GM Global Technology Operations LLC v S.S.S. Auto Parts Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 83 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GM Global Technology Operations LLC v S.S.S. Auto Parts Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 97

File number(s): VID 394 of 2015
Judge(s): BURLEY  J
Date of judgment: 11 February 2019
Catchwords:

DESIGNS – importing, keeping for sale, offering to sell and selling replica parts for motor vehicles which embody designs that are identical to or substantially similar in overall impression to registered designs – claim for design infringement and the operation of the repair defence pursuant to s 72 of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) – attribution of knowledge to corporations and the test for determining actual and constructive knowledge thereof – whether the applicant has established that the respondents knew or ought reasonably to have known that the impugned uses were not for the purpose of repair so as to restore the overall appearance of a complex product in whole or in part – whether sufficient to establish that the impugned uses might (rather than would) be used for a non-repair purpose

DESIGNS – application for relief from unjustified threats pursuant to s 77 of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) – whether the impugned letters of demand constituted a threat or mere notification pursuant to s 80 of the Designs Act – whether a supplier of the recipients of an impugned letter of demand is an “aggrieved person” – the operation of ss 77(3) and 78 of the Designs Act and whether threats made in relation to uncertified designs will necessarily be unjustified, even if subsequently certified – the relevance and operation of s 72 of the Designs Act in the context of s 77 – whether a registered design owner need not be satisfied that impugned uses are not for the purpose of repair prior to making a threat of infringement proceedings – whether a threat is automatically unjustified if the registered owner fails to establish infringement – whether discretion should be exercised not to grant relief for unjustified threats

CONSUMER LAW – misleading or deceptive conduct – whether, in a letter of demand, there is a duty to disclose matters including particulars of the defence afforded by s 72 of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth); that certain designs alleged to have been infringed had not been certified in accordance with s 73 of the Designs Act; that the designs had a maximum term of monopoly; and/or that the impugned parts were not “counterfeit” as alleged

COPYRIGHT – application for relief from unjustified threats pursuant to s 202 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) – whether discretion should be exercised not to grant relief for unjustified threats

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB

Australian Consumer Law as contained in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 18, 29

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 102, 103, 202

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1041A

Designs Act 1906 (Cth)

Designs Act 2003 (Cth), ss 71, 72, 77-81

Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 117, 128, 129

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss, 51AA,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read GM Global Technology Operations LLC v S.S.S. Auto Parts Pty... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 97
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In GM Global Technology Operations LLC v S.S.S. Auto Parts Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, GM Global Technology Operations LLC (GMGTO), sought to establish that the defendant, S.S.S. Auto Parts Pty Ltd (SSS), infringed on certain registered designs by importing, keeping for sale, offering to sell, and selling replica parts for motor vehicles. GMGTO argued that the designs were identical or substantially similar to the registered designs and that the repair defence under section 72 of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) did not apply. The court had to determine whether GMGTO proved that SSS knew or should have known that the parts were not for repair purposes. The court also examined SSS's cross-claim that GMGTO's threats to commence infringement proceedings were unjustified.

The court's reasoning centred on the principles of attributing knowledge to corporations, particularly focusing on whether GMGTO established that SSS knew or should have known that the parts were not for repair purposes. The court noted that GMGTO's case relied on unrealistic expectations about what individuals involved in the transactions should have known. GMGTO succeeded in demonstrating infringement in a limited number of transactions, but the value of these infringements was small relative to the litigation costs. Regarding the cross-claim, the court found that some of GMGTO's threats were unjustified, particularly those related to uncertified designs. The court also considered whether GMGTO needed to prove non-compliance with the repair defence before threatening infringement proceedings and whether a threat was automatically unjustified if infringement could not be established.

The court concluded that GMGTO had not established the necessary knowledge to negate the repair defence for most transactions, except for a few specific cases. The cross-claim was partially successful, with the court finding unjustified threats related to uncertified designs and certain letters of demand. The court planned to hear submissions on the appropriate relief for the unjustified threats. The case highlighted the complexities of attributing knowledge in corporate contexts and the importance of realistic expectations in infringement claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The matter be listed for case management hearing not before 10:15am on 8 March 2019.

2. The parties confer and endeavour to agree as to the appropriate form of orders to be made reflecting the conclusions expressed in these reasons (including as to costs) and providing a timetable for the necessary steps required to determine the outstanding issues in the proceedings. Draft orders (marked up to show any areas of disagreement) are to be provided to the Associate of Justice Burley no later than two (2) working days before the case management hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The final form of the cross-claim was filed (with leave) after the conclusion of the trial, on 24 April 2018. It is brought in relation to 11 specific threats, 10 to spare parts suppliers who have obtained products from SSS, and 1 to SSS itself. The cross-claim relies on correspondence between GMH and the parts suppliers as reflected in Exhibit B. Little time was spent in closing submissions addressing the particular courses of conduct, although it has been necessary in these reasons to go through each. 1.4 Summary of conclusions I have concluded that, in relation to the GMGTO claim, GMGTO has failed to establish that the importation, keeping for sale or offer for sale of the impugned SSS parts was not for a repair purpose within the meaning of s 72 of the Designs Act. It has also failed in respect of all representative transactions nominated for the purpose of considering infringement by selling the impugned parts with the exception of; transactions 1, 6, 7 and 8 (in relation to W & G Smash Repairs only) involving SSS Sydney; transactions 15 and 17 (in relation to sales (1), (2), (3) and (5) only) involving SSS Melbourne; and transactions 25 and 26 involving SSS Queensland. As a broad observation, I note that the case as presented by GMGTO in relation to its claim tended to be based on what I consider to be unrealistic expectations as to what individuals (whose knowledge could be attributed to an SSS party) knew or ought reasonably to have known about a transaction. As a result of legitimate concerns that GMH would commence lengthy, detailed and expensive proceedings against it, SSS introduced a series of policies designed to ensure and demonstrate that sales made were for a repair purpose. This ultimately led to SSS implementing controls on the sale of the impugned parts that appear to be similar to the controls implemented by GMH itself. It is difficult to imagine that the legislators had this in mind when s 72 was enacted. Nevertheless, in order to consider the application of the s 72 defence, it has been necessary to consider each transaction, and the purpose of SSS in the context of each alleged act of infringement. Ultimately, GMGTO has succeeded in respect of a relatively small number of representative transactions, the value of which (seen in the context of this litigation) is likely to be small compared to the costs involved. In relation to the cross-claim, I have found that the SSS cross-claimants have succeeded in only very limited respects. Although the GMH correspondence was undoubtedly aggressive and, in some respects, inaccurate, I have concluded that in the main it did not involve unlawful conduct in the manner contended. I have concluded that there were unjustified threats to bring design infringement proceedings in relation to the Panel House, CarParts and Torq parts suppliers by reason of the fact that Designs 7 and 12 were never certified. Further, an unjustified threat to bring copyright infringement proceedings was made in relation to the relevant letters of demand to Holmart. I will hear submissions from the parties as to the appropriate relief to grant, if any.2. THE REGISTERED DESIGNS AND THE SSS PRODUCTS

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

GMH’s reply particulars rely upon actual or constructive knowledge. The existence of actual knowledge is a question of fact, the proof of which, in the absence of an admission by a party, is always a matter of inference; RCA Corporation v Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd (1978) 19 ALR 123 (NSWCA, Hope, Reynolds, Hutley JJA) at 125. The materials from which the inference may be drawn will vary, according to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. In inferring knowledge, the Court is entitled to assume that the person concerned has the ordinary understanding expected of persons in his or her line of business, unless by evidence it is convinced otherwise. In RCA Corporation, the NSW Court of Appeal said at 126:In other words, the true position is that the court is not concerned with the knowledge of a reasonable man but is concerned with reasonable inferences to be drawn from a concrete situation as disclosed in the evidence as it affects the particular person whose knowledge is in issue. In inferring knowledge, a court is entitled to approach the matter in two stages; where opportunities for knowledge on the part of the particular person are proved and there is nothing to indicate that there are obstacles to the particular person acquiring the relevant knowledge, there is some evidence from which the court can conclude that such a person has the knowledge. However, this conclusion may be easily overturned by a denial on his part of the knowledge which the court accepts, or by a demonstration that he is properly excused from giving evidence of his actual knowledge. GMH relies on a passage from the decision of Burchett J in Richardson and Wrench (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Ligon No 174 Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 488; (1994) 123 ALR 681, where his Honour summarised the principles pertaining to whether shutting one’s eyes to the obvious, or being wilfully blind, may amount to actual knowledge. His Honour said at 693-694:It is because a reference to a person's shutting his eyes to the obvious, or being wilfully blind, is ambiguous, in so far as it suggests a possible view that something less than actual knowledge will do, that Gibbs CJ (at CLR 487) made it clear a jury should not normally be directed in terms that involve the expression “wilful blindness”...…The case is Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 82 ALR 217; 63 ALJR 1. (See also Kural v R (1987) 162 CLR 502 at 507; 70 ALR 658.) Their Honours said in Pereira (at ALR 219–20; ALJR 3):Even where … actual knowledge is either a specified element of the offence charged or a necessary element of the guilty mind required for the offence, it may be established as a matter of inference from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offence. However, three matters should be noted. First, in such cases the question remains one of actual knowledge: Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473 at 504–7; 58 ALR 641; He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 at 570; 60 ALR 449. It is never the case that something less than knowledge may be treated as satisfying a requirement of actual knowledge … All that having been said, the fact remains that a combination of suspicious circumstances and failure to make inquiry may sustain an inference of knowledge of the actual or likely existence of the relevant matter.The effect of Kural and Pereira has been stated extra-curially by Dawson J in an article, “Recent Common Law Developments in Criminal Law”, in (1991) 15 Crim LJ 5 at 15:It was made clear in those two cases that, whilst knowledge as an ingredient of an offence may be established by inference, it must be established as a fact. If the term “wilful blindness” is used merely as a shorthand expression to indicate circumstances which warrant the drawing of the necessary inference, then it is acceptable. But it is unacceptable if it is used as a basis for imputing knowledge where actual knowledge is not proved.