FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 3) [2015] FCA 1050
Citation: Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 3) [2015] FCA 1050 Parties: FONTERRA BRANDS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 095 181 669) v NICHOLAS VIROPOULOS (AKA NIKOLAOS VIROPOULOS) and FCD HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 133 109 798) File number: VID 996 of 2011 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 29 September 2015 Catchwords: TRADE AND COMMERCE – trade practices – misleading and deceptive conduct – claim that corporate purchaser, now in liquidation, at the time goods were sold and delivered never intended to pay for them and that director/controller of that purchaser at the time the goods were sold and delivered never intended that the corporate purchaser pay for them – claim of accessorial liability – whether representations made – whether representations by silence – whether Jones v Dunkel inferences should be drawn Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) ss 42, 68
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 75B, 82Cases cited: Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
Concrete Constructions Group Ltd v Litevale Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 670; (2002) 170 FLR 290
HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 54; (2004) 217 CLR 640
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
Matheson Engineers Pty Ltd v El Raghy (1992) 37 FCR 6McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 2; (2008) 165 FCR 230
Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Limited [2006] FCA 1685
Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125
Warner v Hung; Re Bellpac Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) [2011] FCA 1123; (2011) 297 ALR 56Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (10th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015)
Date of hearing: 7-10 and 23 September 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 110 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Heaton QC with Mr B Guzzo Solicitor for the Applicant: James Partners Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr MA Ashhurst SC with Mr SB Docker Solicitor for the Respondents: Kemp Strang Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 996 of 2011
BETWEEN: FONTERRA BRANDS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 095 181 669)
ApplicantAND: NICHOLAS VIROPOULOS (AKA NIKOLAOS VIROPOULOS)
First RespondentFCD HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 133 109 798)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 SEPTEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.Costs be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 996 of 2011
BETWEEN: FONTERRA BRANDS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 095 181 669)
ApplicantAND: NICHOLAS VIROPOULOS (AKA NIKOLAOS VIROPOULOS)
First…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1050
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed, and that costs be reserved. The court noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. Costs be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Viropoulos accepted that total sales, including of Fonterra’s product, “did not miss a beat”. Consideration of Fonterra’s case that the respondents had a strategy or scheme never to pay Fonterra I next analyse the integers of the strategy or scheme on which Fonterra relies. Fonterra’s case is circumstantial; Fonterra submits that from the eleven considerations set out below and which more or less reflect those set out at [13] above, it is to be inferred that Falcon never intended to pay Fonterra. In analysing Fonterra’s case I rely first on Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141. This was an insurance case involving damage by fire to a house where the insurer refused indemnity, the insured sued and the insurer presented its defence of arson first. Tadgell JA, with whom Winneke P and Phillips JA agreed, said:[T]o assess the evidence in a case like this by reference to various individually-pleaded particulars, as though running through items on a check list, is apt to mislead. The evidence is to be evaluated as a whole in order fairly to consider whether the party bearing the onus of proof has established what is ultimately sought to be proved. The object of the exercise of evaluation is to discover whether the evidence paints a picture reflecting real life, rather than to place a tick or a cross against paragraph after paragraph of torpid pleading. A true picture is to be derived from an accumulation of detail. The overall effect of the detailed picture can sometimes be best appreciated by standing back and viewing it from a distance, making an informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole. The overall effect of the detail is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details: cf Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v Lorrimer; Shepherd v R.In a civil case like this, where there is no direct evidence of a fact that a party bearing the onus of proof seeks to prove, “it is not possible to attain entire satisfaction as to the true state of affairs”: Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell. In such a case, however, the law does not require proof to the “entire satisfaction” of the tribunal of fact. A definition of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a civil case to support proof by inference from the directly proved facts was given by the High Court in the unreported case of Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd in a passage since repeatedly adopted: e.g. Luxton v Vines; Holloway v McFeeters; Jones v Dunkel; Girlock’s case. The relevant passage in Bradshaw’s case is this:Of course as far as logical consistency goes many hypotheses may be put which the evidence does not exclude positively. But this is a civil and not a criminal case. We are concerned with probabilities, not with possibilities. The difference between the criminal standard of proof in its application to circumstantial evidence and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged. In questions of this sort, where direct proof is not available, it is enough if the circumstances appearing in evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference: they must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is mere matter of conjecture: see per Lord Robson, Richard Evans & Co Ltd v Astley. But if circumstances are proved in which it is reasonable to find a balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion sought then, though the conclusion may fall short of certainty, it is not to be regarded as a mere conjecture or surmise …(Citations omitted.)