Benrabah v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Benrabah v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 521

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: NVDC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 457
File number: VID 632 of 2018
Judge: STEWARD J
Date of judgment: 17 April 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm a decision not to revoke a visa cancellation – where applicant’s visa cancelled on character grounds – where applicant has substantial criminal record – whether Tribunal erred in failing to take into account relevant considerations – whether Tribunal erred in interpreting or applying the law – whether Tribunal erred in taking into account an irrelevant consideration
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501, 501CA
Cases cited:

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89

Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 55

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216

Date of hearing: 4 February 2019
Date of last submissions: 4 March 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn on a pro bono basis
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maddocks Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Brown
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 632 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BRAHIM BENRABAH

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

STEWARD J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 APRIL 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be granted.

2.The application for review be dismissed with costs to be agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWARD J:

  1. The applicant is an Algerian man, whose Class AZ Subclass 866 Protection visa was cancelled because he did not pass the character test pursuant to s 501(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). That is not disputed. On 29 November 2017, a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”) decided not to revoke that cancellation pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Act. The applicant sought review of that decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). On 26 February 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. On 30 May 2018, the applicant made an application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. With the consent of the Minister, I granted the necessary extension of time and heard the application for judicial review.

    Legislative Provisions

  2. Section 501CA of the Act provides:

    (1)This section applies if the Minister makes a decision (the original decision) under subsection 501(3A) (person serving sentence of imprisonment) to…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 521
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Benrabah v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, who had been in Australia since 1997 and had a substantial criminal record, sought an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had affirmed a decision not to revoke a visa cancellation of the applicant, who had been living in Australia with an Australian woman and their daughter. The applicant argued that the AAT had erred in failing to take into account relevant considerations, in interpreting or applying the law, and in taking into account an irrelevant consideration. The Minister for Home Affairs opposed the application.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had erred in its decision not to revoke the visa cancellation of the applicant. The court had to consider whether the AAT had failed to take into account relevant considerations, whether it had erred in interpreting or applying the law, and whether it had taken into account an irrelevant consideration. The court also had to consider whether the applicant's visa cancellation was justified on character grounds.

The court found that the AAT had not erred in its decision. The court held that the AAT had considered all relevant matters and had not failed to take into account any relevant consideration. The court also found that the AAT had not erred in interpreting or applying the law. The court held that the AAT had correctly understood how to consider the applicant's criminal convictions and had not taken into account any irrelevant consideration. The court found that the visa cancellation of the applicant was justified on character grounds, given his substantial criminal record.

The court granted the application for an extension of time and dismissed the application for review with costs to be agreed or assessed. The court held that the AAT had not erred in its decision and that the visa cancellation of the applicant was justified on character grounds. The court also held that the applicant's arguments about the AAT's consideration of his employment prospects and the effect of deportation on his daughter were not well-founded. The court found that the AAT had considered all relevant matters and had not failed to take into account any relevant consideration. The court held that the AAT had correctly understood how to consider the applicant's criminal convictions and had not taken into account any irrelevant consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be granted.

2. The application for review be dismissed with costs to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501CA of the Act provides:(1)This section applies if the Minister makes a decision (the original decision) under subsection 501(3A) (person serving sentence of imprisonment) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.(2)For the purposes of this section, relevant information is information (other than non‑disclosable information) that the Minister considers:(a)would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for making the original decision; and(b)is specifically about the person or another person and is not just about a class of persons of which the person or other person is a member.(3) As soon as practicable after making the original decision, the Minister must:(a)give the person, in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances:(i) a written notice that sets out the original decision; and(ii) particulars of the relevant information; and(b)invite the person to make representations to the Minister, within the period and in the manner ascertained in accordance with the regulations, about revocation of the original decision.(4) The Minister may revoke the original decision if:(a)the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and(b) the Minister is satisfied:(i)that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501); or(ii)that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked.…Background The applicant arrived in Australia in 1997 and two years later commenced a de facto relationship with an Australian woman. They have a daughter who at the time of the Tribunal’s decision was 17 years old. In 2001, the applicant injured his back at his place of employment and thereafter relied upon a disability support pension because he could no longer work. Around this time he commenced using drugs and became addicted to “ice”. Commencing in 2003, and over around 13 years, he carried out a large number of crimes for the purpose, so the applicant states, of funding his drug habit. In 2006, the then Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs issued him with a formal warning that his visa might be cancelled should he continue to commit crimes. The applicant has received over 60 convictions. The majority of these related to property offences including the following:(a)burglary;(b)theft;(c)theft of a motor vehicle;(d)obtaining property by deception;(e)obtaining financial advantage by deception;(f)receiving and disposing of stolen goods;(g)going equipped to steal/cheat;(h)intentionally destroying property; and(i)dealing with property suspected as proceeds of crime. He committed other offences which related to the applicant’s use of drugs, including:(a)trafficking amphetamines;(b)possession of amphetamines; and(c)possession of a drug of dependence. The Tribunal correctly understood how to consider these convictions. At [47], it said:In assessing, particular offences, the Tribunal may not impugn a sentence or put in issue the propriety of a conviction or the fairness of the trial. The Tribunal may, however, examine the circumstances surrounding the commission of the relevant offence for the purpose of enabling the Tribunal to make its own assessment of the nature and gravity of the applicant’s criminal conduct: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele [(1981) 61 FLR 354 at 358].(Footnotes omitted.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, it would appear that the Tribunal did raise the issue of employment with the applicant. The answer given by him was that whilst it would not be easy, he agreed that it would be possible to work. The Tribunal addressed this answer when it said at [144] that the applicant did not raise the issue of his work injury and his incapacity to work. Perhaps the Tribunal could have expressed its reasons more clearly and have set out in a more fulsome way the applicant’s evidence. It did not do so. But it was not obliged to record every aspect of its reasoning process; Buadromo at [48]. Nor did the Tribunal fail to make an inquiry and consider the applicant’s prospects of employment in Algeria. Its findings followed from the applicant’s own answers.Strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia − weight given to the relationship between the applicant and his daughter Another concern I raised with the parties was the observation made at [135], for the purposes of considering the strength, nature and duration of the applicant’s ties with Australia, that the effect of deportation on the daughter was to be given “lesser weight” in relation to the “period after she turns 18”. Earlier, for the purposes of considering the best interests of a minor child, the Tribunal had observed at [109] that this factor was “almost neutral” because the daughter was about to turn 18. That finding was open to the Tribunal to make because Direction 65 limits a consideration of the best interests of a minor child to children younger than 18. My concern with [135] was that, in a different context (namely consideration of the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia) the Tribunal appeared to be incorrectly importing the age limitation referred to above. In considering the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia, adult children are not excluded. Nonetheless, the Tribunal gave “lesser weight” to the ties the daughter has with the applicant for the period after she turns 18. The effect of deportation on the applicant’s daughter is a very important issue. The two were found to be very close. Inferentially, the effect of deportation on her well-being should be just as significant, whether or not she just turned 18. I again called for further submissions from the parties. The Minister strongly disputed the foregoing proposition. He also disputed that there had been a wrongful importation of the exclusion of adult children into this factor. He submitted that [135] should be read as a finding made by the Tribunal that the effect of non-revocation on the daughter as an adult would be less than the effect of non-revocation on her as a child. This is because, it was said, as an adult she would possess greater capacity to cope with the effect of non-revocation: she could, for example, independently make arrangements to visit her father and communicate with him as necessary. The Minister submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to make that finding and to draw such a distinction between childhood and adulthood in assessing the impact of a decision not to revoke the cancellation of the visa.