Coretell Pty Ltd v Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Coretell Pty Ltd v Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 54

Appeal from:

Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 1372

Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 5) [2016] FCA 444

File number: WAD 134 of 2016
Judges: JAGOT, NICHOLAS AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 3 April 2017
Catchwords:

PATENTS – whether patentee entitled to relief for infringement from date of patent or date of grant – consideration of the scheme of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) – purpose of complete specification being open to public inspection – divisional applications filed in respect of standard patent filed as divisional of a provisional patent application – infringement and accessorial liability – innovation patents

PATENTS – invalidity – external fair basis and priority date – whether claims of innovation patents fairly based on disclosure in provisional application – whether innovation patents invalid on basis of prior use or prior secret use – meaning of  “use” in Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18

COSTS – decision of primary judge to award costs on indemnity basis

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 191

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 7, 9, 13, 18, 24, 29, 40, 43, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 79B, 101A, 101B, 101E, 101F, 120, 122, 129, 129A, 133, 138, 143A, Schedule 1

Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) regs 2.2, 3.12, 6.3, 13.4

Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Bill 2000 (Cth), Revised Explanatory Memorandum

Cases cited:

Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (No 4) [2013] FCA 162; (2013) 100 IPR 285

Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 102; (2012) 204 FCR 494

Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1220; (2009) 261 ALR 501

Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1169; (2010) 88 IPR 270

Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 121; (2011) 93 IPR 188

Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 1372

Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 5) [2016] FCA 444

Azuko Pty Ltd v Old Digger Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1079; (2001) 52 IPR 75

Bradken Resources Pty Ltd v Lynx Engineering Consultants Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1257; (2008) 78 IPR 586

Britax Childcare Pty Ltd v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1019

Clorox Australia Pty Ltd v International Consolidated Business Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 261; (2006) 68 IPR 254

Comcare v PVYW [2013] HCA 41; (2013) 250 CLR 246

Danisco A/S v Novozymes A/S (No 2) [2011] FCA 282; (2011) 91 IPR 209

Delnorth Pty Ltd v Dura-Post (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1225; (2008) 78 IPR 463

DSI Australia (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Garford Pty Ltd [2013] FCA…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Coretell Pty Ltd (the appellants) appealed against the decision of the primary judge (Kiefel J) in the Federal Court of Australia, which found that Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd (the respondents) had infringed the appellants’ patents and were liable for damages. The patents in question related to an orienting tool for core samples. The appeal involved multiple grounds, primarily concerning the date from which the respondents could be liable for patent infringement, the validity of the patents, and the assessment of costs.

The legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) in relation to the date from which relief for infringement could be claimed, the validity of the patents based on their priority dates, and the principles governing the assessment of costs. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the relief for infringement could commence from the date of the patents or the date of their grant, whether the patents were validly based on the disclosure in the provisional application, and whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion in awarding costs.

The court held that the correct date from which the respondents could be liable for infringement was the date of the grant of the patents, not the date of their filing. This conclusion was based on the language of the Act and the statutory provisions that allow a patentee to commence infringement proceedings upon the grant of a standard patent. The court also found that the primary judge correctly applied the test for external fair basis and determined that the patents were validly based on the disclosure in the provisional application. Additionally, the court rejected the appeal concerning the novelty-defeating prior use of the invention and upheld the primary judge’s findings.

The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the declarations and directions made by the primary judge and substituting new declarations and directions. The court ordered an inquiry into the profits or damages and additional damages in respect of the respondents' infringement of the patents and mandated the respondents to provide specified documents. The appellants were ordered to pay ninety percent of the respondents' costs of the appeal. The orders regarding costs were suspended to allow for further submissions on the costs issue.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed in part.

2. The Declaration and the Directions 7 and 8 made by the primary judge on 23 March 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be the following Declaration and Directions:

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1. The respondents and each of them have from 16 December 2010 until 5 September 2013 infringed each of claims 1 to 5 of Australian Innovation Patent No 2010101356 (‘356 Patent) and from 15 September 2011 until 5 September 2013 infringed each of claims 1 to 5 of Australian Innovation Patent No 2011101041 (‘041 Patent) (together, the Patents).

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

2. There be an inquiry as to profits or damages and additional damages (if any) in respect of the respondents’ infringement of the Patents.

3. The respondents provide discovery (in the event that they have not already done so), to be verified by an affidavit of the third respondent by 21 April 2017, in accordance with r 20.15 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), of the documents in the following categories:

(i) all invoices issued by Procept Pty Ltd to any of the respondents recording the supply of ORIshot orientation tools and/or any circuit boards for ORIshot orientation tools between 16 December 2010 and 5 September 2013; and

(ii) all invoices issued by Coretell Pty Ltd to its customers or agents recording the supply of ORIshot orientation tools between 16 December 2010 and 5 September 2013.

3. The appellants pay ninety per cent of the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

4. Order 3 hereof be suspended for a period of 28 days.

5. Any party wishing to apply for a costs order different to order 3 hereof may file and serve a written submission (limited to 3 pages in length) within 7 days.

6. Any party wishing to reply to such written submission is to file and serve a written submission in reply (limited to 2 pages in length) within 14 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides:191Agreements as to facts(1)In this section:agreed fact means a fact that the parties to a proceeding have agreed is not, for the purposes of the proceeding, to be disputed.(2)In a proceeding:(a)evidence is not required to prove the existence of an agreed fact; and(b)evidence may not be adduced to contradict or qualify an agreed fact;unless the court gives leave.(3)Subsection (2) does not apply unless the agreed fact:(a)is stated in an agreement in writing signed by the parties or by Australian legal practitioners, legal counsel or prosecutors representing the parties and adduced in evidence in the proceeding; or(b)with the leave of the court, is stated by a party before the court with the agreement of all other parties. The document recording the agreed fact purported to be a statement of agreed facts of the kind referred to in s 191. The Court was informed that the statement of agreed facts was filed but not adduced in evidence. Nor was the statement of agreed facts signed by the parties’ legal representatives. It follows that neither of the requirements imposed by s 191(3)(a) was satisfied in this case and s 191 was never engaged. The parties’ failure to ensure that the requirements of s 191 were complied with is significant. Had the document been signed and adduced into evidence as required by s 191(3)(a), it would not have been open to either party to adduce any evidence to contradict or qualify the agreed fact without the leave of the Court. But in circumstances where s 191(3) was not engaged, the leave requirement in s 191(2) did not apply. It was therefore open to the primary judge to decide the case against Mincrest on the evidence as a whole rather than on the basis of an agreed fact that was inconsistent with other evidence. Accordingly, I reject the appeal insofar as it concerns the position of Mincrest. 4. INVALIDITY – EXTERNAL FAIR BASIS AND PRIORITY DATE – GROUNDS 15 AND 164.1 Introduction Grounds 15 and 16 of the appeal concern what is often called “external fair basis” and novelty. The appellants contend that the priority date should be found to be deferred to after 3 September 2004. If that is so, then it is common ground that the Patents are invalid in view of the publication of the ACT Tool (the tool which has been developed and commercialised by AMC for the orienting of core samples, described in the evidence as the ACT Tool or Ace Core Tool). As noted above, the Patents are divisional applications. It is not in issue that, as his Honour found at [440] – [443], any allocation of a priority date based on the Provisional Application arises by operation of ss 43 and 79B of the Act and reg 3.12 of the Regulations. The broad question is whether the claims of the patents in suit are fairly based on the matters disclosed in the Provisional Application. The appellants contend first, that the primary judge made a finding that the claims of the System Patent and the Method Patent are not limited to an orientation device in which the components are present in one physical unit but encompass multi-component tools. Having done so, they submit that his Honour erred in finding that those claims were fairly based on the disclosure of the Provisional Application because, properly construed, that Application disclosed an invention limited to single unitary device (unitary device argument).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Method Patent was granted pursuant to s 62 on 15 September 2011 and certified pursuant to s 101E on 1 November 2011. 1.3 Summary of grounds and conclusions The appellants rely on a Substituted Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 14 November 2016 (Notice of Appeal). That document reduces the grounds of appeal relied upon, but retains the original numbering from the previous draft. In order to aid cross-referencing, I have below retained the numbering in that document. Grounds 1, 2 and 3 concern the identification of the correct date in respect of which the respondents may obtain relief for infringement of the Patents. The contest shows a significant divergence of views. As I explain below, the primary judge implicitly followed the reasoning of Middleton J in Britax Childcare Pty Ltd v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1019 (Britax) which concluded that by operation of ss 13, 65 and 68 of the Act and reg 6.3 of the Regulations, the correct date was the date of the Patents, in this case being 5 September 2005. As a consequence, the primary judge found that the appellants may be liable for acts of infringement committed after that date. The appellants contend that the reasoning in Britax is incorrect and that the correct date should be the date of the grant of the Patents being between five and six years later, on 16 December 2010 (System Patent) and 15 September 2011 (Method Patent). In section 2 below, I accept the appellants’ submission, with the result that grounds 1 and 2 and parts of ground 3 of the appeal are allowed. In ground 6 the appellants contend that the primary judge erred in his findings concerning the accessorial liability of Kleyn Investments. In section 3 I find that the appeal in relation to Kleyn Investments is partially allowed. Grounds 15 and 16 challenge the primary judge’s findings as to the identification of the correct priority date for the Patents, which, if allowed, would have the consequence that the claims of the Patents are invalid for lack of novelty. These grounds call for consideration of whether or not the patentee is entitled to claim priority based on the disclosure of the Provisional Application. In section 4 below I find that the primary judge correctly applied the test for external fair basis and correctly determined that the Patents were entitled to the priority date. Ground 19 of the appeal concerns an alleged novelty-defeating prior use of the invention in that Chardec Consultants Limited (Chardec) (the employer of the inventor of the Patents, Mr Parfitt) used and authorised the public use of the invention by disclosing it to third parties before the priority date. Ground 20 contends that if the learned primary judge found that the “grace period” provisions applied to such use, then he fell into error. In section 5, I reject ground 19 of the appeal and uphold his Honour’s findings. The respondents have filed a Notice of Contention to the effect that his Honour ought also to have also found that any public prior use of the invention benefitted from the grace period provisions under s 24 of the Act. I do not consider, in the circumstances, that it is necessary to address the Notice of Contention.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In answer, the respondents adopted the reasoning in Britax.2.5 Consideration I consider that the date from which the respondents are entitled to relief for infringement of the Patents is the date of their grant, for the following reasons. First, the language of Part 1 of Chapter 11 of the Act supports this conclusion. Section 120(1) provides that the patentee or an exclusive licensee may start “infringement proceedings” in a prescribed court, or in another court having jurisdiction. As noted, an act of infringement will arise where an act is done in respect of the exclusive rights conferred pursuant to s 13. The term “infringement proceedings” is defined in the Dictionary to mean proceedings for infringement of “a patent”, which means a patent as granted pursuant to either ss 61 or 62. The term “patentee” is defined to mean the person for the time being entered in the Register as the grantee or proprietor of a patent. Subsection 120(1A) of the Act provides that infringement proceedings in respect of an innovation patent cannot be started unless the patent has been certified. There is no equivalent provision in relation to a standard patent. Accordingly, whilst a patentee of a standard patent may commence proceedings upon the grant of the patent, the patentee of an innovation patent must not only have received the grant of the patent but also certification under s 101E of the Act. Section 122(1) provides that the relief which a court may grant for infringement of a patent includes an injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the Court thinks fit) and, at the option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits. The words “for infringement of a patent” (emphasis added) signify that relief is available in respect of an act of infringement of a patent that conforms with the definition of that term. Namely, a standard or innovation patent that has had the benefit of a grant within ss 61 or 62. Accordingly, the language of s 122(1) of the Act indicates that it is the grant of the standard patent that entitles the patentee to commence proceedings (s 120(1)), the grant and certification of the innovation patent that entitles the patentee of an innovation patent to commence proceedings for infringement (s 120(1A)) and the focus is upon “grant”. The relief which may be obtained is for the infringement of the granted patent (s 122(1)). Secondly, the statutory expression in s 122(1) “relief… for infringement of a patent” must be properly understood. Infringement arises when all of the features of the invention as claimed are taken; Meyers Taylor v Vicarr. Infringement is in relation to the claims, which define the monopoly, not the patent at large. This lends support for the appellants’ contention that ss 13, 65, 68 and reg 6.3(7)(c) cannot be interpreted literally to give the patentee an enforceable monopoly in respect of an “invention”. The rights to relief can arise only when claims have been brought into existence.