North Shore City Council v Attorney-General

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 77/2010
[2012] NZSC 49

BETWEEN  NORTH SHORE CITY COUNCIL
Appellant

AND  THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AS SUCCESSOR TO THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE BUILDING INDUSTRY AUTHORITY
Respondent

Hearing:         1, 2 and 3 November 2011

Court:             Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and William Young JJ

Counsel:         D J Goddard QC, S B Mitchell and N K Caldwell for Appellant
D B Collins QC Solicitor-General, M T Scholtens QC, T G H Smith and S J Leslie for Respondent

Judgment:      27 June 2012

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is dismissed.

BThe appellant is to pay the respondent costs of $40,000 and reasonable disbursements in connection with this appeal, as fixed by the Registrar if necessary.

______________________________________________________________

REASONS

Para No

Elias CJ  [1]
Blanchard, McGrath and William Young JJ  [92]
Tipping J  [214]

ELIAS CJ

  1. The Building Industry Authority was established by the Building Act 1991 to provide general supervision of the regulatory system for building work.  The appeal is brought from a decision of the Court of Appeal, on summary application before trial, holding that the Building Industry Authority did not owe duties of care in the exercise of its statutory responsibilities either to territorial authorities or to building owners.[1]   The claimed liability of the Building Industry Authority arose in respect of failures to meet the standards for moisture control set by the building code, which have led to leaks and consequential damage. Such failures have been so widespread as to raise questions about systemic error in the regulatory system, in which the Building Industry Authority’s statutory role was key.  They have also presented substantial challenges to the New Zealand legal system.

  2. The Grange apartments were developed under a building consent granted by the North Shore City Council on 28 April 1999.  The design of the building entailed face-fixed monolithic cladding over untreated timber frames.  That method of construction is now known to have been used in very many buildings which failed to meet the performance standard specified by standard E2 of the code.[2]  As a result, there have been a significant number of cases where moisture ingress has led to rot in buildings, especially where ventilation was inadequate.

    [2]The stated objective of E2 (in the Building Regulations 1992, sch 1) was “to safeguard people from illness or injury that could result from external moisture entering the building”.  The “[f]unctional requirement” specified in the standard required “adequate resistance to penetration by, and the accumulation of, moisture from the outside”.  Performance requirements concerned: the ability of roofs to shed moisture; impermeability of roofs and exterior walls to water that could cause undue dampness, damage to building elements or both; similar impermeability of walls, floors and structural elements in contact with or close proximity to the ground; protection from the adverse effects of moisture entering the…

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Details
Case
[2012] NZSC 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by the North Shore City Council against the Attorney-General as successor to the assets and liabilities of the Building Industry Authority (BIA). The Council sought to recover damages from the BIA for losses it incurred due to its liability to building owners for failure to comply with building standards. The Court of Appeal had dismissed the Council's claims as untenable in law, a decision which the Supreme Court reviewed. The key issue was whether the statutory scheme and the circumstances of the BIA's 1995 report, either alone or in combination, placed the BIA and the Council in sufficient proximity to found a duty of care. The court found that the statutory scheme was supportive of a duty of care imposed on the BIA to territorial authorities in undertaking reviews and in reporting on them. The court also found that the claims of knowledge of risk on the part of the BIA added to the strength of the claimed duty of care. The court concluded that the claims were not untenable and allowed the appeal. The court found that the statutory scheme of the Building Act and analogy with existing authority made it impossible to reject any of the four claims as untenable. The court found that the statutory scheme set up an interlocking system of assurance which established proximity between building owners and those with responsibilities under the Act. The court also found that the BIA's functions and powers were operational and routine, rather than involving high policy development. The court found that the division of responsibilities under the Act overlapped, but that was not inconsistent with the distinct liability of each of those with responsibilities. The court found that the duty contended for here did not extend to "general superintendence over the building industry in New Zealand". The court also found that the cost of liability was not a reason to reject it in the case of a public authority such as the BIA. The court found that the imposition of a duty of care on the BIA in playing its part did not set up a clash with the purpose of the Act in minimising regulatory cost. The court found that liability in tort in such circumstances was wholly consistent with the statutory purpose. The court found that the Act required code compliance, but no more than was necessary to achieve it. The court found that the risk of damage through failure to achieve code compliance for moisture was a real risk, not one that would not influence the mind of a reasonable person. The court found that the duty and the statutory purposes were consistent with responsibility and liability. The court found that policy considerations did not count against a duty of care. The court found that the imposition of a duty of care and potential liability in negligence did not cut across established principles of law in fields other than negligence or statutory defences or alternative provisions for relief. The court found that the imposition of a duty of care should not be declined for policy reasons because the prospect of liability would inhibit the free flow of advice from the BIA to the Minister. The court found that the tortious liability recognised by the Act in respect of determinations and accreditations was contrary to such immunity for reasons of policy. The court found that although there was speculation about the cost implications of liability, such consideration could not be determinative in the circumstances. The court found that the Building Industry Authority had operational responsibilities. The court found that territorial authorities, certifiers, and owners were able to obtain authoritative determinations from the Building Industry Authority where there was doubt about code compliance. The court found that the Building Industry Authority had the powers to support its own statutory functions which included providing information. The court found that territorial authorities were able to look to the Authority for authoritative direction. The court found that the Building Industry Authority did have control of what mattered. The court found that the allegations in the present claim were of failings in respect of its operational duties and responsibilities. The court found that if the Building Industry Authority does not owe a duty of care in the exercise of its functions to those directly affected, there is a gap in the system of accountability in the Act. The court found that the liability of the Building Industry Authority sets up no conflict with the purposes of the Act. The court found that liability in tort in such circumstances was wholly consistent with the statutory purpose. The court found that without such liability, territorial authorities might be pushed to excessive caution, substituting effectively an additional layer of local regulation. The court found that that would be contrary to the policy of the Act that a national code would supply the standards, and would potentially add to the costs of regulation, duplicating effort, and undermining the role envisaged for the Authority by the Commission in providing "a single source for referral and review that does not exist in the present fragmented system". The court found that the Authority was set up to protect against the very risk that eventuated. The court found that the risk of damage through failure to achieve code compliance for moisture was a real risk, not one that would not influence the mind of a reasonable person. The court found that the fact that the risk was not fanciful and was the very type of eventuality the Act and the functions assigned to the Building Industry Authority were designed to guard against was a factor pointing towards the existence of a duty of care. The court found that the duty and the statutory purposes were consistent with responsibility and liability. The court found that the claim of knowledge of risk on the part of the Building Industry Authority, which was cumulative on the considerations attaching to the first and second causes of action, added to the strength of the claimed duty of care under the third and fourth causes of action. The court found that the claim based on a duty to owners was closely analogous to the recognised duties of care owed by territorial authorities to owners and properly attached to the Building Industry Authority's distinct functions under the Act. The court found that the causes of action were not untenable. The court found that the statutory scheme of the Act and analogy with existing authority made it impossible to reject any of the four claims as untenable. The court found that the statutory scheme set up an interlocking system of assurance which established proximity between building owners and those with responsibilities under the Act. The court found that the BIA's functions and powers were operational and routine, rather than involving high policy development. The court found that the division of responsibilities under the Act overlapped, but that was not inconsistent with the distinct liability of each of those with responsibilities. The court found that the duty contended for here did not extend to "general superintendence over the building industry in New Zealand". The court found that the cost of liability was not a reason to reject it in the case of a public authority such as the BIA. The court found that the imposition of a duty of care on the BIA in playing its part did not set up a clash with the purpose of the Act in minimising regulatory cost. The court found that liability in tort in such circumstances was wholly consistent with the statutory purpose. The court found that the Act required code compliance, but no more than was necessary to achieve it. The court found that the risk of damage through failure to achieve code compliance for moisture was a real risk, not one that would not influence the mind of a reasonable person. The court found that the duty and the statutory purposes were consistent with responsibility and liability. The court found that policy considerations did not count against a duty of care. The court found that the imposition of a duty of care and potential liability in negligence did not cut across established principles of law in

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