McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 80 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McGrath; in the matter of Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 2

TRADE PRACTICES – misleading and deceptive conduct – whether conduct capable of amounting to representation – whether representations continuous or made as to future matters – onus of proof in establishing ‘reasonable grounds’ for making representation.

TORT – whether a duty of care to avoid economic loss owed.

DAMAGES – method of calculation in claims under Trade Practices Act 1974 – no error in primary judge’s approach.

Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) s 54(2)
Fair Trading Act 1990 (Tas) s 11(2)
Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT) s 11(2)
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) ss 36, 38, 40, 41
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51, 51A, 52, 79, 82
Trade Practices Revision Act 1986 (Cth)

Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Limited v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 cited
Adelaide Petroleum NL v Poseidon Limited (1988) ATPR 40-901 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Danoz Direct Pty Limited [2003] FCA 881 discussed
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Emerald Ocean Distributors Pty Limited [2005] FCA 1703 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Henry Kaye [2004] FCA 1363 discussed
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v IMB Group Pty Limited (1999) ATPR 41-704 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Oceana Commercial Pty Limited [2003] FCA 1516 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Sports Challenge Limited [2002] FCA 1276 discussed
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 cited
Blacker v National Australia Bank [2000] FCA 681 discussed
Branir Pty Limited v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Limited (2001) 117 FCR 424 cited
Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68 cited
Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 referred to
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 cited
City of Botany Bay Council v Jazabas Pty Limited [2001] NSWCA 94 discussed
Concrete Constructions Group v Litevale Pty Ltd (2002) ATPR (Digest) 46-224 referred to
Downey v Carlson Hotels Asia Pacific Pty Limited [2005] QCA 199 discussed
Effem Foods Pty Limited (t/as Uncle Ben’s of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Limited (1999) 161 ALR 599 cited
Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited (2007) 236 ALR 209 cited
Fubilan Catering Services Limited v Compass Group (Australia) Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1205 discussed
Futuretronics International Pty Limited v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 cited
Lewarne v Momentum Productions Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1136 discussed
Miba Pty Limited v Nescore Industries Group Pty Limited (1996) 141 ALR 525 cited
Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Limited (2004) 216 CLR 388 referred to
Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85 cited
Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited (2004) 218 CLR 273 cited
Phoenix Court Pty Limited v Melbourne Central Pty Limited, [1997] FCA 1101 cited
R v Secretary of State for…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd, the dispute involved a claim by the Liquidators against Naturalcare, alleging misleading or deceptive conduct and deceit. The matter was heard by the court, which was tasked with determining several legal issues, including the admissibility of fresh evidence presented by the Liquidators during the appeal. The Liquidators sought to introduce a document that was publicly available, arguing it explained the reason for a product recall. The court rejected the fresh evidence on the grounds that it was reasonably available at the time of the primary hearing and would have required the appeal court to engage in a trial-like process without compelling justification. The court emphasised that the appeal should be based on the pleaded cases and evidence from the trial, ensuring fairness and adherence to the primary function of the appeal court to correct errors. Additionally, the court addressed the substantive issues of misleading or deceptive conduct and deceit, ultimately dismissing the appeal and setting aside the orders made by the primary judge. The court also agreed with the majority view that the appeal should be dismissed but expressed reservations regarding the interpretation of section 51A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The court concluded by ordering the dismissal of the appeal and directing the parties to file submissions on costs by a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. On or before 15 February 2008, the parties file submissions on costs, including draft orders for which they contend.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Though it is strictly unnecessary for me to deal with the tortious count on the above view of the misleading or deceptive conduct claim, I express my agreement with the views of Emmett J on this aspect of the matter on the assumption that I am wrong about the misleading or deceptive conduct claim.Fresh evidence on appeal At the hearing of the appeal, the Liquidators sought to tender fresh evidence pursuant to the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 27. The evidence that they sought to tender was a document that was publicly available from the TGA website, which was said to explain why the recall went back to 1 May 2002. Mr Sullivan QC, who appeared for the Liquidators, frankly conceded, without being asked, that the document was reasonably available at the time of the hearing before the primary judge. The Court rejected the tender and indicated that it would give its reasons for so doing in the reasons for judgment. My reasons for rejecting the tender were as follows. First, the document was available at the time of the hearing. Though that is not a factor found in the terms of s 27, it is a relevant consideration bearing in mind the primary function of the appeal court being to correct error: Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Limited (2001) 117 FCR 424 at 438 [30]. Secondly, the tender was justified on the basis of meeting a new case. To the extent that that assertion arose from how the primary judge dealt with the issues, that submission could be seen as understandable. However, the appeal should be dealt with, as I have done so above, on the basis of how the case was pleaded and conducted at the trial. At the hearing of the appeal I saw, and I see now, no acceptable reason why the parties should not be held to their pleaded cases and to the evidence that they adduced at the trial. Thirdly, and related to the second point, the acceptance of this evidence would, in fairness, have opened up a contest about the period April to May 2002 in a way that would or could have required the appeal court to engage in a trial. That was not acceptable in circumstances where there were no compelling reasons justifying it.Result For the above reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, though I would hear the parties on costs, which can be done by the exchange of written submissions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

EMMETT, STONE AND ALLSOP JJ
No claim in tort is based upon the making of the statements as such. Naturalcare’s complaint is that, by reason of the statements made by Mr Selim, it did not adopt appropriate strategies available to it to avoid a risk of which it was aware. That, of itself, is not sufficient to impose upon Pan a duty to take care to ensure that the risk does not materialise. The complaint in tort must fail, essentially for the reasons given by the primary judge. CONCLUSION The appeal should be upheld. The orders made by the primary judge should be set aside. In lieu of those orders, there should be orders dismissing Naturalcare’s Originating Process with costs. Naturalcare should pay the Liquidators’ costs of the appeal. I have had the advantage of reading in draft, the reasons of Allsop J. I respectfully agree with his Honour’s reasons, except in so far as is indicated below in relation to s 51A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). I note however, that my reservations on this point do not affect my agreement with his Honour’s conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. The interpretation of s 51A throws up many problems. The section provides that a representation as to the future is deemed to be misleading if the representor did not have reasonable grounds for making it; s 51A(1). The provision clearly identifies what must be established, namely the absence of reasonable grounds. The Court’s task of evaluating the actual representation is narrowed so that its enquiry is focused on the reasonability of the grounds for making the representation. Section 51A(2) further narrows the task in some circumstances. At least one aspect of the effect of the s 51A(2) appears to be uncontroversial, namely that a representor who adduces no evidence to support a defence of reasonable grounds is deemed to have made a misleading representation. Despite any other differences of interpretation, this much is clear from the authorities referred to by Allsop J at [177]. There is, however, disagreement as to the effect of the section where the representor adduces some (relevant) evidence that there were reasonable grounds for making the representation. This raises the question of what is evidence “to the contrary”. Among the issues thrown up by this question is whether it is evidence which, taken by itself, is sufficient to establish reasonable grounds or merely to raise the question. In characterising the evidence, does the whole of the evidence adduced by both parties have to be considered? If evidence adduced by the representor in support of a claim to have had reasonable grounds is rebutted by the representee’s evidence, does that show that the representor’s evidence was in fact not “evidence to the contrary”? The background to the introduction to the section outlined by Allsop J shows that when the section was introduced there were different views as to the desirability of imposing the persuasive rather than the evidentiary burden of proof on the representor. Although as a result of that debate, the terms of the present s 51A(2) were accepted by the Government of the day, I am not entirely persuaded that a clear intention of the legislature can be discerned. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, speaking on statutory interpretation, commented in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 at 396, a search for the “intention of Parliament” may be helpful so long as one remembers that it “is an objective concept, not subjective”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EMMETT, STONE AND ALLSOP JJ

Full text does not contain this section.