Sedgwick Australia Pty Ltd v Jloc Super Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sedgwick Australia Pty Ltd v JLOC Super Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 218

PARTIES:

SEDGWICK AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 003 437 161
(appellant)
v
JLOC SUPER PTY LTD
ACN 605 330 786
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 16103 of 2023
SC No 12417 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2023] QSC 270 (Freeburn J)

DELIVERED ON:

12 November 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 May 2024

JUDGES:

Bond JA, Callaghan and Crowley JJ

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Set aside paragraph 1 of the orders made by the primary judge on 29 November 2023 and on 15 December 2023.

3.   Strike out paragraphs [5A], [22AB] and [22B] of the respondent’s fourth amended statement of claim, with leave to replead.

4.   The parties are directed to file written submissions on the costs orders to be made in respect of the appeal and of the application before the primary judge within 7 days, such submissions not to exceed 4 pages in length.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – IN GENERAL – WRONG PRINCIPLE – PARTICULAR CASES – DECISION AFFECTING PLEADINGS – where the original trustees were trustees of a superannuation trust fund and held real property in that capacity on which a building was constructed – where, following damage to the building by a storm, the insurer appointed a loss adjuster to assess damage and determine what needed to be done, with a builder carrying out rectification works – where a new trustee was appointed and legal title to the property vested in it, and a subsequent storm occurred causing further damage, and the new trustee claimed the total costs of the repair of damage and ancillary works alleging that it was caused by the builder failing to carry out properly the original rectification works – where the new trustee commenced a proceeding against the builder and the loss adjuster seeking to recover for loss and damage suffered for breach of a duty of care allegedly owed in tort – where the primary judge dismissed an interlocutory application by the loss adjuster to strike out paragraphs of the new trustee’s statement of claim – whether the primary judge erred in the construction of s 12(6) of the Trusts Act, in holding the new trustee was entitled to sue in respect of the alleged conduct of the loss adjustor prior to appointment as trustee – whether the primary judge erred in the failing to strike out all or part of the pleadings – where the plaintiff advanced an inadequate pleading of the causal link between allegedly wrongful conduct and the loss allegedly suffered

Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), s 12(6)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 149, r 154

Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd (2021) 9 QR 141; [2021] QCA 198, cited
Agar v Hyde (2000)…

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Details
Case
[2024] QCA 218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Sedgwick Australia Pty Ltd v Jloc Super Pty Ltd, the Court of Appeal reviewed a decision made by the primary judge in a dispute concerning the liability of a loss adjuster and a builder in relation to damage to a building. The dispute involved the original trustees of a superannuation trust fund who held property on which the building was constructed. Following a storm, the insurer appointed a loss adjuster to assess the damage and a builder to carry out the necessary rectification works. After a new trustee was appointed, another storm caused further damage, and the new trustee sought to recover the total costs of the repair and ancillary works, alleging the builder's negligence in the initial rectification works. The new trustee commenced proceedings against the builder and the loss adjuster for breach of a duty of care owed in tort. The loss adjuster sought to strike out certain paragraphs of the new trustee's statement of claim, which the primary judge declined to do. The loss adjuster appealed the primary judge's decision, arguing that the new trustee was not entitled to sue regarding conduct prior to its appointment and that the primary judge had incorrectly interpreted the Trusts Act. The Court of Appeal needed to determine whether the primary judge had erred in not striking out the alleged duty of care in tort and whether the primary judge had erred in failing to strike out parts of the pleadings.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had not erred in declining to strike out the alleged duty of care in tort. The Court noted that the primary judge's view that the case was not sufficiently clear to warrant striking out or summarily dismissing the claim was consistent with established legal principles. The factual uncertainties surrounding the relationships and knowledge of the various parties, including the original trustees, the insurer, the loss adjuster, and the builder, justified the primary judge's decision. The Court further held that the loss adjuster had not demonstrated that the order would result in a substantial injustice. Regarding the adequacy of the plea of the loss adjuster's appointment, the Court found that the primary judge had not erred in rejecting the complaints concerning the adequacy of the plea. The Court noted that the new trustee's appointment was valid under the Trusts Act, and the new trustee had the same powers, authorities, and discretions as if it had been originally appointed as the trustee. The Court concluded that the primary judge's decision did not result in any substantial injustice to the loss adjuster.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside certain orders made by the primary judge, and struck out specific paragraphs of the new trustee's statement of claim with leave to replead. The Court directed the parties to file written submissions on the costs orders within seven days, limited to four pages.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside paragraph 1 of the orders made by the primary judge on 29 November 2023 and on 15 December 2023.

3. Strike out paragraphs [5A], [22AB] and [22B] of the respondent’s fourth amended statement of claim, with leave to replead.

4. The parties are directed to file written submissions on the costs orders to be made in respect of the appeal and of the application before the primary judge within 7 days, such submissions not to exceed 4 pages in length.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I turn to consider the grounds of appeal which address the various pleading issues.The challenge to the primary judge’s decision not to strike out the alleged duty of care in tort. Appeal ground 3 was in these terms:“The primary judge erred in finding at [24] of the reasons that the principles in Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 and Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 applied with the result “that this is not a clear case where the court could exercise its discretion to strike out” where his Honour ought to have held that the principles in those two cases could not apply in this case.” It is true that the primary judge expressed the view that the present was not a sufficiently clear case to justify striking out the alleged duty of care in tort. However, as I mentioned at [15] above, authority recognises that it may well be appropriate for a Court to form that view, and to exercise its discretion accordingly. In the present case, there is very evident factual uncertainty surrounding the pleaded matrix of relationships between the original trustees; the insurer, the loss adjuster and the builder and in relation to the various aspects of knowledge which have been pleaded. There is no reason to conclude that the primary judge erred in principle in reaching the view that the case was not sufficiently clear to warrant exercising the power to strike out or to summarily dismiss. Nor does the loss adjuster demonstrate that the order will work a substantial injustice to it. There is no basis on which this Court should intervene in relation to this appeal ground. That view is further justified by the conclusions expressed below that some aspects of the pleading should be struck out with leave to replead.The challenge to the primary judge’s rejection of complaints concerning the adequacy of the plea of the loss adjuster’s appointment. The pleading asserted the appointment of the loss adjuster in this way:“5A.[The loss adjuster] was appointed by [the insurer] to:(a)assess the damage caused to the Property by [the storm];(b)… ;(c)determine the nature and scope of the repair works to the Building … in consultation with [the builder] and maintain site inspections and monitoring of repair works performed by [the builder] to ensure they were carried out in accordance with those instructions setting out the scope of work;(d)conduct further meetings with [the builder] in relation to repairs costs estimates, and review actual quotations and expenses incurred concerning asbestos material removal;(e)provide progressive reports and advice to [the insurer] on developments.Particulars(i) The best particulars that [the new trustee] can presently provide are:(A)[The loss adjuster] was appointed on about 28 November 2014;(B)the terms of the appointment are evidenced by the content of a report entitled "BRISBANE HAIL STORM - REPORT 1" (the First Report) prepared by [the loss adjuster] for [the insurer], including, in particular, section 10.(C)[The loss adjuster’s] involvement in determining the scope of repair works is also evidenced by section 2.1.3 of the report entitled "BRISBANE HAIL STORM - REPORT 4" (the Fourth Report) prepared by [the loss adjuster] for [the insurer].(ii) [The new trustee] will provide further particulars after disclosure and inspection.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The relevant grounds of appeal were as follows:“1.The primary judge:(a)erred in holding that the effect of section 12(6) Trusts Act 1973 is that the [new trustee] is entitled to sue in respect of alleged conduct of the [loss adjuster] occurring prior to 17 April 2015 (at reasons [18], [19] and [21]); and(b)ought to have found that the concepts of “powers, authorities and discretions” in section 12(6) Trusts Act 1973 do not give standing to a trustee to sue in respect of causes of action for breach of duty which were incomplete upon the trustee’s appointment and which have not been assigned to the trustee.2.The primary Judge:(a)erred in holding that at common law, the [new trustee] had standing to enforce a pre-existing right of action for a tort committed in respect of the trust property (reasons at [22] and [23]); and(b)should have held, as was identified in Young v Murphy [1996] 1 VR 279 per Brooking J at 291, that “The appointment of new trustees and the transfer of the trust property to them are two distinct matters: Noble v Meymott (1851) 14 Beav 471; 51 ER 367 at Beav 478” and that a vesting order or an assignment of choses in action arising out of alleged conduct of the [loss adjuster] occurring prior to 17 April 2015 or alternatively prior to 29 June 2015 was necessary for the [new trustee] to sue in respect of causes of action arising out of such alleged conduct; neither of which could have occurred because there was no complete causes of action at these times.”Consideration Section 12 of the Trusts Act relevantly provides:“12 Power of appointing new trustees(1)Where a trustee, … -…(c)seeks to be discharged from all or any of the trusts or powers reposed in or conferred on the trustee; or…then the person nominated for the purpose of appointing new trustees by the instrument (if any) creating the trust, … may by writing appoint a person or …to be a trustee or trustees in the place of the trustee first in this subsection mentioned.…(6)Every new trustee appointed under this section has the same powers, authorities, and discretions and may in every respect act, as if the new trustee had originally been appointed a trustee by the instrument (if any) creating the trust, both before and after all the trust property becomes by law or by assurance or otherwise vested in the trustee.…(8)The provisions of this section relating to a person nominated for the purpose of appointing new trustees apply whether the appointment is made in a case specified in this section or in a case specified in the instrument (if any) creating the trust, but where a new trustee is appointed under this section in a case specified in that instrument, the appointment shall be subject to the terms applicable to an appointment in that case under the provisions of that instrument.” The critical paragraphs in the 4ASOC were the facts and conclusions of law pleaded at [1BA], [1C] and [1CA]:“1BA (a)By clause 14.3 of the Corbett Superannuation Deed, the [original trustees] had the power to appoint a new trustee of the Fund.(b)The [original trustees] sought to be discharged as trustees and retired as trustees of the Fund.(c)The [original trustees] appointed [the new trustee] as trustee of the Fund pursuant to the said power.(d)In the premises, the appointment of [the new trustee] as trustee was an appointment within the meaning of s 12(1) of the Trusts Act 1973 and was, within the meaning of s 12(6) of the Trusts Act 1973, an appointment under s 12.1CBy operation of s 12(6) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), upon appointment of [the new trustee] as trustee of the Fund in place of the [original trustees], [the new trustee] had the same powers, authorities, and discretions and could in every respect act as if [the new trustee] had originally been appointed as trustee of the Fund, both before and after all the trust property of the Fund became vested in [the new trustee].1CAIn the premises, for the purpose of this proceeding, [the new trustee] is deemed to have been at all material times the trustee of the Property.”