Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 3) [2015] FCA 1050

Citation: Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 3) [2015] FCA 1050
Parties: FONTERRA BRANDS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 095 181 669) v NICHOLAS VIROPOULOS (AKA NIKOLAOS VIROPOULOS) and FCD HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 133 109 798)
File number: VID 996 of 2011
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 29 September 2015
Catchwords: TRADE AND COMMERCE – trade practices – misleading and deceptive conduct – claim that corporate purchaser, now in liquidation, at the time goods were sold and delivered never intended to pay for them and that director/controller of that purchaser at the time the goods were sold and delivered never intended that the corporate purchaser pay for them – claim of accessorial liability – whether representations made – whether representations by silence – whether Jones v Dunkel inferences should be drawn
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) ss 42, 68
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 75B, 82
Cases cited:

Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
Concrete Constructions Group Ltd v Litevale Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 670; (2002) 170 FLR 290
HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 54; (2004) 217 CLR 640
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
Matheson Engineers Pty Ltd v El Raghy (1992) 37 FCR 6

McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 2; (2008) 165 FCR 230

Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Limited [2006] FCA 1685
Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125
Warner v Hung; Re Bellpac Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) [2011] FCA 1123; (2011) 297 ALR 56

Heydon JD,  Cross on Evidence (10th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015)

Date of hearing: 7-10 and 23 September 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 110
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Heaton QC with Mr B Guzzo
Solicitor for the Applicant: James Partners Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr MA Ashhurst SC with Mr SB Docker
Solicitor for the Respondents: Kemp Strang Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 996 of 2011

BETWEEN:

FONTERRA BRANDS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 095 181 669)
Applicant

AND:

NICHOLAS VIROPOULOS (AKA NIKOLAOS VIROPOULOS)
First Respondent

FCD HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 133 109 798)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 SEPTEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.Costs be reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 996 of 2011

BETWEEN:

FONTERRA BRANDS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 095 181 669)
Applicant

AND:

NICHOLAS VIROPOULOS (AKA NIKOLAOS VIROPOULOS)
First…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1050
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd brought an action against Viropoulos and other respondents for misleading and deceptive conduct, claiming that the corporate purchaser, which was in liquidation, never intended to pay for goods sold and delivered, and that its director/controller never intended for the corporate purchaser to pay for them. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The legal issues before the court included whether representations were made by the respondents, whether the representations were by silence, and whether the Jones v Dunkel inferences should be drawn. The court found that Fonterra's claims against the respondents failed, and dismissed the application. The court held that the evidence should be assessed from the perspective of how matters stood in the period September 2009 to January 2010, rather than assuming that all matters were known or intended throughout that period. The court found that the evidence supported the conclusion that Falcon never intended to pay Fonterra, and that the Jones v Dunkel inferences should be drawn. However, the court also found that Fonterra had not established the necessary balance of probabilities to support an inference that the respondents had a strategy or scheme never to pay Fonterra. The court reserved costs, and the parties were asked to be heard in relation to costs.
The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed, and that costs be reserved. The court noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Costs be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

These claims must be assessed from the perspective of how matters stood in the period September 2009 to January 2010, rather than assuming, merely from hindsight, that all of these matters were known or intended throughout that period.The evidence As senior counsel for Fonterra accepted, to a large extent Fonterra’s claim stands or falls by reference to the evidence of Mr Viropoulos who swore an affidavit and was cross-examined for over a day in the course of the hearing. Mr Viropoulos gave evidence that Falcon commenced trading in January 2002 and on behalf of Falcon he executed and submitted a credit application in about August 2006 with a company subsequently acquired by Fonterra. Fonterra supplied dairy products under the brand name Riverina Fresh. As noted above, in January 2009 First Choice changed its name back to Falcon. At about that time another company, First Choice Dairy Food Service Pty Ltd, was incorporated. This was the company through which all of Mr Viropoulos’ businesses, except Falcon, purchased goods and transferred them to other entities that distributed the goods. Mr Viropoulos said, and I accept, he did not use this company to purchase for Falcon because it already had arrangements in place for purchasing with Fonterra. Also about that time Bettamilk was incorporated through which, Mr Viropoulos said, if a supply/distributor agreement could be reached with Franklins supermarkets, the Franklins goods would be distributed. In or around January 2007 Mr Viropoulos signed an application for a commercial trade account which he returned to Fonterra. Mr Viropoulos attached to the document a handwritten note stating that he would not provide a personal guarantee until certain events had occurred. The document did not specify a credit limit. I refer to this document again at [64] below.The ‘group facility’ As to the bank account referred to by the parties as the group facility, Mr Viropoulos said that in late January 2009 he opened an account with St George in the name of Bettamilk which he intended to use for the business of distributing Franklins products. However, he said, he had trouble banking cheques into the Falcon account because some of the customers were still making cheques payable to First Choice which was no longer recorded on the account. He arranged with the bank for the name on the group facility to be changed so the cheques made out to Falcon, First Choice and Bettamilk could be banked into the group facility. From July 2009 Falcon commenced using the group facility for the payments it received from its customers. I accept this evidence. It was put to Mr Viropoulos in cross-examination that in the middle of 2009 he set up the Bettamilk account so that he could put all of the receipts of Falcon and Bettamilk and any other business into the group facility. Mr Viropoulos said that the Bettamilk account was set up for the banking of receipts under a new agreement he had entered into with Franklins supermarkets. He agreed that at some point the receipts from the sale of milk were put into that group account and that that meant that when Falcon had to pay its creditors, money had to be transferred from the group facility to Falcon to pay its creditors. He agreed that money would be transferred from the group facility as and when needed by Falcon. In those circumstances, Mr Viropoulos agreed, the money did not go to a Falcon account but went to the group account. He disagreed, however, that Falcon lost direct control of the receipts from the sale of the milk because it was a group banking facility and multiple entities within the group used the facility as a depository for monies coming in. I find that Falcon did not lose direct control of the receipts because Mr Viropoulos controlled both Bettamilk and Falcon.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Lastly, Mr Bruzzano’s evidence could have gone to a further conversation, also in January 2010, when Mr Viropoulos spoke to him about “having trouble collecting debts from some of [Falcon’s] customers” in the period after Falcon had stopped ordering milk and dairy products from Fonterra. Again, on the first day of the trial, on objection taken by Fonterra, I admitted parts of the paragraph in Mr Viropoulos’ affidavit setting out the conversation for a non-hearsay purpose. Subsequently to this conversation, the amount Mr Viropoulos attributed to debtors in the second asset sale agreement was $166,000. This was uncontroversial. He said he attributed that amount to Falcon’s debtors as being the amount he thought would be recovered from the customers/debtors of Falcon. It is not clear what Mr Bruzzano’s evidence could have added, relevant to resolving the issue in the trial, since, again, it was Mr Viropoulos’ state of mind, whether that was in truth the basis on which he arrived at the figure of $166,000, and the factual basis for it which were in controversy.Conclusion In light of my findings, Fonterra’s claims against Mr Viropoulos and FCD fail. It is not necessary to assess damages. The application should be dismissed. The parties asked to be heard in relation to costs and I therefore reserve costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Viropoulos accepted that total sales, including of Fonterra’s product, “did not miss a beat”. Consideration of Fonterra’s case that the respondents had a strategy or scheme never to pay Fonterra I next analyse the integers of the strategy or scheme on which Fonterra relies. Fonterra’s case is circumstantial; Fonterra submits that from the eleven considerations set out below and which more or less reflect those set out at [13] above, it is to be inferred that Falcon never intended to pay Fonterra. In analysing Fonterra’s case I rely first on Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141. This was an insurance case involving damage by fire to a house where the insurer refused indemnity, the insured sued and the insurer presented its defence of arson first. Tadgell JA, with whom Winneke P and Phillips JA agreed, said:[T]o assess the evidence in a case like this by reference to various individually-pleaded particulars, as though running through items on a check list, is apt to mislead. The evidence is to be evaluated as a whole in order fairly to consider whether the party bearing the onus of proof has established what is ultimately sought to be proved. The object of the exercise of evaluation is to discover whether the evidence paints a picture reflecting real life, rather than to place a tick or a cross against paragraph after paragraph of torpid pleading. A true picture is to be derived from an accumulation of detail. The overall effect of the detailed picture can sometimes be best appreciated by standing back and viewing it from a distance, making an informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole. The overall effect of the detail is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details: cf Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v Lorrimer; Shepherd v R.In a civil case like this, where there is no direct evidence of a fact that a party bearing the onus of proof seeks to prove, “it is not possible to attain entire satisfaction as to the true state of affairs”: Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell. In such a case, however, the law does not require proof to the “entire satisfaction” of the tribunal of fact. A definition of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a civil case to support proof by inference from the directly proved facts was given by the High Court in the unreported case of Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd in a passage since repeatedly adopted: e.g. Luxton v Vines; Holloway v McFeeters; Jones v Dunkel; Girlock’s case. The relevant passage in Bradshaw’s case is this:Of course as far as logical consistency goes many hypotheses may be put which the evidence does not exclude positively. But this is a civil and not a criminal case. We are concerned with probabilities, not with possibilities. The difference between the criminal standard of proof in its application to circumstantial evidence and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged. In questions of this sort, where direct proof is not available, it is enough if the circumstances appearing in evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference: they must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is mere matter of conjecture: see per Lord Robson, Richard Evans & Co Ltd v Astley. But if circumstances are proved in which it is reasonable to find a balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion sought then, though the conclusion may fall short of certainty, it is not to be regarded as a mere conjecture or surmise …(Citations omitted.)