RG Capital Radio Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc [2001] FCA 445

PATENTS – patent forprocess and device for operation of smart cards in connection with traders’ loyalty programs – claim for infringement and cross-claim for revocation – construction – “Behaviour file”, “coupon” – whether infringement – whether definite steps to use infringing system before priority date – whether manner of manufacture – whether lacking in novelty – whether obvious – whether useful – whether lacking in clarity – sufficiency or description – fair basis

WORDS AND PHRASES – “Behaviour file” “coupon”

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 7, 13(1), 18(1)(a), 40(2)(a), 40(3), 119(1)(b)
Patents Act 1977 (Imp) s 64
Statute of Monopolies 1623 (Imp) s 6
Constitution of the United States Art 1, s 8, cl 8

Flexible Steel Lacing Company v Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331 at [70]-[81] followed
Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 477 at 496 applied
CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577 at 627 followed
Helitune Ltd v Stewart Hughes Ltd [1991] FSR 171 mentioned
Lubrizol Corporation v Esso Petroleum Ltd  [1998] RPC 727 mentioned
Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Ltd v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 99 FCR 151 at [222] mentioned
Rolls Royce Ltd’s Application [1963] RPC 251 mentioned
Re Brown (1899) 5 ALR 81 mentioned
Commissioner of Patents v Lee (1913) 16 CLR 138 mentioned
Nielson v Minister for Public Works (NSW)  (1914) 18 CLR 423 mentioned
Re Kelvin & Hughes Ltd’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 103 mentioned
Rogers v Commissioner of Patents (1910) 10 CLR 701 mentioned
ESP’s Application (1945) 62 RPC 87 mentioned
W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 141 mentioned
International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 218 followed
CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260 applied
Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232 at 249 distinguished
National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 applied
Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611 at 616 mentioned
Crane v Price (1842) 3 Man & G 580, 134 ER 239 mentioned
Re GEC’s Application (1942) 60 RPC 1 mentioned
Re Cementation Co Ltd’s Application (1945) 62 RPC 151 mentioned
Rantzen’s Case (1946) 64 RPC 63 mentioned
Burroughs Corp Application [1974] RPC 147 at 161 mentioned
International Business Machines Corporation’s Application [1980] FSR 564 mentioned
State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group 149 F 3d 1368 (1998) discussed
Meyers Taylor Pty Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 228 at 235 applied
Flour Oxidising Co Ltd v Carr Atco Ltd (1908) 25 RPC 428 at 457 mentioned
General Tyre & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd [1972] RPC 457 at 485-6 mentioned
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf(Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253 at 293 applied
Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2000) AIPC 91-636 at [69] applied
Sach v Hartford Electric Co 47 F 2d…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 445
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of RG Capital Radio Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Authority, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant's system infringed the plaintiff's patent and an injunction to prevent further infringement. The court was tasked with determining whether the defendant's actions constituted an infringement under the Australian Patents Act 1990 and whether the defendant had taken definite steps to make or use the patented product or process before the priority date. The case hinged on the interpretation of Section 119 of the Patents Act, which allows for the use of a patented product or process if definite steps were taken before the priority date. The court examined the evidence provided by both parties and considered whether the defendant's actions amounted to definite steps under the Act. The court concluded that the defendant had not taken definite steps to use their system before the priority date and thus the defendant's actions constituted an infringement of the plaintiff's patent. The court ordered the defendant to cease and desist from using the patented product or process and to pay damages to the plaintiff.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant within seven days file and serve minutes of proposed orders.

2. Further hearing is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Thus the English courts have adopted a strict interpretation of s 64, a provision which, on its face, seems more favourable to infringers that s 119. Assuming for the moment that doing an act which would constitute infringement in the UK Act can be equated to making a product or using a process claimed in the claim of the patent in the Australian Act (but as to which, see below), in the normal course of events making preparations for the making of a product would be something that occurs prior to steps in the actual making.2. Evidence Mr Garton deposed that in August 1995 the respondents began work developing an upgraded system to make the Wizard/Transcard system suitable for full scale production use. Work continued on the upgrade throughout August and by mid September 1995 the respondents had formulated “the rollout requirements for the upgrade system”. Mr Garton produced a copy of the rollout commencement requirements dated 14 September 1995. He deposed that this was the “first and most critical document developed for the project”. It described the “functionality expected (and finally delivered) by” the respondents’ system. He further deposed that the “technical design of the (respondents’) system was substantially completed by 21 January 1996”. Mr Ben-Meir considered the documents referred to by Mr Garton. In Mr Ben-Meir’s opinion, those documents did not show that the technical design of the respondents’ system was substantially completed by 21 January 1996. From a review of those documents Mr Ben-Meir opined that the development of the respondents’ system had started but was in the early stage of development by that date. Seven of the documents referred to by Mr Garton in his affidavit were not completed by then. Mr Ben-Meir noted that the respondents’ system became operational in August 1996.3. Conclusion Neither Mr Garton nor Mr Ben-Meir was cross-examined on their evidence on this issue. The onus is on the respondents. I am not satisfied that, within the meaning of s 119(1)(b), the respondents had taken definite steps to use their system by 21 January 1996. Quite apart from questions of onus, I note that in terms of Mr Garton’s evidence the design of the respondents’ system was only “substantially completed” by 21 January 1996. The fact that the respondents’ system did not become operational until seven months later confirms the impression that what the respondents were doing as at the priority date was engaging in the ongoing development of a system. Although this was not mentioned in argument, it is worth noting that s 119 may have a quite limited effect. If an infringer comes within the section, it by no means follows that it can act as though the patent did not exist. As Ann Monotti points out in her article “Balancing the Rights of the Patentee and Prior User of an Invention; The Australian Experience” (1997) 7 EIPR 351, s 119 in its terms appears to limit its protection to the act of making a product or using a process and does not extend to other acts which would constitute exploitation, and hence infringement, such as sale or importation of a product: see s 13(1) and the definition of “exploit” in Sch 1.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY J
Once the construction issue is resolved in favour of the applicant, the respondents must fail on this issue.8. Conclusion I find the respondents’ system has infringed the claims of the Patent.IV DEFINITE STEPS TO MAKE OR USE1. The construction of s 119 Section 119 of the Act provides as follows:“(1) Where, immediately before the priority date of a claim, a person:(a) was making a product or using a process claimed in that claim; or(b)had taken definite steps (whether by way of contract or otherwise) to make that product or use that process;the person may, despite the grant of a patent for the product or process so claimed, make the product, or use the process, (or continue to do so) in the patent area, without infringing the patent.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the person:(a)derived the subject-matter of the invention concerned from the patentee or the patentee’s predecessor in title in the invention; or(b)before the relevant priority date, had stopped making the product or using the process (other than temporarily), or had abandoned (other than temporarily) the steps mentioned in paragraph (1)(b).” The respondents rely on s 119(1)(b). The product or process referred to in s 119(1) is the product or process claimed in the claim of the patent: CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577 at 627 per Cooper J. For s 119 to be applicable, it must be possible to say that immediately before the priority date the product or process of the patent was being made or used by the infringer or he or she had taken definite steps to make or use that particular product or that particular process. The concept of which s 119 speaks may be illustrated by the following example. Assume a patented product consisting of components A, B and C. Immediately before the priority date an infringer: has drawings depicting the product; has actually made A; has on his premises the raw materials for component B; and has ordered the raw materials for component C. It can then be said that the infringer had taken definite steps to make that product. Conversely, it would not be sufficient that immediately before the priority date, the infringer has made A, has received the raw materials for B but is investigating whether C, D or E would be the preferable final component. And the infringer would be in no better position if, after the priority date, he in fact decided that C was preferable and then proceeded to manufacture a product consisting of A, B and C. Reference was made in the course of argument to s 64 of the Patents Act 1977 (Imp) which provides:“Where a patent is granted for an intention, a person who in the United Kingdom before the priority date of the invention(a)does in good faith an act which would constitute an infringement of the patent if it were in force, or(b)makes in good faith effective and serious preparations to do such an act, has the right to continue to do the act or, as the case may be, to do the act, notwithstanding the grant of the patent, but this right does not extend to granting a licence to another person to do the act.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY J

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