Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND GAGELER JJ

APOTEX PTY LTD  APPLICANT/APPELLANT

AND

SANOFI-AVENTIS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ORS        RESPONDENTS

Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd

[2013] HCA 50

4 December 2013

S219/2012 & S1/2013

ORDER

Matter No S1 of 2013

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Matter No S219 of 2012

1.Special leave to appeal on ground 3 of the Draft Notice of Appeal filed on 10 September 2012 granted.

2.Appeal allowed with costs.

3.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 18 July 2012 and, in their place, order that:

(a)the appeal be allowed in part;

(b)orders 2, 3 and 6 of the Federal Court made on 18 November 2011 be set aside;

(c)order 1 of the Federal Court made on 24 February 2012 be set aside; and

(d)so much of the Amended Application dated 22 September 2009 as made in paragraphs 14 to 22 be dismissed.

4.Remit the matter to the Full Court on the questions of the costs of the appeal to that Court and the costs of the trial (which latter question may, at the discretion of the Full Court, be remitted to the primary judge).

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

D K Catterns QC with N R Murray for the applicant/appellant (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills)

D F Jackson QC with C Dimitriadis for the respondents (instructed by Jones Day)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

FRENCH CJ.

Introduction

  1. The primary question in this case is whether methods of medical treatment of human beings, including surgery and the administration of therapeutic drugs, can be the subject of patents.  This Court has not had to decide the question until now.  For the reasons that follow, in particular so that the law may be logically coherent, the question ought to be answered in the affirmative.  The appellant, Apotex Pty Ltd ("Apotex"), which was sued by the respondents for infringement of their patent for a method of using a known drug to prevent or treat psoriasis, therefore fails in its challenge to the validity of the patent.However, for the reasons given by Crennan and Kiefel JJ[1], Apotex's application for special leave to appeal against the finding in the Federal Court that it infringed the patent should be granted and its appeal on that matter allowed.

    [1]Reasons of Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [293]–[305].

    Factual and procedural history

  2. It is sufficient to outline briefly salient features of the factual and procedural history, which are dealt with in more detail in the judgment of Hayne J[2] and the joint judgment of Crennan and Kiefel JJ[3].

    [2]Reasons of Hayne J at [59]–[67].

    [3]Reasons of Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [178]–[185], [205]–[214].

  3. The drug Leflunomide, the preparation and composition of which were the subject of an expired Australian patent[4], is used…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Apotex Pty Ltd and Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd concerning the patentability of medical treatments. The core of the disagreement revolved around whether a method of medical treatment of the human body constitutes a patentable invention under the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth).

The legal issues before the Court included whether a method of medical treatment of the human body is a patentable invention within the meaning of s 18(1)(a) of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth), and whether such a method, or a product or process for it, qualifies as a "manner of manufacture" under s 6 of the *Statute of Monopolies*. Additionally, the Court was required to consider whether a novel therapeutic use of a known substance is patentable and, in the context of infringement, whether supplying a drug with an indication for a different condition infringes a patent.

The High Court's reasoning acknowledged that, as a general proposition, the exclusion of medical treatments from patentability has been a long-standing, albeit anomalous, qualification on the principles of patentability. The Court noted that previous decisions, such as those in *Rescare* and *Wellcome Foundation*, lent support to the idea that this exclusion might be dispensed with as a development of existing principles. However, the Court also observed that the question of whether to expand patentability to cover methods of medical treatment was a matter for the legislature, rather than the judiciary, to determine, particularly given the complex public and private interests involved. The Court found that Apotex's submissions regarding the historical position in Australia were not as definitively supported by prior case law as contended.

In Matter No S1 of 2013, the appeal was dismissed with costs. In Matter No S219 of 2012, special leave to appeal was granted on a specific ground, and the appeal was allowed with costs. The orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia were set aside and replaced with new orders, including that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed in part and that certain parts of Apotex's amended application be dismissed. The matter was remitted to the Full Court for determination of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No S1 of 2013

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Matter No S219 of 2012

1. Special leave to appeal on ground 3 of the Draft Notice of Appeal filed on 10 September 2012 granted.

2. Appeal allowed with costs.

3. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 18 July 2012 and, in their place, order that:

(a) the appeal be allowed in part;

(b) orders 2, 3 and 6 of the Federal Court made on 18 November 2011 be set aside;

(c) order 1 of the Federal Court made on 24 February 2012 be set aside; and

(d) so much of the Amended Application dated 22 September 2009 as made in paragraphs 14 to 22 be dismissed.

4. Remit the matter to the Full Court on the questions of the costs of the appeal to that Court and the costs of the trial (which latter question may, at the discretion of the Full Court, be remitted to the primary judge).

Background

Background to the litigation

Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd involved a dispute over the patentability of a method for administering a pharmaceutical substance to prevent or treat a medical condition. The case originated from a patent held by Sanofi-Aventis concerning a specific use of a pharmaceutical substance for a medical condition. Apotex challenged the validity of this patent and argued that methods of medical treatment are not patentable under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The dispute escalated through various courts, including the Federal Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court, before reaching the High Court of Australia.

At the Federal Court, Apotex did not contest the correctness of earlier decisions that held methods of medical treatment are not patentable but reserved the right to challenge these decisions on appeal. The primary contention during the proceedings was whether a method of medical treatment for a "second or later medical use" of a known substance could be considered a patentable invention. The Federal Court upheld the view that such methods were not patentable, aligning with previous case law that methods of medical treatment were excluded from patentability under the Patents Act. In the Full Court, the judges similarly held that methods of medical treatment were not patentable inventions, leaving the question of legislative intent and potential expansion of patentable subject matter to the legislature.

The case was brought before the High Court to address the broader question of whether methods of medical treatment could be considered patentable inventions under the Patents Act. Apotex argued that the exclusion of medical treatment methods from patentability was inconsistent with the principles of patent law, particularly the concept of "manner of new manufacture." The High Court's decision considered the legislative history, judicial precedents, and the coherence of the current legal framework. The court acknowledged the potential for legislative reform to address the issue, leaving the ultimate resolution to the parliament rather than the judiciary. The High Court's ruling set aside certain orders from the lower courts and remitted the matter back for reconsideration of the costs involved in the litigation.

This matter originated as an appeal against decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in proceedings between Apotex Pty Ltd and Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd. The primary issue concerned the patentability of methods of medical treatment under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). Initially, the Federal Court held that methods of medical treatment were not patentable inventions, a decision that was upheld by the Full Court. Apotex subsequently appealed to this Court, challenging both the patentability of medical treatment methods and the infringement of a patent that claimed such a method. The appeal was heard on multiple grounds, and special leave to appeal was granted on certain issues. During the proceedings, key procedural steps included the filing of various applications and the making of interlocutory orders by both the Federal Court and the Full Court. The Court's ultimate decision involved a detailed consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and the submissions of both parties. The matter was remitted back to the Full Court to address the issue of costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ HAYNE J GAGELER J
As a general proposition, the reasoning of Gummow J at first instance in Rescare and of Lockhart J on appeal to the Full Court, and that of Davison CJ at first instance in Wellcome Foundation, lend powerful support to the proposition that the exclusion of medical treatment is an anomalous qualification on the principles governing patentability under the rubric "manner of new manufacture". A decision to dispense with the exclusion may be seen as a development of existing principle. To the extent that the Court enunciates such a development to enhance coherence in the law, it is not required to endeavour to resolve complex tensions between public and private interests which may be affected. Such tasks are largely matters for the legislature. They may require informed appraisal of a range of considerations backed by empirical evidence and expert advice concerning the practical significance of striking the balance in any particular way. The question whether, in the interests of coherence, this Court should support or reject the propounded exclusion of methods of medical treatment should now be considered in light of the decisions below and the submissions put to this Court by the parties. First it is appropriate to refer briefly to the decisions at first instance and in the Full Court. The decisions in the Federal Court At first instance, Apotex did not challenge the correctness of the Full Court's decisions in Rescare and Bristol-Myers, but reserved the right to do so on appeal[157]. In its written submissions to the Full Court, Apotex contended first that methods of medical treatment are not patentable, and second that methods of medical treatment for a "second or later medical use" are not patentable[158]. In oral argument to the Full Court, Apotex did not press the first contention, that methods of medical treatment are not patentable. Apotex's second use contention fell away because of the view that the Full Court formed of the proper construction of the claim in the Patent. On the first contention, Keane CJ, having referred to the decision of the Full Court in Rescare, said that the question whether or not patentability should be expanded to cover methods of medical treatment was a matter for determination by the legislature, rather than the judiciary below the level of this Court[159]. Bennett and Yates JJ took a similar approach to the Rescare and Bristol-Myers decisions. Like Keane CJ[160], and like Wilcox J in Rescare[161], they placed some weight upon legislative silence on the topic[162]. Their Honours expressed no view on Apotex's contention relating to second or later use[163]. [157](2011) 196 FCR 1 at 37 [143].[158](2012) 204 FCR 494 at 500–501 [23].[159](2012) 204 FCR 494 at 501 [26].[160](2012) 204 FCR 494 at 501 [26].[161](1994) 50 FCR 1 at 42–43.[162](2012) 204 FCR 494 at 537 [193].[163](2012) 204 FCR 494 at 538 [195].Patentability of medical treatments — A common law answer Apotex submitted, correctly, that a method of treating a human being with a known substance was never held to be capable of being an invention under the 1949 UK Act and its predecessors. Its submission that that was the position which had been accepted before 1990 as the law in Australia attached a more definite characterisation to Maeder v Busch and NRDC than the reasons in those decisions could bear. It is, however, correct to say that the exclusionary proposition has not been examined directly in any decision of this Court. While the obiter observations in the decisions reviewed in these reasons invite respect and close attention, they do not determine the answer to the question before this Court in this appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, HAYNE J, GAGELER J

The High Court in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd addressed the contentious issue of whether the administration of a pharmaceutical substance as a method of preventing or treating a medical condition constitutes a patentable invention under section 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The Court considered the broader legal principles governing patentability and the statutory language of "manner of new manufacture" as elucidated by the Statute of Monopolies. The Court also examined whether the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patentability represented an anomalous qualification on these principles.

The Court began by acknowledging the established jurisprudence, notably the decisions in Rescare and Bristol-Myers, which held that methods of medical treatment were not patentable inventions. These decisions were grounded in the understanding that such methods do not constitute a "manner of new manufacture" under the Patents Act. The Court highlighted that these decisions, while authoritative, left open the question of whether this exclusion should continue to apply. The Court recognized that any alteration to this exclusion would likely involve a legislative change, given the significant policy considerations and empirical evidence required to balance public and private interests.

In addressing whether the exclusion of methods of medical treatment was an anomalous qualification, the Court examined the historical context and statutory interpretation. The Court noted that the exclusion had not been directly challenged or examined in prior decisions, but the obiter observations in previous cases provided a foundation for reconsidering this issue. The Court observed that the exclusion might be seen as an anomaly when juxtaposed with the general principles of patentability, which typically encompass novel and useful inventions. However, the Court also emphasized the importance of legislative intervention to resolve such complex issues, as they involve broader societal and economic considerations.

The Court further considered whether a novel therapeutic use of a known substance could be deemed a patentable invention. This consideration was crucial in understanding the scope of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The Court noted that while the therapeutic use of a known substance might be novel, the exclusion of methods of medical treatment would still apply unless the legislature chose to alter the statutory framework. The Court did not find it necessary to definitively resolve this issue, as the broader question of patentability for methods of medical treatment remained central to the appeal.

The Court also deliberated on the interpretation of the phrase "manner of manufacture" within the Patents Act and the Statute of Monopolies. This interpretation was critical to determining the scope of patentable subject matter. The Court recognized that "manner of manufacture" traditionally referred to tangible products or processes, rather than intangible methods of medical treatment. The Court's analysis suggested that a broader interpretation of "manner of manufacture" might be warranted to align with contemporary understandings of patentable inventions, but again, any such change would require legislative action.

In addressing whether supplying a drug with an indication for a different condition constituted infringement under section 117(1) of the Patents Act, the Court focused on the specific claims made in the patent. The Court determined that supplying a drug with an indication for a different condition did not infringe the patent, as the patent did not claim the use of the drug for that particular condition. This interpretation underscored the importance of precise claim construction in determining patent infringement.

Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether methods of medical treatment for a "second or later medical use" were patentable under Australian law. The Court found that, given the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patentability, methods for a "second or later medical use" would also not be patentable. This conclusion was consistent with the existing legal framework and prior jurisprudence.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of the decision in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd is that methods of medical treatment are not patentable inventions under section 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), and any alteration to this exclusion would require legislative intervention. The Court emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation and the potential for legislative development to enhance coherence in the law of patentability. The Court's decision highlighted the need for informed legislative action to balance the complex public and private interests at stake in the patenting of pharmaceutical methods.