FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
viagogo AG v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2022] FCAFC 87
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- Case
- [2022] FCAFC 87
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal issues concerning whether the primary judge had erred in finding that three of four representations were misleading, and whether the pecuniary penalty imposed was manifestly excessive. The court held that the primary judge had not erred in finding that the representations were misleading, as the representations did not fully disclose the total cost to consumers. The court also held that the penalty was not manifestly excessive, as the primary judge had appropriately considered all relevant factors in exercising the discretion to impose the penalty. The court dismissed the appeal on both liability and penalty grounds.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The court found that the primary judge had correctly identified the misleading representations and had appropriately exercised the discretion in imposing the pecuniary penalty. The primary judge's findings were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed in its entirety. The orders included the dismissal of the appeal with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge rejected viagogo’s submission that s 48 does not apply because the price of the 18 May 2017 tickets were not fixed by viagogo but by third party vendors and that in circumstances where the representation as to “price” was made by two different parties, namely the third party ticket vendor and viagogo, the section is not engaged: LJ [190]. viagogo did not cite authority to support its contention. The primary judge held that s 48 of the ACL concerns the making of a representation with respect to an amount. The proscription does not confine the scope of operation of s 48 to a party making the representation who also “fixes” the price. viagogo does not challenge this aspect of the LJ on appeal.CONSIDERATION – GROUNDS 1 TO 3 (LIABILITY)The nature of this appeal The observations made by the Full Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Employsure Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 142; 392 ALR 205 in respect of the appropriate approach to appellate review in a case involving evaluative decision-making by the primary judge are apposite:[117]Appeals to this Court from the decision of a single judge of the Court are by way of a rehearing, which involves correction of error. How the primary judge’s reasoning may be shown to be wrong depends on what the reasoning is about, and error is not demonstrated merely because the appellate court disagrees with the primary judge: Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] (Allsop J (as his Honour then was) with Drummond and Mansfield JJ agreeing). [118]As Perram J (with whom Allsop CJ and Markovic J agreed) pellucidly explained in Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; (2018) 261 FCR 301 at [45]-[54], at one extreme lies a trial judge’s conclusions as to the law, where the appellate court will show no deference at all to such conclusions. If the appeal court considers the trial judge has made an error of law it must substitute its view. At the other extreme lies a trial judge’s findings of fact where the reliability or credit of a witness is involved. In such cases it is accepted that the trial judge enjoys very considerable advantages over an appellate court and the court on appeal will not depart from such findings unless they are shown to be wrong by reference to “incontrovertible fact or uncontested testimony” or otherwise are “contrary to compelling inferences”: Moroccanoil at [46] citing Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [28]-[29]. [119]Between those extremes lies a “grey area” in which the amount of deference shown to a trial judge’s conclusions is a function of the nature of the issues before the trial judge and the relative advantage enjoyed by the trial judge over the appellate court: Moroccanoil at [47]. One type of finding that falls within this grey area is the drawing of inferences by an appellate court from facts already found. Speaking of that question, in Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 551, Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Murphy JJ explained: …[I]n general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge. In deciding what is the proper inference to be drawn, the appellate court will give respect and weight to the conclusion of the trial judge, but, once having reached its own conclusion, will not shrink from giving effect to it.[120]Other types of findings within this grey area, include conclusions as to whether certain packaging conveyed the alleged representation, whether a word or phrase is capable of distinguishing one trader’s goods from another, and whether the facts show conduct within or outside standards such as unconscionability or oppressive conduct. Such questions and the application of such standards involve an element of evaluation. In such cases the appeal court must be guided not by whether it disagrees with the finding but whether it detects error in it. Error may appear syllogistically where it is apparent that the conclusion reached involves some false step, for example overlooking some relevant matter. Error may, on the other hand, also appear without any explicitly erroneous reasoning as the result may be such as simply to bespeak error. In such cases as Allsop J (as his Honour then was) said in Branir at [29] an error may be manifest where the appellate court has a “sufficiently clear difference of opinion”: Moroccanoil at [49]. [121]Even so, as Allsop CJ (with whom Markovic J agreed) said in Moroccanoil at [7], the Full Court in Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 130; (2011) 197 FCR 67 at [33] (Cowdroy, Middleton and Jagot JJ) correctly eschewed the use of “sound bites” such as “plainly or [sic: and] obviously wrong” (taken from Eagle Homes Pty Ltd v Austec Homes Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 138; (1999) 87 FCR 415) or “sufficiently clear difference of opinion” (taken from Branir). The Full Court in Optical 88 explained that the task of this appellate Court is complex; it cannot be captured by such sound bites and approved the principles explained in Branir at [28]-[29].