Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Limited [2006] FCA 1685

TRADE PRACTICES – misleading and deceptive conduct – invoice agreement between applicant and respondent whereby respondent undertook to pay invoices for supply of paper by applicant to third party companies – where respondent/cross-claimant at time considering acquiring third parties' business – where cross-claim that agreement invalid for misleading and deceptive conduct partly based on silence - whether cross-claimant could reasonably have expected cross-respondents to warn of companies' poor payment history and financial position

EVIDENCE – failure by both parties to call witness where both parties submitted that Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn against other party - where witness equally available to both parties – whether principle in Jones v Dunkel applies

EVIDENCE – expert evidence – use of expert evidence to impeach credit of witness - opinion evidence about existence of fact furnished to prove fact's existence – whether permissible

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 55, 76 and 79
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52

Butcher and Another v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 212 ALR 357 referred to
Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky and Another (1992) 39 FCR 31 applied
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 referred to
Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650 referred to
Warner and Another v Elders Rural Finance Limited and Others (1993) 41 FCR 399 discussed

STORA ENSO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v CPI GROUP LIMITED
NSD 1349 of 2004

MOORE J
8 DECEMBER 2006
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1349 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

STORA ENSO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ABN 81 001 583 268)
Applicant/First Cross-Respondent

AND:

CPI GROUP LIMITED (ACN 006 364 067)
Respondent/Cross-Claimant

AND

STORA ENSO OYJ
Second Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 DECEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. there be judgment for the applicant in the sum of $3,967,544.65 plus interest pursuant to s 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.   The cross claim of CPI be dismissed.

3.   CPI pay the costs of the applicant/first cross-respondent and of the second cross-respondent of the proceedings.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1349 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

STORA ENSO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ABN 81 001 583 268)
Applicant/First Cross-Respondent

AND:

CPI GROUP LIMITED (ACN 006 364 067)
Respondent/Cross-Claimant

STORA ENSO OYJ
Second Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

8 DECEMBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Two companies involved in the wholesale distribution of paper in Australia have been unable to resolve a commercial dispute.  One is Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd, the other CPI Group Limited.  SEA supplied paper to a group of related companies, the Boomerang companies.  The dispute concerns an invoicing agreement between SEA and CPI made in June and July 2003.  Under the agreement, SEA…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1685
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Limited was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff, SEA, a subsidiary of SEO, a Finnish corporation, brought a claim against the defendant, CPI, for breach of contract. In its cross claim, CPI alleged that SEA breached s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) by making misleading and deceptive representations and by remaining silent about the financial instability of the Boomerang companies, with whom SEA had a business relationship. The court was required to decide whether SEA's conduct contravened s 52 of the TP Act and whether it was liable to pay damages to CPI under s 82 of the TP Act.

The court examined the commercial arrangements between SEA, CPI, and the Boomerang companies, and considered the evidence presented by both parties, including expert accounting evidence. The court found that SEA's representations and silence did not constitute misleading and deceptive conduct under s 52 of the TP Act. The court was not satisfied that the accounting evidence could establish that SEA's representatives knew or should have known about the Boomerang companies' poor financial position and indebtedness at the time the invoicing agreement was made. The court concluded that SEA did not engage in conduct proscribed by s 52 and dismissed CPI's cross claim. The court ordered judgment for SEA in the sum of $3,967,544.65 plus interest and that CPI pay the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. there be judgment for the applicant in the sum of $3,967,544.65 plus interest pursuant to s 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. The cross claim of CPI be dismissed.

3. CPI pay the costs of the applicant/first cross-respondent and of the second cross-respondent of the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

The proceedings take the form of a claim by SEA against CPI and a cross claim by CPI against SEA and Stora Enso Oyj (“SEO”). SEA is a wholly owned subsidiary of SEO, a company incorporated in Finland. SEA now only alleges breach of contract by CPI and has abandoned claims under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("TP Act"). SEA claims the sum of $3,967,544.65, the amount outstanding under the invoicing agreement. In its cross claim against SEA, CPI alleged contravention of s 52 of the TP Act arising from representations made by SEA, as well as SEA's silence and its failure to warn CPI of the Boomerang companies' precarious financial position and poor payment history. CPI's cross claim also involved an alleged contravention of s 52 of the TP Act based on the same facts. The representations on which CPI relied are discussed more fully at [119] to [123]. At the trial, CPI abandoned its claim based on s 51AA of the TP Act and its claim that based on the relationship CPI had with SEA and SEO, both companies owed CPI a duty of care, which had been breached. The central issue is whether SEA engaged in conduct proscribed by s 52 and is liable to pay damages to CPI under s 82 of the TP Act. THE FACTSThe commercial arrangements The following is an overview of some of the commercial background in which the invoicing agreement between CPI and SEA was made. Contentious matters of detail are discussed later. In March 1993, Stora Feldmuhle Carbonless Paper GmbH operated a paper manufacturing mill in Germany ("the Mill") and entered an agency agreement with SEA. The Mill at that time formed part of the Stora Enso group. Generally, no distinction will be drawn between the owner and operator of the paper production facility and the facility itself. Under the agency agreement, SEA was to act as agent for the Mill on a commission basis for the sale in Australia and New Zealand of carbonless paper produced by the Mill. The dispute in these proceedings concerns Giroform carbonless paper supplied either in sheets or rolls. Under the agency agreement, no commission was payable to SEA on orders where payment was not received by the Mill. The agreement applied to all deliveries beginning 1 April 1993, was not limited in duration and could be terminated at the end of a calendar year with six months notice. The mechanism for terminating this agreement assumed significance during the events of 2003 central to these proceedings. In March 1994, the Mill entered a distributor agreement with SEA, in which SEA was appointed distributor for the sale of carbonless paper to the Australian company Boomerang Trading Pty Ltd. SEA was to take all credit risks for sales and incurred a liability to the Mill. The Mill was to deliver the products directly to Boomerang Trading. The distributor agreement became effective on 1 May 1994 and was of indefinite duration. As with the agency agreement, either party could terminate the agreement at the end of a calendar year with six months notice. Under the agreement, SEA received a dealer discount of 2 per cent on the price invoiced by the Mill.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

CPI submitted that the principle operated more generally, adversely to SEA, and particularly in relation to the issue of whether SEA had made a decision to cut supply to Moore. But again I doubt whether the principle in Jones v Dunkel has a material role to play. The relevant factual issue was the position which had been adopted by SEA by 19 May 2003 in relation to supplying Moore, and what was said by Mr Ellenberg to Mr Cassell about that matter on that day. That particular issue was not a matter about which Mr Koeppen was likely to be able to give evidence beyond giving evidence about the Mill's attitude and contractual obligations. Both of those matters are addressed by contemporaneous records (emails and contracts).The accounting evidence SEA filed expert accounting evidence well before the hearing. The expert was Ms Wheatley. At that time no responsive expert accounting evidence was filed by CPI. However, it sought to file such evidence days before the hearing was scheduled to commence. It was allowed to do so. Its expert was Mr Phillips. Ultimately, the two experts conferred and a joint report was prepared, although differences of opinion remained. Somewhat simplified, the experts addressed the question of what a chief financial officer in the position of Mr Akdogan might have gleaned from the financial information provided to him before 26 June 2003. SEA submitted that the purpose of its expert's evidence was not to demonstrate incompetence on the part of Mr Akdogan, but rather to lend weight to the proposition that on the balance of probabilities he and Mr Cassell in fact new that Boomerang would not be able to meet its obligations. CPI challenged the conclusions reached by Ms Wheatley but also submitted that the expert evidence said nothing about the actual knowledge of Mr Akdogan, still less Mr Cassell, and whether they had actual knowledge of the financial position of the Boomerang companies was not a matter for expert evidence. What, in substance, SEA sought to do with the expert evidence was no more than to impeach the credit of Mr Akdogan and also Mr Cassell. Its thesis was that an expert says a competent chief financial officer would have understood certain things from the financial information Mr Akdogan was sent. Accordingly, Mr Akdogan did understand (or would have had doubts about), the financial position of the Boomerang companies as it related to its trading position and indebtedness to SEA at the time the invoicing agreement was made. The expert's evidence could establish this, notwithstanding Mr Akdogan's evidence that he did not have such knowledge. For my part, I do not see how expert evidence can be used this way. Regrettably, the submissions of the parties did not involve any substantial analysis of the use that could be made in the evidence having regard to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) or limits on its use. The relevant fact in issue for the purposes of s 55 of the Evidence Act is whether Mr Akdogan and Mr Cassell knew the amount the Boomerang companies owed SEA at the time the invoicing agreement was made, knew to what extent it was then in arrears and knew its trading history with SEA over the preceding two years or at least had doubts in relation to these things. Expert evidence to the effect that Mr Akdogan should have known (or should have had doubts about) is not, in my opinion, evidence which could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact in issue.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
If I am wrong, and the accounting evidence should be considered in the mix of evidence, it involved no more, at its highest, than an opinion that Mr Akdogan should have had doubts about the Boomerang companies' capacity to meet its obligations under the invoicing agreement. That was Ms Wheatley's view, but not a view shared by Mr Phillips, although he did say that had a reasonably competent chief financial officer had been asked to investigate the invoicing arrangement, further information would have been requested. For the reasons I have given, I am not satisfied, notwithstanding the accounting evidence, that Mr Akdogan or Mr Cassell actually knew of the Boomerang companies' poor trading history and level of indebtedness to SEA at the time the invoicing agreement was made. Also, for those reasons, I am not satisfied that the information in the accounting records (apart from the views expressed by the experts about what they might reveal) which were seen by Mr Akdogan and Mr Cassell alerted them to the trading and general financial position the Boomerang companies were then in, or had been in for the preceding two years or so.CONCLUSIONThe pleaded misleading and deceptive conduct CPI alleged SEA engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct or conduct likely to mislead or deceive. The conduct relied upon was three representations and, generally, SEA's failure to disclose the true position concerning the Boomerang companies' trading history and its then current indebtedness, that is, its silence. Two of the representations were made at a meeting on 19 May 2003 and the third at a meeting on 7 June 2003. First, at a meeting on 19 May 2003, SEA was said have informed CPI that SEA intended to restrict the sale and supply by SEA of carbonless paper to the Boomerang companies in respect of Moore, by 30 June 2003 ('the first representation'). CPI contended that the first representation was false because SEA had no such intention. Secondly, CPI alleged that, at the same meeting, SEA represented that it could no longer obtain credit insurance in respect of monies owing by the Boomerang companies to SEA because paper products emanating from the Mill were no longer eligible to be covered by SEA’s internal credit insurance company, Pankavara ('the second representation'). CPI contended that the second representation was false and that the reason SEA could no longer obtain credit insurance for the Boomerang companies was because of Boomerang's poor payment history. Thirdly, CPI contends that at a meeting on or about 17 June 2003, SEA represented to CPI through Mr Fabrello that the Boomerang companies were making payments for carbonless paper supplied to the Boomerang companies by SEA wholly or substantially within the trading terms between SEA and the Boomerang companies ('the third representation'). The second aspect of CPI's claim was based on SEA's silence, in failing to advise or warn CPI of the Boomerang companies' poor financial position and payment record, namely:1.The companies had cash flow problems and other difficulties and/or was insolvent, between at least 1 January 2001 and 30 June 2003;2.The companies failed to pay for the carbonless paper supplied by SEA within SEA's trading terms, for the same period as above;3.The companies owed SEA nearly $6.5 million as at 31 May 2003; and4.The companies were significantly in arrears and outside the credit limit SEA had approved, at the relevant times.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

Full text does not contain this section.