Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 102

Citation: Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 102
Appeal from: Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 846
Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 1307
Parties: APOTEX PTY LTD (ACN 096 916 148) v SANOFI-AVENTIS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 008 558 807), SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH and AVENTISUB II INCORPORATED
File number: NSD 2133 of 2011
Judges: KEANE CJ, BENNETT & YATES JJ
Date of judgment: 18 July 2012
Catchwords:

PATENTS – proper construction of claim of patent – method claim – medical treatment – validity – whether invention novel – whether invention as claimed a manner of manufacture – infringement – whether appellant threatened to infringe patent by supplying pharmaceutical product for particular purposes

COPYRIGHT – product information for pharmaceutical product – whether respondents bound by an implied licence – whether licence implied by custom in the industry

Legislation: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 15, 36, 183, 44BA
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 7, 13, 18, 40, 117, 138
Statute of Monopolies 1623: 21 Jac 1 c 3 s 6
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 25AA
Therapeutic Goods Legislation Amendment (Copyright) Act 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 173 cited
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1 discussed
Apotex v Sanofi-Aventis Australia [2012] FCAFC 62 referred to
Avel Proprietary Limited v Multicoin Amusements Proprietary Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88 cited
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v F H Faulding & Company Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 524 discussed
British United Shoe Machinery Co Ltd v A. Fussell & Sons Ltd (1908) 25 RPC 631 cited
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 41 discussed
Catnic Components Limited v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 cited
Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 cited
Con-Stan Industries of Australia Proprietary Limited v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Limited (1986) 160 CLR 226 discussed
Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales (2008) 233 CLR 279 cited
H Lundbeck A/S v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2009) 177 FCR 151 cited
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 discussed
Hill v Evans (1862) 4 De GF & J 288; 1A IPR 1 cited
ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v The Lubrizol Corporation Inc (2000) 106 FCR 214 cited
Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611 cited
Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Roland Corporation (1992) 23 IPR 376 cited
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v HN Norton & Company Ltd [1996] RPC 76 cited
National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 cited
Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619 cited
Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 cited
Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119 discussed
Reynolds v Herbert Smith &…
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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2), the dispute centered on the construction of a patent claim concerning a method for preventing or treating a skin disorder, specifically psoriasis, through the administration of a compound. The primary judge favoured the respondents' construction of the claim, which was that the method claimed involved the actual effect of the administration rather than the purpose or aim of the administration. The appellant, Apotex, disagreed and sought a different interpretation, arguing that the method claim depended on the objective determination of the treating physician's purpose or aim in administering the compound.

The court examined whether the claim should be construed to involve the purpose, object, or aim of the administration, or the actual effect of the administration. The primary judge held that the claim was directed to achieving a biological result, namely the prevention or treatment of psoriasis, rather than the purpose of the administration. The court noted that the claim did not mention the purpose of the administration and that the method was defined by the result achieved. The primary judge concluded that the claim was validly constructed to require that the compound be administered in an effective amount to prevent or treat psoriasis, based on the actual effect of the administration.

The court upheld the primary judge's construction of the claim, rejecting Apotex's argument that the claim should depend on the purpose or aim of the administration. The court found that the claim was for a method of preventing or treating psoriasis and that the method necessarily involved a deliberate exercise of diagnosis and prescription by a medical practitioner. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that Apotex pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant’s preferred construction of the claim was construction (2). The respondents’ preferred construction was construction (4).The primary judge’s conclusions The primary judge summarised the issue of construction of the patent at Reasons [151]-[152]:151 … The essence of the dispute between the parties insofar as it related to the construction of the patent is ultimately whether the claim for a “method of preventing or treating a skin disorder, wherein the skin disorder is psoriasis” by administration of a compound should be construed as involving the purpose, object or aim of the administration (whether that purpose, object or aim be determined subjectively or objectively), or the effect in fact of the administration.152 …Apotex’s … [preferred construction] … depends on an objective determination of the treating physician’s purpose, object or aim in administering the compound. It asks whether the purpose, object or aim of the treating physician’s administration of the compound can be objectively characterised as preventing or treating psoriasis. … The concept of the “incidental” treatment of psoriasis assumes the existence of another direct or immediate purpose of treatment. By contrast … Sanofi-Aventis’s construction asks whether the administration will in fact have the effect of preventing or treating psoriasis …. In resolving the issue of construction in favour of the respondents, her Honour said at Reasons [154]-[155]:154 …The difficulty for Apotex’s proffered constructions is that the claim itself says nothing about the purpose of the administration of the compound. The method claimed is a method of preventing or treating the skin disorder psoriasis by administering an effective amount of the compound. The method is described and defined by the result: the prevention or treatment of psoriasis. If there were any ambiguity in the concepts of preventing or treating psoriasis, the definition of those terms in the specification confirms that they mean achieving a particular biological result or effect in the recipient of the administration of the leflunomide. According to the specification, “prevention” is the prophylactic prevention of psoriasis in a susceptible mammal and “treatment” is arresting the development and retarding the progression of psoriasis in a susceptible mammal. As Apotex submitted, the particular disease, psoriasis, is an essential integer of the method claimed. But its essentiality operates in terms of result or effect (the fact of prevention or treatment of psoriasis) and not, as Apotex said, in terms of the purpose of the administration. 155 Accordingly, the claimed method is used where the compound (leflunomide) is administered to a recipient in an effective amount so that the recipient’s psoriasis is in fact prevented or treated. The validity of the patent and, if valid, its infringement are to be determined on the basis of this construction. Earlier, her Honour had said at Reasons [130]:Leflunomide is a drug used in the treatment of RA and PsA and, for that purpose, is prescribed by rheumatologists. Leflunomide is not used in Australia for the treatment of psoriasis alone and is not prescribed by dermatologists for that purpose. However, if leflunomide is administered to a patient with PsA, that administration would be expected also to prevent or treat the patient’s psoriasis, to some extent at least.The arguments of the parties on appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent submits that the manner in which the appellant seeks to support its construction (by referring to the dermatologist’s diagnosis and prescription) postulates an inquiry into the purpose of the user of an invention which is alien to patent law. The appellant’s construction is also said to disregard the definitions of treating and preventing contained in the specification which confirm that the claim is directed to the achievement of a biological result. Further, the appellant’s construction is said to import words not present in the claim, in that the claim does not state that the process is dependent upon a doctor’s diagnosis. Consideration In my respectful opinion, the construction of the claim which was preferred by the primary judge fails to recognise that the claim is for a method of treating or preventing a specific ailment. The claim in the patent is not for the use of leflunomide in a manner that treats or prevents psoriasis. The claim is not for the discovery of whatever happens in the human body after the drug is administered. Rather, the claim is for a method of preventing or treating psoriasis. The claim is for a method of treatment of a human ailment. That method necessarily presupposes a deliberate exercise of diagnosis and prescription by a medical practitioner. The treatment or prevention of psoriasis by the use of the claimed method presupposes a diagnosis of psoriasis and the consequent prescription of the application of leflunomide. That this is so is hardly controversial: as is apparent from all the potential constructions of the patent advanced by the parties, the claim in the patent involves the application of leflunomide by a medical practitioner. Lord Hoffman observed in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v HN Norton & Company Ltd [1996] RPC 76, 92 that, under the “traditional United Kingdom doctrine of infringement … liability for infringement is … absolute. It depends upon whether the act in question falls within the claims [in the patent] and pays no attention to the alleged infringer’s state of mind.” His Lordship went on to note that this traditional doctrine may be “difficult to apply to a patent for the use of a known substance in a known way for a new purpose”. His Lordship articulated this difficulty in the question: “How does one tell whether the person putting the additive into his engine is legitimately using it to inhibit rust or infringing by using it to reduce friction?” The first point to be made in relation to Lord Hoffman’s observations is that the difficulty identified by his Honour arises because it is now accepted that methods or processes which do not produce a vendible product may nevertheless be patentable: see National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 268-277; Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611 at 616-617. A claim for a method or process used to achieve a specific result is intelligible only as a teleological proposition. In the case of the patent in question the identification of the object of the application of the method depends on the diagnosis of a medical practitioner. In the present case, of course, no need arises to look into the mind of “the alleged infringer”. All four potential constructions of the claim identified by the parties acknowledge that the claim is for a method which comprises the administration of leflunomide prescribed by a medical practitioner to treat a specific human ailment. Even construction (4), the construction ultimately adopted by the primary judge, proceeds on the footing that the administration of leflunomide is a step in a clinical process of diagnosis and prescription by a medical practitioner. It is natural to construe the claim in the patent as a claim to a method of treatment the object of which is determined by the diagnosis and prescription of the medical practitioner whose area of practice is ailments of the skin. To return to Lord Hoffman’s question, one can readily tell that the person putting the additive into his engine is using it to inhibit rust, rather than to reduce friction, if the person controlling the process is a specialist in rust prevention.