FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 1372
Citation: Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 1372 Parties: AUSTRALIAN MUD COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 009 283 416 and REFLEX INSTRUMENTS ASIA PACIFIC PTY LTD ACN 124 204 191 v CORETELL PTY LTD ACN 119 188 493, MINCREST HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 068 672 471 (TRADING AS CAMTEQ INSTRUMENTS), NICKY KLEYN and KLEYN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD ACN 118 967 687 (TRADING AS CAMTEQ INTERNATIONAL SERVICES) File number: NSD 2082 of 2011 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 4 December 2015 Catchwords: PATENTS – innovation patents – system and method patents for the orientation of core samples extracted from the ground in connection with geological surveying and other drilling operations – construction of the claims – whether the claims are directed to orientation of core samples in the context of mineral exploration which involves hard rock formations where there is unlikely to be fractured rock or to petroleum exploration which involves soft, fractured or brittle rock – whether the patents are confined in their scope to a system and method carried out by a ‘unitary’ electronic device or embrace a ‘two part’ device – whether the claims require that the recording of time at which the core sample is detached is a separate and discrete action removed in time from the ‘inputting’ of the time – whether an essential integer of the applicants’ tool is that the core sample be ‘held in fixed relation to’ the inner tube at the time of detachment from the body of material – whether the integer ‘indication of the orientation’ in the claims is not present in the respondents’ tool in the ‘real time roll’ method of display
PATENTS – infringement – whether the respondents’ tools include the features of each of the claims of the system and method patent – liability of each of the respondents for infringement – direct infringement – whether the corporate respondents have infringed the patents by making, selling, suppling or otherwise disposing of, or offering for those purposes, the respondents’ tools – indirect infringement – whether the corporate respondents have authorised, procured, induced or joined in a common design with persons to whom the respondents’ tools have been supplied to use the tools, and those persons have so used the respondents’ tools – joint tortfeasorship – whether the second and fourth respondents authorised, procured or induced, or joined in a common design with the first respondent to do the acts alleged to amount to infringement – whether the third respondent authorised, procured or induced or joined in a common design with the corporate respondents to do the acts alleged to amount to infringement – whether the third respondent was directly and personally involved in the corporate respondents’ activities alleged to amount to infringement – innocent infringement – whether the respondents were not aware or had no reason to believe that a patent for the…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1372
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning was thorough, focusing on the construction of the patent claims and comparing them with the background art and the respondents' tools. The court considered whether the respondents' tools incorporated the features of the claims and whether the applicants' patents were valid. The analysis included an examination of the novelty, innovative step, and utility of the inventions, as well as the potential for prior use or disclosure that could affect the patents' validity. The court also deliberated on the question of direct and indirect infringement, including the liability of the respondents for infringement and whether they were aware of the patents or the potential infringement. Furthermore, the court addressed the applicants' entitlement to relief for infringement activities occurring outside Australia and whether they could claim additional damages.
The court concluded that the applicants' patents were valid and had been infringed by the respondents. The claims were properly construed and the respondents' tools did include the features of the claims. The court found that the applicants were entitled to relief for the infringement activities and that the infringement occurred both directly and indirectly. The court also held that the applicants were entitled to additional damages for patent infringement. Consequently, the court made orders requiring the applicants to file and serve a minute of orders reflecting these reasons, allowing the respondents to file any responsive material, and scheduling a further directions hearing to address the making of orders consequent upon these reasons and to provide directions for the future conduct of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicants file and serve a minute of orders reflecting these reasons within 30 days.
2. The Respondents file any responsive material within a further 21 days.
3. A further directions hearing be scheduled in late February 2016 to make and/or program the making of orders consequent upon these reasons and directions as to the future conduct of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I note that this approach appears to be consistent with the views expressed by Dowsett J in Grove Hill when considering authorities relevant to the onus of establishing secret use (at [214]-[220]). His Honour concluded in the following terms (at [221]):… Whilst there may have been an evidential onus upon the [patentee] to raise the issue of reasonable trial or experiment, and perhaps even to address that issue in so far as it lay within its knowledge, it did so by calling Mr Mansur to give relevant evidence. In the end, however, the onus remained upon the [party alleging secret use] to satisfy the Court that there had been a disqualifying secret use, having regard to the combined operation of ss 9 and 18. Proof of use which may have been for the purpose of trial or experiment only would not have discharged that onus. It is worth observing that in virtually all cases, the invention in question will have been secretly used for necessary experimental and/or trial purposes. It cannot have been intended that in proceedings for revocation, the inventor should be put to proof of the reasonableness of such use simply because the applicant for revocation alleges disqualifying secret use. Such an outcome, if intended, would surely have been directly addressed.(emphasis added) Importantly, his Honour observed in that passage that proof of use which may have been for the purpose of trial or experiment only by the party alleging secret use would not have discharged the onus of proving secret use. I followed that approach in Bradken (at [366]). It is necessary then to consider the meaning of the matters which are ‘not to be taken as secret use’, including s 9(a) of the Act which is extracted above. In particular, the meaning of the expression ‘… for the purpose of reasonable trial or experiment only’. The principles relevant to what constitutes ‘reasonable trial or experiment only’ were considered in Grove Hill and Bradken. The view taken by Justice Dowsett in Grove Hill (at [229]) was that any collateral commercial advantage from ‘field trials’ was irrelevant if the true purpose of the use was for trial, and the trial was necessary. In Bradken, I took the view (at [359]-[360]) that the word ‘only’ in s 9(a) of the Act did not exclude the anticipation of any ultimate commercial benefit through the use in question, as that could be expected to be theoretically present in any case. The approach taken in Bradken was intended to accord with the approach of Dowsett J in Grove Hill. In my view, the state of the law is that the concept of ‘reasonable trial and experiment’ itself does not preclude that such trial and experiment be conducted in a circumstance which has in mind an ultimate commercial benefit. The word ‘only’ must be read in this light, otherwise almost all trial and experiment would be excluded. To the contrary, it is not intended under the Act that any and all commercial considerations be removed from ‘reasonable trial and experiment’. This would be quite unrealistic and unworkable.