Staged Plus Pty Ltd v Yummi Fruit Ice-Creamery Pty Ltd

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: 

Staged Plus Pty Ltd & others v Yummi Fruit Ice-Creamery Pty Ltd & others [2024] QDC 88

PARTIES: 

STAGED PLUS PTY LTD ABN 85 634 996 062

(First Plaintiff)

AND

COREY ROSS FRASER

(Second Plaintiff)

AND

TANYA MARGARET WIEDEN

(Third Plaintiff)

v

YUMMI FRUIT ICE-CREAMERY PTY LTD ABN 72 624 325 846

(First Defendant)

AND

JULIE AMANKA KOPP

(Second Defendant)

FILE NO:

3325/23

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT: 

District Court

DELIVERED ON:

10 June 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE: 

5 March 2024

JUDGE:

Porter KC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The parties are to file and serve written submissions as to the proper form of order and as to costs by 24 June 2024.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – Civil proceedings in state and territory courts – Pleadings – Striking out – Generally – where the defendants applies to strike out the claim and statement of claim for an action in the tort of defamation – where the defendants contend all claims advanced by the plaintiffs must be dismissed for want of a valid concerns notice in respect of the matter concerned – where the defendants make complaint as to the adequacy of the pleading

DEFAMATION – Actions for defamation – Pleading – Queensland – Validity of concerns notice - where the tenth to thirteenth publications, occurring after the issue of the concerns notice, comprise the same or substantially the same matter as those referred to in the concerns notice – where the proceedings are not prohibited by reason of non-compliance with the condition in s. 12B(1)(a) because, on the proper construction of s. 12A a concerns notice is valid if it informs the publisher of harm, and is not required expressly to identify the characteristics of serious harm nor that the publication was causative of that harm – where the concerns notice complies with s. 12B(1)(a) because it identifies imputations of a quite serious nature which are apt to impact on business or reputation of the natural person plaintiffs – where the corporate first plaintiff is prohibited from commencing proceedings for failure to meet the further requirement of s. 12A(1)(a)(v) – where the concerns notice otherwise complies with (ii) to meet the threshold of validity – whether the proceedings are prohibited by reason of the plaintiffs’ failure to issue a valid concerns notice pursuant to s. 12A(1)(a) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) in respect of the matter concerned

PROCEDURE – Civil proceedings in state and territory courts – Pleadings – Striking out – Generally – where the statement of claim fails to plead the element of serious harm – where the statement of claim fails sufficiently to plead the element of publication  – where the statement of claim fails to sufficiently plead material facts to sustain the allegation that the first plaintiff is an excluded corporation – where the statement of claim fails sufficiently to plead material facts to sustain the allegation that each publication was made with malice – where certain imputations linked to…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Staged Plus Pty Ltd v Yummi Fruit Ice-Creamery Pty Ltd, the defendants sought to have the plaintiffs' defamation claim struck out. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to provide a valid concerns notice, as required by s. 12A(1)(a) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), and that the statement of claim was insufficient in various respects. The court had to determine whether the plaintiffs' concerns notice was valid and whether the statement of claim adequately pleaded the necessary elements of the defamation claim.

The court examined the requirements of a valid concerns notice under s. 12A(1)(a) and s. 12B(1)(a) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld). The court found that the concerns notice was valid as it identified imputations of a quite serious nature which were apt to impact on the plaintiffs' business or reputation. The court also held that the concerns notice did not need to expressly identify the characteristics of serious harm or that the publication was causative of that harm. However, the court found that the corporate plaintiff, Staged Plus, was prohibited from commencing proceedings because the concerns notice did not articulate the financial loss required by s. 12A(1)(a)(v). The court also considered the adequacy of the pleading in the statement of claim, including the elements of serious harm, publication, and malice, as well as the requirement to plead material facts to sustain the allegations.

The court concluded that the concerns notice was valid, but that the corporate plaintiff was barred from proceeding due to the failure to articulate financial loss. The court further found that the statement of claim was deficient in several respects, including the failure to adequately plead the element of serious harm, publication, and malice. Consequently, the court ordered the parties to file written submissions on the proper form of order and on costs by a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to file and serve written submissions as to the proper form of order and as to costs by 24 June 2024.

Background

Background to the litigation

The defendants contend that the statement of claim fails properly to plead the element of publication. Publication by posting on the internet has been treated as raising issues which differentiate it from publication in broadcast media, or newspapers and periodicals with wide circulation. In the latter, publication in broadcast or sale is the subject of a rebuttable presumption. The authorities were recently summarised by Gleeson JA (with whom MacFarlane JA and Brereton JA agreed) in Stoltenberg v Bolton [2020] NSWCA 45, as follows:[13][13] Defendant’s Submissions.55It is not in dispute that his Honour correctly acknowledged the bilateral nature of publication for the purposes of a defamation claim, referring to Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; [2002] HCA 56, where the plurality (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) said at [26]-[27] and [44]”[26] Harm to reputation is done when a defamatory publication is comprehended by the reader, the listener, or the observer. Until then, no harm is done by it. This being so it would be wrong to treat publication as if it were a unilateral act on the part of the publisher alone. It is not. It is a bilateral act – in which the publisher makes it available and a third party has it available for his or her comprehension.[27] The bilateral nature of publication underpins the long-established common law rule that every communication of defamatory matter founds a separate cause of action.…[44] In the case of material on the World Wide Web, it is not available in comprehensible form until downloaded on to the computer of a person who has used a web browser to pull the material from the web server. … (Citations omitted)56His Honour also correctly accepted that the mere fact of posting material online does not lead to an inference that it has been downloaded, referring to Sims v Jooste (No 2) [2016] WASCA 83 at [18]-[20]. It is useful to reproduce in full the remarks of Martin CJ at [17]-[20] (Buss JA and Mitchell J agreeing) in relation to proof of publication in cases involving the internet:[17] Because of the vast number of internet sites, and the vast number of web pages accessible through those internet sites, in the absence of evidence it cannot be inferred that one or more persons has undertaken the steps required to identify and access any particular web page available through the internet merely from the fact that material has been posted on an internet site. There is a real prospect that many of the billions of web pages accessible via the internet have never been seen by anyone other than the person who posted the page on an internet site. This has been recognised in the cases to which I will now refer.[18] In England, it has been consistently held that a plaintiff claiming to have been defamed in material posted on the internet cannot rely upon an inference of publication analogous to that customarily drawn in cases involving publication via the mass media of print or broadcast in order to establish that there has been substantial publication within the jurisdiction. Rather, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the material of which complaint is made has been accessed and downloaded. The English cases recognise however that publication, in the legal sense, may be established by pleading and proving a platform of facts from which an inference of download can properly be drawn. However, such an inference will not be drawn from the mere fact that the material complained of has been posted on an internet site.[19] With one apparently anomalous exception, the same approach has consistently been taken in Australia. So, in Toben v Jones [2012] FCA 1193 and MacDonald v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2014] NSWSC 206 it was held that a plaintiff claiming to have been defamed by material posted on the internet must plead and prove facts which established that the material of which complaint was made had been downloaded and viewed by somebody, without necessarily having to provide particulars of the identity of the person or persons who downloaded the material. The cases also establish that an inference to the effect that the material of which complaint is made has been downloaded by somebody might be drawn from a combination of facts, such as the number of ‘hits’ on the site on which the allegedly defamatory material was posted and the period of time over which the material was posted on the internet. For example, in Scali v Scali [2015] SADC 172 screenshots of the defendant’s YouTube posts, which appeared to demonstrate the number of times the allegedly defamatory videos had been viewed as at the date of the screenshot, were relied upon as evidence of the fact that the videos of which complaint was made had been downloaded and comprehended by third parties.[20] Cavasinni v Camenzuli [2009] NSWDC 159 provides the one Australian exception to this line of authority. In that case, in deciding an application to strike out the statement of claim, Gibson DCJ distinguished the principle enunciated by the High Court in Dow Jones on the basis that that case concerned publication on an internet site only available to subscribers. In her view, in a case in which the relevant internet site was available to all, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to plead the jurisdictions in which publication was asserted, without pleading or proving specific facts from which an inference could be drawn to the effect that the material of which complaint was made had been downloaded. With respect to her Honour, I do not read the observations of the plurality in Dow Jones as being limited to cases in which complaint was made of material published on a site only available to subscribers. Nor is such a distinction consistent with the principles consistently enunciated in the English cases, or the other cases in Australia to which I have referred. For that reason, with respect, I would not follow the view expressed in Cavasinni. (Emphasis added.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This application concerns provisions introduced into the Act recently to give effect to the reforms to the law of defamation, recommended by the Model Defamation Law Working Party. It is common ground that the Act, as amended, applies to these proceedings. The Act relevantly provides: (a)By s. 9:9Certain corporations do not have cause of action for defamation(1)A corporation has no cause of action for defamation in relation to the publication of defamatory matter about the corporation unless it was an excluded corporation at the time of the publication.(2)A corporation is an excluded corporation if—(a)the objects for which it is formed do not include obtaining financial gain for its members or corporators; or(b)it has fewer than 10 employees and is not an associated entity of another corporation;and the corporation is not a public body. The Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and the cognate Victorian statute contain identical provisions. Mr Nott, who appeared for the plaintiffs, made some concessions. He conceded that the claims based on the fourth to seventh alleged publications (pleaded in paragraphs 35, 43, 51 and 59 of the statement of claim) should be struck out on the basis that they involved a direct message between the writer and the plaintiffs, rather than a communication which was published on any social media site or website in a manner which permitted others to read the matter. The result is that paragraphs 35 to 66 are to be struck out by consent. No further specific consideration will be given to the issues raised by the defendant insofar as they relate to the fourth to seventh publications. The defendants contend that all the claims advanced by the plaintiffs must be dismissed, because they have not given a valid concerns notice in respect of the matter concerned in any of those causes of action advanced by any of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the precondition to the commencement of defamation proceedings in s. 12B(1)(a) has not been met, and the claims should be struck out. The defendants articulate the following several points to make good that submission. First, they contend that the claims made in reliance on the defamatory matter pleaded in the tenth to 13th publications are not referred to, expressly or impliedly, in the concerns notice, and all claims based on the matter pleaded there must be dismissed. Second, they contend that the concerns notice fails to comply with s. 12A(1)(a)(iv), because it does not particularise the serious harm called for by that subsection for any claim advanced. On this basis all claims should be dismissed. Third, they contend that, for the claims at the suit of Staged Plus, the concerns notice fails to comply with s. 12A(1)(a)(v), in that the notice does not articulate the financial loss called for by that subsection. Fourth, they contend that, for all claims, the concerns notice does not provide sufficient detail of where the matter complained of may be accessed. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs are barred from commencing proceedings in relation to the alleged defamatory matter pleaded in the tenth to 13th publications by s. 12B(1)(a), because the text of those publications was not included in the concerns notice.