JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: THE PILBARA INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LTD -v- BROCKMAN IRON PTY LTD [No 2] [2014] WASC 345
CORAM: EDELMAN J
HEARD: 18 - 20 AUGUST 2014
DELIVERED : 26 SEPTEMBER 2014
FILE NO/S: CIV 2512 of 2013
BETWEEN: THE PILBARA INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
BROCKMAN IRON PTY LTD
First DefendantECONOMIC REGULATION AUTHORITY
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Statutory interpretation - Implications into regulations - Meaning of s 8 of the Railways (Access) Code 2000 (WA) - Whether implication should be made that a proposal is 'genuine' - Whether proponent must have a real intention to use and promise to use railway infrastructure - Whether proposal must be made for a sole subjective purpose of carrying on rail operations - Whether proposal must be for a sole subjective purpose of carrying on rail operations - Whether proposal must be for immediate access - Degree of precision that is required in a proposal for indication of times for access - Whether there is a requirement that proponent have a genuine intention to negotiate or a genuine intention to make an agreement
Legislation:
Economic Regulation Authority Act 2003 (WA)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Railway and Port (The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd) Agreement Act 2004 (WA)
Railways (Access) Act 1998 (WA)
Railways (Access) Code 2000 (WA)
Result:
Action dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr B Dharmananda SC, Mr M J Feutrill & Mr C P K Russell
First Defendant : Mr B J A Coles QC & Mr K J Mony De Kerloy
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Allen & Overy
First Defendant : Herbert Smith Freehills
Second Defendant : State Solicitor for Western Australia
Cases referred to in judgment:
A & S Ruffy Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] HCA 18; (1958) 98 CLR 637
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 2
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 WLR 1988
Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50; [2013] 3 WLR 351
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
Carr v Western Australia [2007] HCA 47; (2007) 232 CLR 138
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378
Collector of Customs v Agfa‑Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36; (1996) 186 CLR 389
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 322; (1993) 43 FCR 280
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32
Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 36; (2013) 248 CLR 619
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135
De Gruchy v The Queen [2002] HCA 33; (2007) 211 CLR 85
Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler [1984] HCA 48; (1984) 154 CLR…
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- Case
- [2014] WASC 345
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the arguments presented by both parties, focusing on the importance of the case and the complexity of the legal issues involved. The case was deemed significant due to its commercial implications for the parties, and the novel legal question it presented. The court found that the defence presented by Brockman Iron, though brief, required considerable legal and factual understanding, necessitating the involvement of Senior Counsel. The court was satisfied that there was a fairly arguable case for allowing costs beyond the Scale limit, given the complexity of the issues and the importance of the case to the parties.
The court's reasoning highlighted the importance of understanding the complexities and commercial significance of the case, which justified the involvement of Senior Counsel. The court allowed for costs beyond the Scale limit, reflecting the importance of the case to the parties and the complexity of the legal issues involved. This decision underscores the need for careful consideration of the circumstances in which costs beyond the Scale limit may be appropriate.
In conclusion, the court allowed costs beyond the Scale limit, acknowledging the complexity and importance of the case to the parties. The decision emphasizes the need for a thorough understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in such significant commercial disputes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to each of these matters, the fairly arguable case that rates of a Counsel or Senior Counsel would be allowed at an amount greater than the amount allowable under the Scale is due to the importance of the case to the parties which, in turn, reflected the complex manner in which the case was run, particularly having regard to the usual run of cases. Although this issue is one which is essentially a value judgment to be made by the court and is not 'a question that I think is usually assisted by elaborate or detailed argument',[305] in the introduction to these reasons I have outlined some of the reasons for my impression concerning the fair arguability of a need for counsel of a level of seniority requiring rates beyond Scale rates.[305] O'Rourke v P & B Corporation [2008] WASC 36 [25] (Martin CJ). It is necessary, however, to emphasise one point. At various points in submissions and evidence, TPI argued that Brockman Iron's case had been presented with economy. For instance, counsel relied on affidavit evidence that during the 2.5 day hearing, Senior Counsel for Brockman Iron spoke for only 2.6 hours.[306] But, as counsel for TPI acknowledged orally on this application, an economy of oral presentation time, or an economy of written submissions, is not the same as an economy of effort. Indeed, the two can sometimes be inversely related. Nor does an economy of oral or written submissions suggest that counsel of less seniority might have been appropriate. Often it will take considerable time and consideration, and the experience and judgement of very experienced counsel, for a decision to be made not to oppose a particular point or not to make a particular submission. [306] Affidavit of Mr Van Brakel, sworn 3 December 2014 [7(c)]. The Scale makes provision in Item 3(b) for 10 hours preparation of a defence by a Senior Practitioner. The total ceiling cost is $4,510. The approximate cost initially said in affidavit evidence to have been incurred by Brockman Iron is almost ten times the Scale limit, $43,000.[307] Then, in subsequent affidavit evidence, a draft bill of costs was included which substantially increased this amount. That draft bill, prepared by counsel who appeared for Brockman Iron on this application, suggested that the cost of preparation of the defence was $56,295.20.[308] This was said to include the defence, amended defence, further amended defence, further re-amended defence, and second further re-amended defence.[307] Affidavit of Ms Di Russo, sworn 31 October 2014, CDR 5, page 17.[308] Affidavit of Ms Di Russo, sworn 18 December 2014, page 17. I am satisfied based upon my knowledge and impression of the case that there is a fairly arguable case that a taxing officer might properly allow costs for more than 10 hours of preparation of a defence. Although the defence was brief, consisting of around 17 paragraphs, the legal and factual issues raised by TPI needed to be understood and considered as part of the process of pleading the defence. Those legal and factual issues were not simple, the core issue was important and had never been previously decided, and the matter was of significant commercial significance to the parties. The defences were signed by Senior Counsel and Counsel for Brockman Iron. Senior Counsel for Brockman Iron spent 3.75 hours working on the defence and, as counsel for TPI properly conceded, an uplift of the rates for Senior Counsel would require an uplift of the limit on costs allowed for the Defence.