FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 102
Citation: Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 102 Appeal from: Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 846
Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 1307Parties: APOTEX PTY LTD (ACN 096 916 148) v SANOFI-AVENTIS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 008 558 807), SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH and AVENTISUB II INCORPORATED File number: NSD 2133 of 2011 Judges: KEANE CJ, BENNETT & YATES JJ Date of judgment: 18 July 2012 Catchwords: PATENTS – proper construction of claim of patent – method claim – medical treatment – validity – whether invention novel – whether invention as claimed a manner of manufacture – infringement – whether appellant threatened to infringe patent by supplying pharmaceutical product for particular purposes
COPYRIGHT – product information for pharmaceutical product – whether respondents bound by an implied licence – whether licence implied by custom in the industry
Legislation: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 15, 36, 183, 44BA
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 7, 13, 18, 40, 117, 138
Statute of Monopolies 1623: 21 Jac 1 c 3 s 6
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 25AA
Therapeutic Goods Legislation Amendment (Copyright) Act 2011 (Cth)Cases cited: Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 173 cited
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1 discussed
Apotex v Sanofi-Aventis Australia [2012] FCAFC 62 referred to
Avel Proprietary Limited v Multicoin Amusements Proprietary Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88 cited
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v F H Faulding & Company Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 524 discussed
British United Shoe Machinery Co Ltd v A. Fussell & Sons Ltd (1908) 25 RPC 631 cited
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 41 discussed
Catnic Components Limited v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 cited
Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 cited
Con-Stan Industries of Australia Proprietary Limited v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Limited (1986) 160 CLR 226 discussed
Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales (2008) 233 CLR 279 cited
H Lundbeck A/S v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2009) 177 FCR 151 cited
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 discussed
Hill v Evans (1862) 4 De GF & J 288; 1A IPR 1 cited
ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v The Lubrizol Corporation Inc (2000) 106 FCR 214 cited
Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611 cited
Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Roland Corporation (1992) 23 IPR 376 cited
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v HN Norton & Company Ltd [1996] RPC 76 cited
National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 cited
Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619 cited
Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 cited
Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119 discussed
Reynolds v Herbert Smith &…
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- Case
- [2012] FCAFC 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the claim should be construed to involve the purpose, object, or aim of the administration, or the actual effect of the administration. The primary judge held that the claim was directed to achieving a biological result, namely the prevention or treatment of psoriasis, rather than the purpose of the administration. The court noted that the claim did not mention the purpose of the administration and that the method was defined by the result achieved. The primary judge concluded that the claim was validly constructed to require that the compound be administered in an effective amount to prevent or treat psoriasis, based on the actual effect of the administration.
The court upheld the primary judge's construction of the claim, rejecting Apotex's argument that the claim should depend on the purpose or aim of the administration. The court found that the claim was for a method of preventing or treating psoriasis and that the method necessarily involved a deliberate exercise of diagnosis and prescription by a medical practitioner. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that Apotex pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent submits that the manner in which the appellant seeks to support its construction (by referring to the dermatologist’s diagnosis and prescription) postulates an inquiry into the purpose of the user of an invention which is alien to patent law. The appellant’s construction is also said to disregard the definitions of treating and preventing contained in the specification which confirm that the claim is directed to the achievement of a biological result. Further, the appellant’s construction is said to import words not present in the claim, in that the claim does not state that the process is dependent upon a doctor’s diagnosis. Consideration In my respectful opinion, the construction of the claim which was preferred by the primary judge fails to recognise that the claim is for a method of treating or preventing a specific ailment. The claim in the patent is not for the use of leflunomide in a manner that treats or prevents psoriasis. The claim is not for the discovery of whatever happens in the human body after the drug is administered. Rather, the claim is for a method of preventing or treating psoriasis. The claim is for a method of treatment of a human ailment. That method necessarily presupposes a deliberate exercise of diagnosis and prescription by a medical practitioner. The treatment or prevention of psoriasis by the use of the claimed method presupposes a diagnosis of psoriasis and the consequent prescription of the application of leflunomide. That this is so is hardly controversial: as is apparent from all the potential constructions of the patent advanced by the parties, the claim in the patent involves the application of leflunomide by a medical practitioner. Lord Hoffman observed in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v HN Norton & Company Ltd [1996] RPC 76, 92 that, under the “traditional United Kingdom doctrine of infringement … liability for infringement is … absolute. It depends upon whether the act in question falls within the claims [in the patent] and pays no attention to the alleged infringer’s state of mind.” His Lordship went on to note that this traditional doctrine may be “difficult to apply to a patent for the use of a known substance in a known way for a new purpose”. His Lordship articulated this difficulty in the question: “How does one tell whether the person putting the additive into his engine is legitimately using it to inhibit rust or infringing by using it to reduce friction?” The first point to be made in relation to Lord Hoffman’s observations is that the difficulty identified by his Honour arises because it is now accepted that methods or processes which do not produce a vendible product may nevertheless be patentable: see National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 268-277; Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611 at 616-617. A claim for a method or process used to achieve a specific result is intelligible only as a teleological proposition. In the case of the patent in question the identification of the object of the application of the method depends on the diagnosis of a medical practitioner. In the present case, of course, no need arises to look into the mind of “the alleged infringer”. All four potential constructions of the claim identified by the parties acknowledge that the claim is for a method which comprises the administration of leflunomide prescribed by a medical practitioner to treat a specific human ailment. Even construction (4), the construction ultimately adopted by the primary judge, proceeds on the footing that the administration of leflunomide is a step in a clinical process of diagnosis and prescription by a medical practitioner. It is natural to construe the claim in the patent as a claim to a method of treatment the object of which is determined by the diagnosis and prescription of the medical practitioner whose area of practice is ailments of the skin. To return to Lord Hoffman’s question, one can readily tell that the person putting the additive into his engine is using it to inhibit rust, rather than to reduce friction, if the person controlling the process is a specialist in rust prevention.