Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold (No 2) [2015] FCA 34

Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold (No 2) [2015] FCA 34
Parties: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v STEPHEN PAUL ARNOLD, LEAF CAPITAL PTY LTD ACN 136 955 265 and DONORS WITHOUT BORDERS ACN 139 263 871
File number: NSD 1351 of 2012
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 4 February 2015
Catchwords: TAXATION – Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – Div 290 – civil penalty regime – whether entity engaged in conduct that resulted in it or another entity being a promoter of a tax exploitation scheme – whether an entity that entered into or carried out the scheme did so with the sole or dominant purpose of that entity or another entity getting a scheme benefit from the scheme ­– whether it is reasonably arguable that the scheme benefit is available at law – factors relevant to imposition of penalty
Legislation:

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 3AA, Sch 1, ss 255-1, 284-15, Div 290
Taxation Law Amendment (Self Assessment) Act 1992 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 78A, 177F, 263, 264, 318
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 30-15, 995-1, 960-100
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 52D
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (NSW) ss 4, 10(3), 11(1)
Poisons Standard 2009 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No. 1) Bill 2006 (Cth)  

Cases cited:

ACE Insurance Limited v Trifunovski (No 2) [2012] FCA 793 considered
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] FCA 1212 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Fila Sport Oceania Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2004] FCA 376 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v GIA Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] FCA 1298 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42-091 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 2) & Ors (2005) 215 ALR 281 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Qantas Airways Limited [2008] FCA 1976 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v SIP Australia Pty Limited [2003] FCA 336 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v The Vales Wine Co Pty Ltd [1996] ATPR 41-528 cited
Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Loiterton & Ors (2004) 50 ACSR 693 cited
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Soust(No 2) [2010] FCA 388 considered
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Visy Packaging Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 930 cited
BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2001] FCA 336 cited
Clean Energy Regulator v MT Solar Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 205 cited
Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404 cited
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 894

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold (No 2), the Court was tasked with determining whether Arnold, along with two other respondents, had contravened the civil penalty regime under the Taxation Administration Act 1953. The central issue was whether the respondents engaged in conduct that led to a tax exploitation scheme, specifically if they had the dominant purpose of obtaining a scheme benefit, which was a tax deduction, from the scheme. The court was also required to consider whether the scheme benefit was reasonably arguable to be available at law.

The court held that the DWB Scheme constituted a tax exploitation scheme. It concluded that the DWB Scheme was indeed a scheme as defined by the Act, and that each respondent had entered into or carried out the scheme with the dominant purpose of obtaining a scheme benefit, namely, a reduction in tax liability for each participant. The court found that the scheme benefit was not reasonably arguable to be available at law, as the pharmaceuticals donated were undervalued and the scheme was structured in a way that primarily served to facilitate tax deductions at an inflated value. This conclusion led the court to impose civil penalties on the respondents.

The court's reasoning was based on a detailed analysis of the scheme's structure, the nature of the transactions involved, and the explicit focus on tax deductions in the terms negotiated with the charities. The court determined that the respondents' actions were driven by the intent to obtain tax benefits, which was evident from the marketing materials and the terms of the agreements. The penalties imposed were commensurate with the respondents' roles in the scheme, reflecting the severity of their involvement.

Orders

Orders of the court

Pursuant to s 290-50(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA:

1. The first respondent pay a penalty to the Commonwealth in the sum of $1,000,000.

2. The second respondent pay a penalty to the Commonwealth in the sum of $400,000.

3. The third respondent pay a penalty to the Commonwealth in the sum of $100,000.

4. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In other words, there is a contravention of s 290-50(1) even where the entity did not know that his, her or its conduct would have that result. This is confirmed by the specific exception in s 290-55(7), which provides that, in those circumstances, the Court “must not order [the] entity to pay a civil penalty” in relation to that conduct. The premise for those exceptions is that there was a contravention in relation to which the entity might have otherwise been ordered to pay a penalty. It follows that the subjective knowledge of Mr Arnold and the other respondents is relevant only to penalty.THE FACTSThe Pleadings The primary facts as pleaded are, to a large extent, not disputed although the amended defence puts in issue a number of the Commissioner’s pleadings in his amended statement of claim in relation to the application of the provisions of Subdiv 290-B of Sch 1 to the TAA to those facts on a variety of grounds including, without limitation, that there was no relevant “scheme” or “tax exploitation scheme” for the purposes of ss 290-50 or 290-65; the lack of a nexus, connection or association, whether in a temporal or substantive sense, between various written instruments entered into by the parties to those instruments and participants gifting cash or property to charities that are conferred with Deductible Gift Recipient (“DGR”) status or the entitlement of participants to claim tax deductions; the Commissioner’s characterisation of documents; and the respondents’ lack of knowledge of, lack of meeting with, lack of transacting with or lack of otherwise interacting with participants. This is, by no means, an exhaustive statement of the grounds upon which the respondents put in issue the Commissioner’s pleadings in his amended statement of claim and it will be necessary to return to particular issues that are put in dispute to analyse and test the particular grounds raised by the respondents in respect of particular issues.Prelude to Mr Arnold’s activities in Australia Mr Arnold is a Canadian citizen. In the period 2005 to 2009 he engaged with Robert Steen, Terrence Bey and others in schemes for the sale of pharmaceuticals to Canadian taxpayers. The schemes were apparently intended to enable participating taxpayers to donate the pharmaceuticals to charities which provided international aid and then to claim a deduction of the value of the pharmaceuticals, for Canadian income tax purposes. These activities were the subject of investigation by the Canadian Revenue Authority in 2009, resulting in a decision of that agency issued 30 March 2010. The decision was to revoke the registration of an entity which had been involved in the schemes. The decision was based in part upon the Canada Revenue Agency’s (“CRA’s”) view of the market value of the pharmaceuticals which had been purchased and donated as part of the activities. On the CRA’s findings, the subject goods had been manufactured, sold and distributed outside Canada. They had been acquired in bulk and were never intended to be used for personal consumption in Canada. However, the taxpayers had been issued with receipts purporting to show the fair market value of the goods in amounts based upon the Canadian retail market. The CRA rejected the amounts shown on the receipts as not reflecting the fair market value of the goods, having regard to their origin and the circumstances of their sale and distribution outside Canada.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

These amounts represent the consideration that each of the respondents, respectively received for their part in marketing the DWB Scheme and in encouraging participation in it.TAX EXPLOITATION SCHEME: CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSIS For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that:(1)The DWB Scheme is a “scheme” for the purposes of s 290-65(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA;(2)at the time of the conduct mentioned in s 290-50(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA, it is reasonable to conclude that each respondent (and each participant) entered into or carried out the DWB Scheme for the dominant purpose of getting a “scheme benefit” for each participant from the scheme;(3)at the same time, it is not reasonably arguable that the scheme benefit is available at law; and(4)by reason of (1), (2) and (3), the DWB Scheme is a “tax exploitation scheme” for the purposes of s 290-65(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA.The DWB Scheme is a “scheme” By reason of the operation of s 3AA(2) of the TAA and s 995-1 of the 1997 Act, the term “scheme” means “any *arrangement; or … any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct, whether unilateral or otherwise”. The term “arrangement” is further defined to mean “any arrangement, agreement, understanding, promise or undertaking, whether express or implied, and whether or not enforceable (or intended to be enforceable) by legal proceedings”. The DWB Scheme clearly qualifies as a “scheme” so defined by these provisions.Dominant purpose of getting the “scheme benefit” The scheme benefit sought to be obtained by each participant from the DWB Scheme was a lesser “tax-related liability” for the relevant accounting period, namely, income tax. The income tax liability of the participant would be “less than it would be apart from the scheme” (s 284-150(1)(a) in Sch 1 to the TAA), if the Commissioner allowed an income tax deduction claimed by each participant under s 30-15 of the 1997 Act for the full purchase price of the Donation Units said to have been purchased by the participant from MedAid under the Purchase Agreement and gifted to the relevant Charity. The issue which arises under this head is whether it is reasonable to conclude that each respondent entered into or carried out the DWB Scheme for the dominant purpose of getting this scheme benefit for each participant from the scheme. In my view, it is not only reasonable to so conclude, but it would not be reasonable to come to any other conclusion. A number of aspects of the DWB Scheme lead me to this view:(1)The fact that the subject matter of the alleged gifts were pharmaceuticals and not money. In saying this, I acknowledge that each participant did donate a modest sum of money ($200) to his designated Charity, but this was insignificant relative to the purchase price of the pharmaceuticals.(2)The fact that the purchase price of the pharmaceuticals was many multiples of the market value of the pharmaceuticals in the country or countries where the Charity operated and where the pharmaceuticals were to be administered and consumed.(3)The fact that only 7.5% of the purchase price of the pharmaceuticals had to be paid by the participant at the time of entering into the Purchase Agreement with MedAid, with the balance of the purchase price being “payable in full no later than fifty years from the date of this agreement”. In reality, due to the effluxion of time, the balance would never be paid to MedAid.(4)The fact that the balance of the purchase price only carried interest of 0.108% per annum, albeit payable in advance.(5)The memorandum of understanding with each Charity included repetitive, explicit obligations concerning issuing documents to ensure that participants could claim their deductions. Deductibility appears to have been uppermost in the mind of Mr Arnold in settling the terms of these memoranda with each Charity.(6)Mr Arnold’s approach to Mr Fratzia of the AVO in November 2009, to seek assurance about obtaining a valuation of the pharmaceuticals on the basis of figures from IMS Health regarding Australian prices, indicates his preoccupation with and priority of facilitating the participants’ deduction claims at a rate per Donation Unit equal to the high Australian prices for the pharmaceuticals.(7)The terms of Mr Arnold’s marketing of the scheme to potential participants highlighted the purported tax benefits: see, for example, the marketing referred to at [79] and [81] above.