Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN Television Qld Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 31 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Tripple A Pty Limited v WIN Television Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246

PARTIES:

TRIPPLE A PTY LIMITED
ACN 609 514 418
(appellant)
v
WIN TELEVISION QLD PTY LTD
ACN 009 697 198
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4895 of 2018
DC No 632 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2018] QDC 58

DELIVERED ON:

28 September 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 August 2018

JUDGES:

Morrison and Philippides JJA and Bowskill J

ORDERS:

The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

LANDLORD AND TENANT – RENEWALS AND OPTIONS – EXERCISE OF OPTION – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE – where the parties to a commercial lease entered into an agreement for a further lease, in purported exercise of an option to renew, after the expiry of the time limit specified for exercise of the option – whether the lessor could be said to have waived compliance with the time limit, such that the further agreement was the result of the exercise of the option  – or whether the option lapsed upon expiry of the time limit, and the further agreement was the result of a negotiation in accordance with ordinary contractual principles of offer and acceptance

LANDLORD AND TENANT – RENT – PROVISIONS AS TO RENT IN AGREEMENT FOR LEASE OR LEASE – DETERMINATION OF RENTAL – dispute as to the proper construction of the agreement between the parties for a lease for a further term, in particular as to the rent payable and whether a market rent review process applied – whether subsequent conduct of the lessor could be relied upon

Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; [2008] HCA 57, cited
BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-A-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589; [1990] VicRp 52, considered
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337; [1982] HCA 24, considered
Duncan Properties Pty Ltd v Hunter [1991] 1 Qd R 101, considered
Elsafty Enterprises Pty Ltd v Mermaids Café & Bar Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 394, considered
Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd (1957) 59 SR (NSW) 122, considered
Glenlaton Investments Pty Ltd v Weemah Park Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 445, cited
Grepo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd[2015] QCA 131, considered
JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v Matos[2016] QCA 355, cited
Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150, considered
JV Pub Group Pty Ltd v Red Carpet Real Estate Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 232, considered
Phillips Fox (a firm) v Westgold Resources NL [2000] WASCA 85, considered
Re Copperart Pty Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 351, cited
Rushton (SA) Pty Ltd v Holzberger [2003] ANZ ConvR 316; [2003] QCA 106, considered
Traywinds Pty Ltd v Cooper [1989] 1 Qd R 222, considered

COUNSEL:

A W Duffy QC, with P D Hay,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN Television Qld Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] QCA 246
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN Television Qld Pty Ltd, the dispute centred around the terms of a commercial lease renewal agreement. Specifically, the issue was whether the option to renew the lease was validly exercised after the specified time limit had expired. Additionally, the parties contested the proper construction of the agreement, particularly the rent payable and whether a market rent review process applied. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining the validity of the option's exercise and the interpretation of the lease's terms.

The primary legal issues revolved around whether the lessor waived the time limit for exercising the option to renew, thus rendering the subsequent agreement as a result of the option's exercise, or whether the option lapsed, making the agreement a product of standard contractual negotiations. Furthermore, the court had to determine the correct interpretation of the rent provisions in the renewal agreement and whether the lessor's subsequent conduct could inform the interpretation of these provisions.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appellant had seemingly waived the time limit for exercising the option, it had still confirmed the exercise of the option in its letter dated 28 August 2017. The court held that there was no express agreement on the rent payable in the new term, and the documents seemed to anticipate exercising an option. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a valid agreement for a further lease, with clause 8 (market rent reviews) applicable from the commencement of the new term on 1 November 2017. The court also dismissed the appellant's contention that it had not given a valid notice setting out reviewed rent, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court's reasoning hinged on the characterisation of the option, which it found to be immaterial in this case. Despite divergent views on whether an option is a conditional contract or an irrevocable offer, the court concluded that the characterisation did not affect the outcome. The court focused on the parties' conduct and the clear intention to renew the lease, despite the timing issues.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In that case, there was a dispute as to the terms of a variation to a deed of settlement, in terms of whether one side’s liability to pay an amount of money was expunged, or merely deferred. The evidence relied upon included post-contractual statements said to constitute admissions that the liability was merely deferred. Basten JA said this:“121… where [post-contractual statements] provides evidence of facts, the assertion of which is against the interests of one party, it may be admissible as an admission by that party. However, to the extent that the evidence reveals an opinion as to a question of law rather than fact, the admission may be irrelevant or valueless. (The relevant authorities were collected by Campbell JA in Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 234; 261 ALR 382 and in Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo [2011] NSWCA 303.) Alternatively, the evidence may establish contextual facts in existence at the time the contract was executed.122These principles apply to the determination of the meaning of a written document. However, in this case, as succinctly stated by Spigelman CJ in County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 at [7]:‘The issue is not one of interpretation, because there are no words to interpret. The issue is one of fact: what did the parties agree?’123The conclusion reached by the trial judge was based primarily on the post-settlement conduct of the parties, which, he held, demonstrated that, over a period of some six months, the appellants acted on the basis that they had a continuing obligation to pay $170,000.124To the extent that post-settlement conduct could be considered, the appellants sought to rely upon communications between themselves and their solicitor as evidence that they did not personally believe they had any obligation to pay Willis & Bowring’s fees, although their solicitor was of a contrary view. The trial judge did not rely upon this material and was correct not to do so. With respect to an alleged agreement not wholly reduced to writing, the post-agreement conduct of one party known to the other, and communications between the parties, which reveal a common assumption as to the existence and terms of an agreement may provide evidence of such an agreement. However, the subjective views or reservations of one party, undisclosed to the other, cannot provide a basis for inferring the terms of a pre-existing agreement.”[37][37]Underlining added. The issue in this case is not whether the parties entered into an agreement, but as to whether the terms of that agreement were as contended by the appellant or the respondent. That is a question of fact.[38][38]Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd at [84] and [122]. It is apparent from the appellant’s agent’s email of 17 October 2017 that the appellant considered that the market rent review process applied to the agreement for a new lease and, further, that it had been instigated by the appellant, in its letter of 28 August 2017, nominating the “current rent” as the reviewed rent for the purposes of clause 8.1.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent commenced the proceeding below, seeking a declaration that the appellant had not given a valid notice setting out reviewed rent for the purposes of clause 8.1 of the lease. Shortly before the hearing, the appellant filed its cross-application, seeking a declaration that a valid and binding agreement for a lease at the current rent had been entered into on 29 August 2017, and an order for specific performance of it. In its submissions before the District Court, on the hearing of the applications, the appellant argued, in the alternative to its primary contention, that its letter of 28 August 2017 did constitute an effective notice of reviewed rent (that is, the position articulated in its solicitor’s correspondence of 22 December 2017).The decision below The learned primary judge accepted the respondent’s argument that, by the appellant’s correspondence of 8 August 2017, the appellant had “apparently waived the time limit which required notice of the exercise of option under clause 42.1 to be at least three months before the expiry date”; but said that “[i]n any event, by letter dated 28 August 2017, [the appellant] confirmed the exercise of the option”.[17][17]Reasons at [17] and [18]. The learned primary judge rejected the appellant’s primary contention, saying that he was “not persuaded on the material before me as to an express agreement as to the rent payable in the new term” and that “[f]urther all of the documents seem to have been done in anticipation of exercising an option”.[18][18]Reasons at [22]. As already noted, his Honour was not satisfied the appellant had given a valid notice setting out reviewed rent.[19] Accordingly, his Honour granted the declaratory relief sought by the respondent before him; and dismissed the appellant’s cross-application.[19]Reasons at [15], [16], [21], [23]-26]. In practical terms, the consequence of this is that there has been found to be a valid agreement for a further lease between the parties, to which clause 8 (market rent reviews) applied and applies, from the commencement of the new term on 1 November 2017, which is still to be invoked, in the first instance by the appellant (lessor) giving the requisite notice of reviewed rent under clause 8.1.What is the proper characterisation of the agreement for lease between the parties? The characterisation of the agreement between the parties as a result of the correspondence exchanged in August 2017 depends, in one respect at least, upon the correct legal characterisation of the option. There have been divergent views expressed about this, going back at least as far as 1910 in Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674.[20] It is an “academic riddle”[21] that an ensuing over 100 years of judicial analysis has not seemingly resolved. In some cases, the characterisation matters;[22] in others it does not.[23] For reasons I will explain, this is a case in the latter category. For that reason, and because there was no substantive argument on this appeal about it,[24] the riddle will remain unresolved.[20]In which Griffith CJ (at 678-9) and O’Connor J (at 685) were of the view that an option is a conditional contract, not an irrevocable offer, but Isaacs J (at 691) considered the true characterisation of an option is as an irrevocable offer.[21]Lontav Pty Ltd v Pineross Custodial Services Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 485; (2011) V ConvR 54-805 at [114] per Dixon J.[22]Gibbs J gives some examples in Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 (the authority often cited in support of the conditional contract characterisation) at 72 and 75; another example is David Deane & Associates Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd (2005) Q ConvR 54-630.[23]For example, Grepo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131; (2015) Q ConvR 34-829 at [64].[24]Although the appellant contended the learned primary judge erred in concluding there had been a waiver by the appellant of the time limit for exercise of the option, that was not the focus of its primary argument on the appeal; and the respondent did not strongly argue against that, in any event, having regard to Duncan Properties Pty Ltd v Hunter [1991] 1 Qd R 101, and subsequent decisions following it (cases which were not referred to the learned primary judge): respondent’s written submissions at [8]-[10] and T 1-27.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.