Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

VISY PAPER PTY LIMITED & ORS  APPELLANTS

AND

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER COMMISSION   RESPONDENT

Visy Paper Pty Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

[2003] HCA 59

8 October 2003

S209/2002

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

N J Young QC with M H O'Bryan for the appellants (instructed by Minter Ellison)

B R McClintock SC with V F Kerr for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ.   This case arises out of attempts the first appellant ("Visy Paper") made to make an agreement with Northern Pacific Paper Pty Ltd ("NPP") under which NPP would have been prevented from acquiring goods from some third parties and would have been prevented from supplying services to those third parties.  The respondent ("the ACCC") contended that these attempts contravened the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act").

  2. Part IV of the Act contains a number of provisions dealing with what its heading describes as "Restrictive Trade Practices". Since the Act was first enacted, various amendments and additions have been made to the provisions of Pt IV. This appeal concerns the relationship between certain provisions of Pt IV, as they stood in 1996 and 1997. In particular, it concerns the relationship between provisions of ss 45 and 47. Section 45 dealt (among other things) with the making of a contract, arrangement or understanding which contained an "exclusionary provision"[1]. Section 47 dealt with "the practice of exclusive dealing".

    [1]s 45(2)(a)(i).

  3. The central issue debated on the appeal concerned the operation of s 45(6) of the Act. So far as relevant, that sub‑section provided that:

    "The making of a contract ... does not constitute a contravention of this section by reason that the contract ... contains a provision the giving effect to which would, or would but for the operation of subsection 47(10) ... constitute a contravention of section 47 and this section does not apply to or in relation to the giving effect to a provision of a contract ... by way of:

    (a)engaging in conduct that contravenes, or would but for the operation of subsection 47(10) ... contravene, section 47".

  4. Section 47(1) prohibited exclusive dealing. It provided that:

    "Subject to this section, a corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in the practice of exclusive dealing."

    Sections 47(2) to (9) identified various forms of dealing which constituted a corporation engaging in the practice of exclusive dealing. Sub‑section (10) provided that sub‑section (1) did not apply to identified forms of exclusive dealing, unless engaging in that conduct had the purpose, or would likely have the effect, of substantially lessening competition[2].

    [2]Section 47(13) gave further content to what was meant by the reference to competition.

  5. The particular provision about exclusive dealing which must be considered…

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Details
Case
[2003] HCA 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from Visy Paper Pty Ltd concerning arrangements for the collection of waste paper. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was the respondent. The dispute centred on whether certain non-competition provisions in proposed agreements between Visy Paper and NPP, a waste paper collector, contravened the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth).

The legal issues before the Court were whether the non-competition provisions had a dual character, preventing both the acquisition of goods from and the supply of services to particular persons, and if so, whether both aspects of these provisions contravened section 45(2)(a)(i) of the Act. A further issue was whether one aspect of these provisions would have contravened section 47, and if section 45(6) precluded the application of section 45(2)(a)(i) to both aspects or only that aspect covered by section 47.

The Court reasoned that the collection of waste paper could be characterised as both the provision of a service (waste collection) and the acquisition of goods (title to the waste paper). The Court found that the proposed agreements contained provisions that restricted NPP from acquiring waste paper from Visy Paper's customers and from supplying waste collection services to those same customers. These restrictions were held to be primarily referable to the horizontal relationship between Visy Paper and NPP as competitors in the waste collection market, rather than their vertical supplier-purchaser relationship. Consequently, these restrictions fell under section 45(2)(a)(i) of the Act, which prohibits corporations from making contracts or arrangements that have the purpose or effect of restricting the supply or acquisition of goods or services to or from particular persons. The Court determined that section 45(6) did not preclude the application of section 45(2)(a)(i) to both aspects of the non-competition provisions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The definition of exclusionary provision in s 4D encompasses more than that identified above but it is not necessary to consider those wider applications. What is important is that the definition of exclusionary provisions extends to provisions which deal with the supply or the acquisition of goods or services. Accordingly, s 45(2) prohibited corporations who are competitors from making a contract, or arrangement, or arriving at an understanding, which had the purpose or effect of restricting or limiting the supply, or the acquisition, of goods or services, to or from particular persons. By contrast, the form of exclusive dealing said to be relevant in this appeal (that described in s 47(4)) does not deal with conditions which restrict both supply and acquisition. It deals with the acquisition of goods or services on the condition that the person from whom the goods or services are acquired will not supply goods or services to particular persons (as distinct from acquire goods or services from them).The facts In this Court, the parties accepted that collecting waste paper could be identified as providing a service to the person from whom it was collected (the service of waste collection) and as an acquisition of goods (the acquisition of title to the goods collected). This double characterisation reflected the market for waste paper. Sometimes, a collector paid to acquire the waste paper; sometimes a collector was paid to take it away. Sometimes no payment was made – the collector simply took it away. Sometimes the collector provided bins or other receptacles in which the waste paper was held pending its collection. In every case the collector took title to the waste paper, but in some circumstances it could be said that the collector provided a service to the person from whom it was collected. Who paid whom, and how much, was, at the relevant times, affected by the price obtainable for exporting waste paper. If export prices were high, Visy Paper sometimes found it difficult to acquire waste at a suitable price; if export prices were low, it might have lowered its price or even charged for its collection. Visy Paper conducts a vertically integrated business involving the collection of waste paper and cardboard, and the recycling of this material to produce paper and cardboard. At the relevant times, NPP conducted a business collecting waste paper which it sold to recycling companies, including Visy Paper. Visy Paper and NPP competed in collecting and acquiring waste paper; they dealt with each other as acquirer and supplier of goods when NPP supplied paper to Visy Paper. Visy Paper sought to make an agreement with NPP which would not only provide for NPP to supply waste to it, but would also preclude NPP from acquiring waste from actual, or certain prospective, suppliers of waste to Visy Paper. It proposed that the contracts contain both a provision restricting the supplier from acquiring goods (waste paper) from particular persons (Visy Paper's customers and those with whom it had entered discussions or negotiations to become a customer) and a provision restricting the supplier from supplying services to those persons (the service of waste collection).

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J CALLINAN J (dissent)
Characterisation of the arrangements between Visy Paper and NPP as either horizontal or vertical enables an evaluation of whether the restrictive provisions in the contracts proposed by Visy Paper are protected by the operation of s 45(6). Only then is it possible to conclude whether the restrictive provisions are "exclusionary provisions" within s 4D. On my analysis, the making of an arrangement does not constitute a violation of s 45 by reason of a restrictive provision being characterised as an element of a vertical "exclusive dealing" arrangement between the parties. However, the provision will be prohibited by s 45(2)(a)(i), regardless of the actual effect of the provision on competition in the market, if it restricts the supply of goods or services to the customers or potential customers of the parties. This is because such a restriction would become an aspect of the parties' horizontal relationship as competitors and thereby restrain competition between them.Conclusion: a case of horizontal restraint Given the character of the commercial relationship between Visy Paper and NPP, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the non-competition clauses in the contracts proposed by Visy Paper, which restrained NPP from acquiring waste paper products from or providing waste removal services to Visy Paper's existing or potential customers, were primarily referable to the horizontal relationship between those two corporations as competitors, rather than to their vertical supplier-purchaser relationship. As part of the vertical relationship, Visy Paper could impose certain valid restraints on NPP's conduct that would also protect any investment in NPP's operations funded by Visy Paper[56]. For instance, Visy Paper could prevent NPP from supplying waste paper products to Visy Paper's manufacturing competitors, within s 47(4). The original 1995 contract provided for such a relationship[57]. Similarly, the draft supply agreements proposed by Visy Paper provided that NPP would sell exclusively to Visy Paper the whole of its stocks of certain categories of waste paper[58]. This would have imposed a restriction on NPP not to supply waste paper products to any of Visy Paper's competitors in the paper recycling industry that might also have been interested in purchasing such products. That restriction would not violate the TPA, to the extent that it did not have the purpose or effect of "substantially lessening competition"[59].[56]ACCC v Visy (2000) 186 ALR 731 at 741 [54].[57]ACCC v Visy (2000) 186 ALR 731 at 737-738 [31].[58]ACCC v Visy (2000) 186 ALR 731 at 742-743 [63].[59]See TPA, s 47(1) and (10) (emphasis added). As part of the vertical relationship, Visy Paper could lawfully negotiate the price at which it would purchase waste paper products sold by NPP. Through negotiating the purchase price, Visy Paper was able to restrain the degree to which NPP could compete with Visy Paper for customers in the waste collection market. However, to the extent that Visy Paper remained in the waste collection market, and therefore remained competitive with NPP in that market, it could not lawfully negotiate restrictions about the price at which they would acquire waste products or the price at which they would supply waste removal services to customers. Nor could it lawfully restrict the customers from which NPP could obtain waste in either form. All such restrictions or attempted restrictions were a feature of the horizontal relationship between Visy Paper and NPP as competitors. They were therefore governed by s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA read with s 4D.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, KIRBY J,

The case of Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission presents a nuanced analysis of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in relation to non-competition provisions within contracts between competitors. The central issue was whether such provisions contravened the prohibition on restrictive trade practices, particularly in the context of a vertical relationship between supplier and purchaser. The court's reasoning hinged on distinguishing between vertical and horizontal relationships and assessing the implications of these distinctions on the application of relevant statutory provisions.

Firstly, the court examined whether the non-competition provisions in the contracts between Visy Paper and NPP restricted the supply or acquisition of goods or services, thereby contravening s 45(2)(a)(i) of the Trade Practices Act. The court found that the provisions in question did indeed restrict both the acquisition of goods and the supply of services, which were integral parts of their commercial relationship. By restricting NPP from acquiring waste paper from or providing waste removal services to Visy Paper's existing or potential customers, the provisions had a dual effect on the market, restraining competition. The court relied on the broad definition of exclusionary provisions in s 4D, which encompasses arrangements that restrict the supply or acquisition of goods or services.

Secondly, the court considered whether one aspect of the non-competition provisions would have contravened s 47 but for s 47(10) if the provisions contravened s 45(2)(a)(i). Section 47 addresses exclusive dealing, but the court found that the non-competition provisions were more akin to a dual restriction on both supply and acquisition, which s 47 does not cover. Therefore, the court did not delve into the applicability of s 47(10) because the primary issue was the contravention of s 45(2)(a)(i).

The third issue was whether s 45(6) precluded the application of s 45(2)(a)(i) to both aspects of the non-competition provisions or only to the aspect covered by s 47. The court clarified that s 45(6) does not exempt vertical relationships from the prohibition in s 45(2)(a)(i) if the restriction is primarily referable to the horizontal relationship between the parties as competitors. The court distinguished between vertical restraints, which can sometimes be lawful, and horizontal restraints, which are typically prohibited if they restrain competition.

Fourthly, the court assessed whether the non-competition provisions, characterized as a vertical relationship between supplier and purchaser, were protected from the prohibition in s 45(2)(a)(i) under s 45(6). The court determined that the provisions were not protected because they primarily affected the horizontal relationship between Visy Paper and NPP as competitors, rather than the vertical relationship. This was based on the fact that the restrictions were aimed at preventing NPP from competing with Visy Paper in the market for waste collection services and waste paper acquisition.

Fifthly, the court examined whether the non-competition provisions, which restrained NPP from acquiring waste paper products from or providing waste removal services to Visy Paper's existing or potential customers, were primarily referable to the horizontal relationship between Visy Paper and NPP as competitors. The court concluded that the provisions were indeed primarily referable to the horizontal relationship because they restrained NPP's ability to compete with Visy Paper in the market. This conclusion was based on the fact that Visy Paper and NPP were direct competitors in the waste paper collection and recycling market.

Lastly, the court addressed whether any restrictions on the price at which Visy Paper would purchase waste paper products sold by NPP, or the price at which they would supply waste removal services to customers, were a feature of the horizontal relationship between Visy Paper and NPP as competitors and governed by s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA read with s 4D. The court found that such price restrictions were indeed a feature of the horizontal relationship and were governed by the prohibition on restrictive trade practices. The court emphasized that while Visy Paper could negotiate purchase prices as part of a vertical relationship, it could not impose restrictions on the price of services or the customers from which NPP could obtain waste products, as these were aspects of the horizontal competition between the two companies.

In conclusion, the court found that the non-competition provisions in the contracts between Visy Paper and NPP contravened s 45(2)(a)(i) of the Trade Practices Act because they restricted the horizontal competition between the two companies. The court dismissed the appeal and found that the provisions were not protected by s 45(6) because they were primarily referable to the horizontal relationship as competitors. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that non-competition provisions in contracts between competitors, which restrain competition in the market, are prohibited under s 45(2)(a)(i) of the Trade Practices Act, regardless of the vertical relationship between the parties.