FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 797
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 797
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues involved whether the agreed penalties and orders proposed by the parties were appropriate and whether the Court should exercise its discretion to accept these agreed terms. The Court considered principles such as the public interest in promoting predictability of outcomes and the importance of sending a strong deterrent message to prevent future non-compliance. It also weighed the lack of intent to mislead and Jetstar's high degree of cooperation with the ACCC.
The Court found that the agreed penalties and orders were appropriate given the circumstances. It relied on the precedent set in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, which supported the practice of accepting agreed penalties and orders in civil penalty proceedings. The Court exercised judicial restraint, accepting the agreed terms as long as they were within the appropriate range and served the public interest. Ultimately, the Court approved the agreed penalty of $1.95 million and the other proposed orders, emphasising the importance of deterrence and the cooperative stance taken by Jetstar.
Orders
Orders of the court
3. Jetstar pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $1,000,000 in respect of the contraventions referred to in declaration 1 above, within 30 days of the date of these orders.
4. Jetstar pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $950,000 in respect of the contraventions referred to in declaration 2 above, within 30 days of the date of these orders.
THE COURT ORDERS, BY CONSENT, THAT:
5. Jetstar make a contribution to the ACCC’s costs in the amount of $50,000, to be paid within 30 days of the date of these orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, I am satisfied that the facts and admissions in the Agreed Facts and annexures provide a sufficient factual foundation for the making of the declarations: see s 191(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] FCAFC 146; (2007) 161 FCR 513 at [91]-[92] (the Court); Hadgkiss v Aldin (No 2) [2007] FCA 2069; (2007) 169 IR 76 at [20]-[23] (Gilmour J); ACCC v Coles [2014] at [79] (Gordon J).6. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY6.1 Legal principles: penalty In approaching considering the appropriateness of the agreed penalty, I recently explained in Oticon that:41. ... the judicial restraint in scrutinising proposed settlements of controversies under the [ACL] and its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), means that the Court will not substitute its own view of the orders or undertakings if the agreed orders, including penalties, fall with[in] the range of an appropriate disposition of the case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commissionv Real Estate Institute of Western Australia (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [20]-[23] (French J (as his Honour then was)). As Burchett and Kiefel JJ observed in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 (NW Frozen Foods) at 291: There is an important public policy involved. When corporations acknowledge contraventions, very lengthy and complex litigation is frequently avoided, freeing the courts to deal with other matters, and investigating officers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to turn to other areas of the economy that await their attention. At the same time, a negotiated resolution in the instant case may be expected to include measures designed to promote, for the future, vigorous competition in the particular market concerned. These beneficial consequences would be jeopardised if corporations were to conclude that proper settlements were clouded by unpredictable risks. A proper figure is one within the permissible range in all the circumstances. The court will not depart from an agreed figure merely because it might otherwise have been disposed to select some other figure, or except in a clear case.(emphasis added)42. Thus the High Court in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate at [57] considered that it was open to the Court to receive submissions, including joint submissions, as to an appropriate penalty, and noted there was generally considerable scope given to parties to agree on an appropriate remedy. Under s 224 of the ACL the Court may order a person to pay, relevantly, to the Commonwealth “such pecuniary penalty, in respect of each act or omission by the person to which [s 224] applies, as the court determines to be appropriate”. This provision applies relevantly only to the contraventions of s 29 of the ACL. The primary purpose of civil penalties “is deterrence: specific deterrence of the contravener and, by his or her example, general deterrence of other would-be contraveners”: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3; (2018) 262 CLR 157 (ABCC) at [116] (Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ (with whose reasons Kiefel CJ agreed at [50])) (citations omitted); see also Director, FWBII at [55], [59] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ) and [110] (Keane J); and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640 (TPG Internet) at [65]. Thus, with respect to specific deterrence, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained in ABCC:116. … According to orthodox sentencing conceptions as they apply to the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties, specific deterrence inheres in the sting or burden which the penalty imposes on the contravener. Other things being equal, it is assumed that the greater the sting or burden of the penalty, the more likely it will be that the contravener will seek to avoid the risk of subjection to further penalties and thus the more likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions; likewise, the more potent will be the example that the penalty sets for other would-be contraveners and therefore the greater the penalty's general deterrent effect. Conversely, the less the sting or burden that a penalty imposes on a contravener, the less likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions and the less the general deterrent effect of the penalty. Ultimately, if a penalty is devoid of sting or burden, it may not have much, if any, specific or general deterrent effect, and so it will be unlikely, or at least less likely, to achieve the specific and general deterrent effects that are the raison d'être of its imposition. (citations omitted)