Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 797

File number: NSD 2358 of 2018
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 30 May 2019
Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – admitted contraventions of ss 18 and 29(1)(m), Australian Consumer Law (ACL) – misleading or deceptive representations made on respondent airline’s website – where representations in booking flow that fares were non-refundable when there may be an entitlement to a refund under statutory consumer guarantees – where representation in conditions of carriage that flight services were not subject to statutory guarantees – where representations in conditions liable to mislead consumers as to remedies available for non-compliance with consumer guarantees – consideration of principles for determining whether agreed penalty and other agreed orders for non-compliance with the ACL appropriate – where public importance in sending a strong message of deterrence to highlight importance of ensuring accuracy in making representations on consumer rights – where no intention to mislead – where high degree of co-operation by the respondents with the ACCC – where appropriate to impose agreed penalties and grant declaratory relief in terms agreed
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29(1)(m)

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3; (2018) 262 CLR 157

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Apple Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 953

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 36

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Limited [2015] FCA 330; (2015) 327 ALR 540

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] FCAFC 146; (2007) 161 FCR 513

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hillside (Australia New Media) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 698

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Homeopathy Plus! Australia Pty Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 1090

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Limited (No 2) [2017] FCA 205

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1263; [2016] ATPR 42-523

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Oticon Australia Pty Limited [2018] FCA 1826

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; (2016) 340 ALR 25

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation [2018] FCAFC 73; (2018) 357 ALR 55

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Westpac Banking Corporation [2018] FCA 1733

Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58

BMW Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2004] FCAFC 167; (2004) 207 ALR 452

Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 797
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought proceedings against Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd for making misleading and deceptive representations about the refundability of airline fares. The dispute centred on Jetstar's website representations that certain fares were non-refundable, despite statutory consumer guarantees potentially entitling consumers to refunds. Additionally, Jetstar's conditions of carriage stated that flight services were not subject to statutory guarantees, which further misled consumers regarding their remedies.

The primary legal issues involved whether the agreed penalties and orders proposed by the parties were appropriate and whether the Court should exercise its discretion to accept these agreed terms. The Court considered principles such as the public interest in promoting predictability of outcomes and the importance of sending a strong deterrent message to prevent future non-compliance. It also weighed the lack of intent to mislead and Jetstar's high degree of cooperation with the ACCC.

The Court found that the agreed penalties and orders were appropriate given the circumstances. It relied on the precedent set in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, which supported the practice of accepting agreed penalties and orders in civil penalty proceedings. The Court exercised judicial restraint, accepting the agreed terms as long as they were within the appropriate range and served the public interest. Ultimately, the Court approved the agreed penalty of $1.95 million and the other proposed orders, emphasising the importance of deterrence and the cooperative stance taken by Jetstar.

Orders

Orders of the court

3. Jetstar pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $1,000,000 in respect of the contraventions referred to in declaration 1 above, within 30 days of the date of these orders.

4. Jetstar pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $950,000 in respect of the contraventions referred to in declaration 2 above, within 30 days of the date of these orders.

THE COURT ORDERS, BY CONSENT, THAT:

5. Jetstar make a contribution to the ACCC’s costs in the amount of $50,000, to be paid within 30 days of the date of these orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Jetstar admits that, by making the representations summarised above, it contravened ss 18 and 29(1)(m) of the ACL. The parties jointly seek the declarations and orders set out in proposed orders signed by the parties on 13 December 2018, including penalties totalling $1.95 million, relying upon the Statement of Agreed Facts and Admissions dated 13 December 2018 (Agreed Facts). They also filed joint submissions explaining why they contend that the proposed relief is appropriate and that the Court ought to make orders in those terms in the exercise of its discretion. 1.2 Principles applying to a determination of whether to give effect to agreed orders in the exercise of the Court’s discretion In Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482 (Director, FWBII), French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (with whose reasons Keane J agreed at [79]) approved the practice whereby the parties may file agreed penalty submissions, holding that:46. … there is an important public policy involved in promoting predictability of outcome in civil penalty proceedings and … the practice of receiving and, if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions increases the predictability of outcome for regulators and wrongdoers… such predictability of outcome encourages corporations to acknowledge contraventions, which, in turn, assists in avoiding lengthy and complex litigation and thus tends to free the courts to deal with other matters and free investigating officers to turn to other areas of investigation that await their attention. Their Honours further observed at [57] that in civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings “there is generally very considerable scope for the parties to agree on the facts and upon consequences. There is also very considerable scope for them to agree upon the appropriate remedy and for the court to be persuaded that it is an appropriate remedy” (emphasis in the original). More specifically, while acknowledging that there may be exceptions to the general rule, their Honours explained that:58. … There is, however, no reason in principle or practice why civil penalty proceedings should be treated as an exception. Subject to the court being sufficiently persuaded of the accuracy of the parties’ agreement as to facts and consequences, and that the penalty which the parties propose is an appropriate remedy in the circumstances thus revealed, it is consistent with principle and … highly desirable in practice for the court to accept the parties’ proposal and therefore impose the proposed penalty. To do so is no different in principle or practice from approving an infant’s compromise, a custody or property compromise, a group proceeding settlement or a scheme of arrangement. (emphasis in the original, citations omitted) In this regard, their Honours accepted at [59] the public interest in the imposition of civil penalties but considered that “[o]nce it is understood that civil penalties are not retributive, but like most other civil remedies essentially deterrent or compensatory and therefore protective, there is nothing odd or exceptionable about a court approving an agreed settlement of a civil proceeding which involves the public interest; provided of course that the court is persuaded that the settlement is appropriate.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In short, as for example, Gordon J in ACCC v Coles [2014] helpfully explained by way of a summary of the applicable approach: 70 … First, there is a well-recognised public interest in the settlement of cases under the Act: NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at 291. Second, the orders proposed by agreement of the parties must be not contrary to the public interest and at least consistent with it: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [18].71 Third, when deciding whether to make orders that are consented to by the parties, the Court must be satisfied that it has the power to make the orders proposed and that the orders are appropriate: Real Estate Institute at [17] and [20] and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Virgin Mobile Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 1548 at [1]. Parties cannot by consent confer power to make orders that the Court otherwise lacks the power to make: Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150 at 163.72 Fourth, once the Court is satisfied that orders are within power and appropriate, it should exercise a degree of restraint when scrutinising the proposed settlement terms, particularly where both parties are legally represented and able to understand and evaluate the desirability of the settlement: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Woolworths (South Australia) Pty Ltd (Trading as Mac’s Liquor) [2003] FCA 530 at [21]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Target Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1326 at [24]; Real Estate Institute at [20]-[21]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Econovite Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 964 at [11] and [22] and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2007] FCA 1370 at [4].73 Finally, in deciding whether agreed orders conform with legal principle, the Court is entitled to treat the consent of [the respondent] as an admission of all facts necessary or appropriate to the granting of the relief sought against it: Thomson Australian Holdings at 164.2. EVIDENCE In support of the orders sought, the parties tendered the Agreed Facts to which were attached:(1)Annexure A comprising details of the specific rules applicable to each category of fare in the form which were accessible on the website during the relevant period (Agreed Facts at [19]); and(2)Annexure B comprising Jetstar’s conditions that applied to a contract for the booking and acquisition of the flight services during the relevant period (Agreed Facts at [20]). The parties also relied upon the affidavit of Christopher Michael Steger, solicitor, affirmed on 14 December 2018 annexing the proposed consent orders. Finally, at the hearing on 11 April 2019, the parties handed up a copy of the draft undertaking given by Jetstar to the ACCC for the purposes of s 87B of the CCA. As a consequence of certain concerns which arose during the course of the hearing, the parties provided a notice of variation on 16 May 2019 to the s 87B undertaking which had been accepted by the Chair of the ACCC and executed by the parties. 3. THE STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally I note that Jetstar has agreed to contribute $50,000 towards the ACCC’s costs of the proceeding and to pay the costs contribution within 30 days of the Court’s orders (joint submissions at [86]-[87]). 7. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, I consider that it is appropriate to make final orders in the terms agreed by the parties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, I am satisfied that the facts and admissions in the Agreed Facts and annexures provide a sufficient factual foundation for the making of the declarations: see s 191(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] FCAFC 146; (2007) 161 FCR 513 at [91]-[92] (the Court); Hadgkiss v Aldin (No 2) [2007] FCA 2069; (2007) 169 IR 76 at [20]-[23] (Gilmour J); ACCC v Coles [2014] at [79] (Gordon J).6. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY6.1 Legal principles: penalty In approaching considering the appropriateness of the agreed penalty, I recently explained in Oticon that:41. ... the judicial restraint in scrutinising proposed settlements of controversies under the [ACL] and its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), means that the Court will not substitute its own view of the orders or undertakings if the agreed orders, including penalties, fall with[in] the range of an appropriate disposition of the case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commissionv Real Estate Institute of Western Australia (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [20]-[23] (French J (as his Honour then was)). As Burchett and Kiefel JJ observed in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 (NW Frozen Foods) at 291: There is an important public policy involved. When corporations acknowledge contraventions, very lengthy and complex litigation is frequently avoided, freeing the courts to deal with other matters, and investigating officers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to turn to other areas of the economy that await their attention. At the same time, a negotiated resolution in the instant case may be expected to include measures designed to promote, for the future, vigorous competition in the particular market concerned. These beneficial consequences would be jeopardised if corporations were to conclude that proper settlements were clouded by unpredictable risks. A proper figure is one within the permissible range in all the circumstances. The court will not depart from an agreed figure merely because it might otherwise have been disposed to select some other figure, or except in a clear case.(emphasis added)42. Thus the High Court in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate at [57] considered that it was open to the Court to receive submissions, including joint submissions, as to an appropriate penalty, and noted there was generally considerable scope given to parties to agree on an appropriate remedy. Under s 224 of the ACL the Court may order a person to pay, relevantly, to the Commonwealth “such pecuniary penalty, in respect of each act or omission by the person to which [s 224] applies, as the court determines to be appropriate”. This provision applies relevantly only to the contraventions of s 29 of the ACL. The primary purpose of civil penalties “is deterrence: specific deterrence of the contravener and, by his or her example, general deterrence of other would-be contraveners”: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3; (2018) 262 CLR 157 (ABCC) at [116] (Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ (with whose reasons Kiefel CJ agreed at [50])) (citations omitted); see also Director, FWBII at [55], [59] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ) and [110] (Keane J); and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640 (TPG Internet) at [65]. Thus, with respect to specific deterrence, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained in ABCC:116. … According to orthodox sentencing conceptions as they apply to the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties, specific deterrence inheres in the sting or burden which the penalty imposes on the contravener. Other things being equal, it is assumed that the greater the sting or burden of the penalty, the more likely it will be that the contravener will seek to avoid the risk of subjection to further penalties and thus the more likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions; likewise, the more potent will be the example that the penalty sets for other would-be contraveners and therefore the greater the penalty's general deterrent effect. Conversely, the less the sting or burden that a penalty imposes on a contravener, the less likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions and the less the general deterrent effect of the penalty. Ultimately, if a penalty is devoid of sting or burden, it may not have much, if any, specific or general deterrent effect, and so it will be unlikely, or at least less likely, to achieve the specific and general deterrent effects that are the raison d'être of its imposition. (citations omitted)