of the decision.

The court found that the constitutional limitation identified in NZYQ did not apply to the applicant's circumstances. The High Court's decision in NZYQ focused on the lack of a real prospect of the plaintiff's removal from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future, which rendered certain provisions of the Migration Act invalid as they applied to the plaintiff. In contrast, the concessions made by the Minister in the present case, made before the High Court's decision in NZYQ, did not prefigure the specific factual findings made by the High Court. Moreover, the applicant had not yet exhausted his domestic review and appeal rights, and the AAT's role was to consider the legal consequences of the decision under review. Therefore, the court concluded that the AAT did not commit a jurisdictional error by not applying the constitutional limitation identified in NZYQ.

The court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision. The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs, as per Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While the Minister is correct to observe that it is not the task of an administrative decision-maker to embark on enquiries that may expose a constitutional limitation resulting in the non-application of the Act (or specific provisions of it), that is not to say that the Tribunal can in all circumstances, or must always, proceed on the basis that ss 186(1) and 196(1) of the Act will necessarily apply without s 3A of the Act being engaged to limit their application. However, as I have concluded that the concessions made before, and facts found by, the Tribunal did not engage the constitutional limitation explained in NZYQ, it is not necessary to determine whether the effect of NBMZ, Taulahi and other cases in that line of authority, is that, in considering the legal consequences of the decision, the Tribunal should have assumed all provisions of the Act, including ss 186(1) and 196(1), would operate and apply according their terms. In another case, concessions made, or facts found, concerning ongoing detention or the prospects of removal might make that proposition look rather fragile, if not wrong. GROUND 1: FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE APPLICANT SUFFERED FROM ANY DIAGNOSED MENTAL HEALTH CONDITION Ground 1 does not have merit. The Applicant submitted that it was part of his case before the Tribunal that there was “another reason” to revoke the cancellation decision, which involved his mental health and possible acquired brain injury. As advanced by the Applicant, this ground of appeal concerned the “other consideration” of the impediments that the Applicant would face if removed to South Sudan. The Applicant submitted that the issue was also raised in relation to the risk of re-offending. Central to the Applicant’s argument on this ground was a report of Dr Nina Zimmerman, a forensic psychiatrist (the Zimmerman Report). The Applicant contended as follows in relation to the Zimmerman Report (footnotes omitted):44. The Zimmerman Report makes the following findings:i. it was likely that the applicant suffered from either a mild intellectual disability or an Acquired Brain Injury (ABI);ii. it was striking that a psychological assessment resulted in the applicant being placed in a Specialist School for children with disabilities and that it was at that school that the applicant could cope for the first time;iii.the applicant reported receiving a serious head injury at age 15 that left him unconscious;iv. the applicant’s struggles with employment and feedback that he was “making too many mistakes” may represent difficulties with a mild intellectual disability;v. in relation to interventions and supports necessary to address the applicant’s risk of further offending, Dr Zimmerman recommended counselling by a service that has experience working with offenders and those with comorbidities “such as intellectual impairments”;45. Taken together, the matters set out in the Zimmerman Report are tantamount to a finding, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant suffered from a mild intellectual disability or an ABI. Dr Zimmerman speaks in terms of ‘likelihood’ as opposed to ‘possibility’.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The parties’ written and oral submissions focused on ground 3, so I will start with that ground.GROUND 3: JURISDICTIONAL ERROR RELATING TO EFFECT OF HIGH COURT DECISION IN NZYQ V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION The High Court’s decision in NZYQ Ground 3 relies on the High Court’s decision in NZYQ. In NZYQ, the High Court determined that, subject to s 3A of the Act, ss 189(1) and 196(1) of the Act authorised the detention of the plaintiff in that case. Their Honours also determined, however, that ss 189(1) and 196(1) of the Act were beyond the power of the Commonwealth insofar as they applied to the plaintiff in that case. Section 189(1) obliges an officer to detain an unlawful non-citizen in certain circumstances. Section 196 is concerned with duration of detention. Section 196(1) provides that:(1)An unlawful non-citizen detained under section 189 must be kept in immigration detention until:(a)he or she is removed from Australia under section 198 or 199; or (aa)an officer begins to deal with the non-citizen under subsection 198AD(3); or (b)he or she is deported under section 200; or (c)he or she is granted a visa. Section 3A(1) of the Act provides that:(1) Unless the contrary intention appears, if a provision of this Act:(a)would, apart from this section, have an invalid application; but (b) also has at least one valid application;it is the Parliament’s intention that the provision is not to have the invalid application, but is to have every valid application. In NZYQ, the High Court declared that “by reason of there having been and continuing to be no real prospect of the removal of the plaintiff from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future”, his detention was unlawful and therefore ordered a writ of habeas corpus issue requiring the plaintiff’s release (emphasis added). The specific language by which the High Court framed the declaration in NZYQ, is important. Their Honours explained (at [55]) that the “appropriate expression of the applicable constitutional limitation” followed directly from the principle in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 (Lim). Their Honours went on to explain why they rejected variations of the expression of the applicable constitutional limitation that had been proffered by the defendants and certain amici. The Court (at [57]) noted that the defendants’ fallback position was that the limitation should be expressed by reference to the time when there “is no real prospect” of removal of the alien from Australia, and expressly rejected the defendants’ contention that notions of practicability and the reasonably foreseeable future were unnecessary distractions. Their Honours considered that those notions were “essential to anchoring the expression of the constitutional limitation in factual reality”. The High Court also explained (at [58]) why it rejected the suggestion by some amici that the limit should be expressed by reference to the point at which it “can be determined to be more probable than not that the alien will not be removed from Australia in the foreseeable future”. That formulation was rejected on the basis that it uncoupled the limitation from its underlying constitutional justification and would go beyond merely ensuring that the detention is limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of removal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thirdly, the Minister contended that if there was an error, it was as to a matter of fact (an error in forecasting the practical consequences of an adverse decision).Consideration In my view, the Minister’s submission that the constitutional limit explained in NZYQ was not clearly engaged in respect of the Applicant, must be accepted. In NZYQ, the parties agreed, as at 30 May 2023, various facts. One such fact was that there was “then no real prospect of the plaintiff being removed from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future”: NZYQ at [63]. Evidence was also adduced in the High Court concerning enquiries that had recently been made of the four other “Five Eyes” countries as to the potential for the plaintiff to be removed to those countries. Three of the four countries in question quickly responded in the negative. The United States Department of State said it would consider the matter but, despite frequent follow-up contact, provided no further substantive response before the High Court heard the plaintiff’s application: NZYQ at [65]–[66]. The High Court had affidavit evidence concerning what an officer of the Department of Home Affairs made of the response of the United States. Neither party submitted that the position at the end of the hearing differed from that agreed as at 30 May 2023: NZYQ at [69]. The final position was that although removal to the United States remained a possibility, “the evidence failed to establish that the prospect of removal to the United States occurring in the foreseeable future was realistic”. There being “no real prospect of the removal of the plaintiff from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future”, ss 189(1) and 196(1) of the Act did not validly apply to authorise his continued detention: NZYQ at [70]. The circumstances before the Tribunal were different. The concessions made by the Minister are to be understood having regard to the context in which they were made. First, that context included the factual reality that NZYQ had not yet been handed down, and so the concessions cannot be construed as pre-figuring characterisations of fact that the High Court had yet to make. Secondly, the Applicant had not yet exhausted his domestic review and appeal rights. Accordingly, and as the Minister submitted, the occasion had not yet arrived to make enquiries and see whether he could be removed to a third country, or what timeframes would be involved. All the Tribunal had to go on were the Minister’s concessions (coupled with its assessment of the potential that the Applicant would, notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, return voluntarily to South Sudan). Thirdly, and relatedly, the Minister’s concessions were made in the context of the Tribunal having to consider the legal consequences of the decision under review. The effect of the concessions was to identify, as a legal consequence of the decision, the prospect of indefinite detention and the impact of such detention on the Applicant.