JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2005 (WA)
CITATION: HANSON CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS PTY LTD and CITY OF VINCENT [2017] WASAT 81
MEMBER: MS L EDDY (MEMBER)
HEARD: 17 MAY 2017
DELIVERED : 23 MAY 2017
PUBLISHED : 2 JUNE 2017
FILE NO/S: DR 59 of 2017
BETWEEN: HANSON CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
CITY OF VINCENT
Respondent
Catchwords:
Town planning Development application
Legislation:
City of Perth City Planning Scheme No 2
Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015 (WA), Sch 2, cl 60, cl 61, cl 62(1), cl 66, cl 67, cl 75, cl 76, cl 77, cl 77(1)(b)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 162, s 241, s 246, s 247, s 257B, Pt 14
Planning Appeals Amendment Bill 2001 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29, s 29(5), s 29(5)(a), s 60, s 105
Result:
Application dismissed
Summary of Tribunal's decision:
The applicant owns and operates a concrete batching plant in East Perth. The use of the current site is subject to a development approval granted by the Minister for Planning in 2012 under s 247 of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), which expires in October 2017. In October 2016, the applicant applied to the respondent under cl 77 of Sch 2 of the Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015 (WA) to amend the current development approval by, amongst other things, deleting the condition that causes the approval to expire in October 2017. The respondent raised, as a preliminary issue, the question of whether there was a reviewable determination capable of being reviewed in the Tribunal when the development approval, which the applicant seeks to have amended in this proceeding, was not granted by a local government but by the Minister for Planning under s 246 of the Planning and Development Act 2005. The Tribunal determined that cl 77 of Sch 2 of the Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015 did not allow for an application to amend an existing development approval to be made where the development approval had been granted by a minister. The Tribunal, therefore, had no powers to grant or refuse to grant the application to amend the current development approval. The Tribunal therefore dismissed the application.
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr P McGowan
Respondent: Mr H Jackson
Solicitors:
Applicant: Clayton Utz
Respondent: McLeods
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Aznavour Pty Ltd & Ors v The City of Mandurah [2002] WASC 95
Bakker and City of Nedlands [2005] WASAT 106
Director General of Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41
The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Brockman Iron Pty Ltd [No 2] [2014] WASC 345
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Agreed facts
Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd (applicant) owns and operates a concrete batching plant at Lot 200 (No 71) Edward Street, Perth (site).
The East Perth Redevelopment Authority granted development…
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- Case
- [2017] WASAT 81
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework and the legislative intent behind the review process outlined in the PD Act. It noted that the applicant's argument hinged on the notion that the review determination, regardless of whether made by the SAT or the Minister, should maintain the local government's original decision-making authority. The applicant cited the case of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi, where it was established that the Tribunal, in reviewing a decision, acts in the shoes of the original decision-maker. The court had to determine if this principle applied to the review process under the PD Act and whether the review determination effectively substituted the local government's decision.
In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the applicant's interpretation of the PD Act and the SAT Act was not tenable. The court found that the statutory language and legislative intent did not support the notion that a review determination by the SAT or the Minister should be deemed a decision of the local government. The court emphasized that the PD Act establishes a distinct pathway for review and that the role of the local government in the development approval process is not supplanted by a review determination. Consequently, the court ruled against the applicant's submission, affirming that the review determination does not replace the original decision of the local government.
The final orders of the court dismissed Hanson Construction Materials' application, upholding the decision that a review determination under the PD Act does not deem to be a decision of the local government. This ruling clarifies the role and authority of local governments in the development approval process and the distinct nature of the review process under the PD Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant submits that the PD Act impliedly deems a review determination of a local government's decision under Pt 14 of the PD Act to be a decision of the local government. It is argued that this is because of the nature of the review under Pt 14 of the PD Act, within the context of the PD Act, which, it is submitted, requires development approval to be granted by the local government before development can occur. The applicant cites the decision of Smithers J in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 (Pochi) at 45 46 in support of its submission. The passage relied upon states:… It is provided by s. 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act that for the purpose of reviewing a decision the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any relevant enactment on the person who made the decision. And by s. 43(6) a decision of the person as varied by the Tribunal or in substitution for the decision of a person shall for all purposes, other than certain purposes irrelevant to this discussion, be deemed to be a decision of that person. These provisions operate subject to s. 26 which gives overriding effect to the provisions of Pt XXII of the Schedule to the Act, but they tend to confirm what is no doubt otherwise implied, that in reviewing a decision the Tribunal is to be considered as being in the shoes of the person whose decision is in question. It follows from this that in reaching a decision in review of a decision of an administrator the Tribunal should consider itself as though it were performing the relevant function of that administrator in accordance with the law as it applied to him, including the law contained in any relevant statute interpreted according to its terms and objectives[.] The applicant submits that the determination by the Minister under s 247 of the PD Act is part of a single pathway, which starts with an application to the local government. It is submitted that an application to the local government has a single pathway within which the decision of the local government may be reviewed by lodging an application in the Tribunal. This review may be determined by the Tribunal, or alternatively, if the Minister calls the review in, may be determined by the Minister. The applicant submits that the single pathway in which an application originally made to the local government, whether determined on review by the Tribunal or the Minister, results in a determination of the original development application. Therefore the decision, whether made by the Tribunal or the Minister, has the effect of taking the place of the decision of the local government as decisionmaker. This means the decision remains a decision of the local government. It is submitted that s 29(5) of the SAT Act 'is only repeating what would have been the position anyway (i.e. s.29(5) of the SAT Act is not needed to enable the conclusion to be reached that the Minister's decision is in substitution for the original decision of the local government)'.