c - .. BE9EEM :
B(?PID CORPORATION PTY. L I M I T D
Applicant
THIESS COWACTORS PTY. L I M I T D
First Respondent
Second Respondents
JUDGES KW.IMG ORDER: B O I a . C.J., SHEPPARD and LEE JJ. E-TE OF ORDEI? 9 MARCH 1988 N-IERE KaJE PERTH THE COURT 0RDEP.S WIT:- L T h c applicant pay the respondents' costs of the motion. L T h e applicant's notice of motlon of 4 February 1988 seeklng
leave to appeal against the order of French J. made on 20 January l?e8 be dismissed.
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of the Federal Court Rules
Applicant
THIESS COPITRACTORS PTY.
LIMITED
First Respondent
O V E ARUP FTY. LIMITED, .9RUP
P.9RTNJEP.S PTY. LIMITED and O V E .9P.UP COMSULT.WTS FTY. LIMITED
Second Respondents
THE COURT: EOPEPI, C. J. , SHEPP.9P.D and LEE JJ.
: - E 9 March 1988
R E E O M S FOR JUI?C"T
This is a notice of motlon seeking leave to appeal against an
crdcr made by French J. on 20 Januar;- 1988. The application is
made by the applicant !"Bond") slhich has sued the first respondcnt !"Thiess") for causes of action under the Trade
*
Prlctlces Act 1074 and for breach of contract. Bond has also
sued the second respondents ("Ove Arup") in the same proceedings
but the;- are not concerned with the matters xhich arise for
conzideratlon in the present motion.
The background to the matter is this. On 24 February l98?
French J. made an ordcr rcztralnlng Thless frcm prosecutlng an xbltratlon Setzeen It I n 3 Eond m acccrdance vlch a ncizlre of
r s fz r '2 rco tz I r b l t r a c l o n zcr-zed b - : Thiess on 1 3 CeFtenber 1996.
The notlco :.-as q1:.en purzuant tc an arbltration cause, clause 49 ,
:n zcrtaln q z n c r a l ccnditlonz of ccntract ::hlch "ere annexed to
m d f3rmed part 3f J. ccntract made on 12 March 1935 whereby Eond engaged Thiczs to carry out certain civil engineerlng vork on llnd at Mlllendm in Wcstcrn P.ustralla. The cause3 of action
relied U ~ O R b; Eond againzt Thiess in the principal proceedings
Irlze out of such vork and the contract of 12 March 1985.
The second respondents were engaged by Bond to act as its
consulting and supervising cngineer for the development of the l m d . The; W e n appointed the superintendent under the contract.
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His Honour made the order of 2 4 February 1937 staying the
xbltration proccedinqs substantlally because he accepted submissions made by counsel for Eond that a11 Issues which would x i z e for determination in the application and in the arbltration
proceedings were justiciablc in this Court and that Thiess would be able to raise in the proccedings all matters of claim vhich It deslred to raise in the arbltration.
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After his Honour's order was made Thiess filed a cross claim
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- Case
- [1988] FCA 73
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the Court of Appeal in England's decision in Northern Regional Health Authority v. Derek Crouch Construction Co. Limited (1984) 1 Q.B. 644 applied to the current case and whether the Court should grant leave to appeal against French J.'s order. The primary submission of counsel for Bond was that the only way in which Thiess could seek review was to proceed against Bond, whether in this Court or by way of arbitration proceedings, for breach of a promise made by Bond to Thiess that the superintendent would exercise the powers conferred upon him by the contract in a reasonable and equitable manner. Counsel for Thiess, on the other hand, contended that clauses 23 and 49, when read together, conferred on Thiess a right to have all directions of the superintendent reviewed in arbitration proceedings irrespective of whether the superintendent was shown to have acted unreasonably or inequitably.
The Court found that French J. had exercised a discretion in a matter relating to practice and procedure, and he had determined no matter of substance between the parties. The Court further found that there was no error in the decision against which leave to appeal was sought. The Court dismissed the motion with costs. The Court's decision was based on the fact that French J. had not made any final determination on the substantive issue at hand, and the matter had not been clearly formulated before him. The Court also noted that the interlocutory steps to take place before the arbitrator would much more clearly define the issues than was the case at that point in time.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal against the order made by French J. on 20 January 1988. The applicant, Bond, argued that the decision demonstrated an error in the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. The respondents, Thiess and Ove Arup, opposed the motion, arguing that the court should not interfere with the trial judge's decision. The motion was heard on 4 March 1988.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the decision of the trial judge demonstrate an error in the exercise of discretion?
2. Should the court interfere with the trial judge's decision to grant Thiess leave to discontinue its cross-claim and have the stay of the arbitration lifted?
3. What is the appropriate scope of review for the directions given by the Superintendent under the contract?
4. Can Thiess seek review of all directions given by the Superintendent in arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether the Superintendent acted unreasonably or inequitably?
Held
1. The decision of the trial judge did not demonstrate an error in the exercise of discretion.
2. The court will not interfere with the trial judge's decision to grant Thiess leave to discontinue its cross-claim and have the stay of the arbitration lifted.
3. The scope of review for the directions given by the Superintendent under the contract is limited to whether the Superintendent acted unreasonably or inequitably.
4. Thiess cannot seek review of all directions given by the Superintendent in arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether the Superintendent acted unreasonably or inequitably.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered the competing submissions on the scope of review for directions given by the Superintendent under the contract. Counsel for Bond submitted that Thiess could only seek review if it could show that the Superintendent acted unreasonably or inequitably, while counsel for Thiess contended that all directions were subject to independent review in arbitration. The Court found that the trial judge had not made a final determination on the substantive issue, as the cross-claim had not been fully formulated and the issues had not been clearly defined. The Court held that the trial judge had exercised a sound discretion in allowing Thiess to proceed with the arbitration to better define the issues. The Court concluded that the primary submission on the scope of review was not the appropriate matter to be resolved at that stage of the proceedings. The Court therefore dismissed the application for leave to appeal, with costs awarded to the respondents. The ratio of the decision is that the scope of review for directions given by the Superintendent is limited to instances of unreasonable or inequitable conduct.