Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission

[2005] FCAFC 236

TRADE PRACTICES – restrictive trade practices – contract containing an ‘exclusion clause’ – attempts to enter and attempts to induce a third party to enter such a contract – appeal against pecuniary penalties – whether primary Judge’s discretion miscarried – whether primary Judge’s findings as to the anti-competitive purpose and effect of the appellants’ conduct and the consequent loss or damage were in error – whether primary Judge misapplied the reasoning in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 131 FCR 529 – significance of legal uncertainty and an unanticipated application of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – whether appropriate to depart from the level of penalties imposed by primary Judge.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal – role of appellate court in reviewing primary Judge’s imposition of pecuniary penalties – whether primary Judge fell into error by applying a wrong principle, by acting on a misapprehension of the facts, taking into account irrelevant material or failing to take account of relevant material.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 14
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 45, 47, 76

Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Ithaca Ice Works Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1716 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 201 ALR 618 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2000) 186 ALR 731 discussed
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 37 discussed
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1471 affirmed
Australian Gas Light Company v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 137 FCR 317 referred to
Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd (1982) 64 FLR 238 referred to
J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532 applied
Melway Publishing Pty Limited v Robert Hicks Pty Limited (2001) 205 CLR 1 referred to
NW Frozen Foods Proprietary Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 referred to
Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 667 referred to
Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority [2000] ATPR 41-752 referred to
Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority [2000] FCA 1381 referred to
Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076 referred to
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 131 FCR 529 applied
Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 1 referred to

VISY PAPER PTY LTD and WILLIAM GUTHRIDGE and STEPHEN RICHARDS v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
NSD 1838 OF 2004

STONE & ALLSOP JJ
17 NOVEMBER 2005
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1838 OF 200

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 236
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Visy Paper Pty Ltd, along with its executives Mr William Guthridge and Mr Stephen Richards, appealed against the decision of the Full Court which had remitted the matter back to the primary Judge to determine pecuniary penalties. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) had commenced proceedings against Visy, alleging that it attempted to contravene section 45(2)(a)(i) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and also attempted to induce a third party, Northern Pacific Paper Pty Ltd, to contravene that section. The primary Judge dismissed the proceedings against Visy and the appellants. The ACCC appealed to the Full Court which allowed the appeal and ordered that the matter be remitted to the primary Judge for the determination of pecuniary penalties. The primary Judge then imposed penalties on Visy and the appellants. The appellants challenged the penalty judgment. The main issues for the court to decide were whether the primary Judge misapplied the reasoning of the Full Court in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and whether the primary Judge made errors in his findings as to the anti-competitive purpose and effect of the appellants’ conduct and the loss or damage that resulted from, or was likely to result from, the appellants’ conduct. The court found that the primary Judge did not misapply the reasoning of the Full Court and that his findings were supported by the evidence. The court also found that the penalties imposed were appropriate. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Regrettably, the third member of the Full Court, Hill J, died following the hearing of the appeal. The parties have consented to the remaining members of the Full Court determining the appeal pursuant to s 14(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).BACKGROUND On 18 November 1998, the respondent (‘the ACCC’) commenced proceedings in this Court alleging that the first appellant, Visy Paper Pty Ltd (‘Visy’), attempted to contravene s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA. The ACCC also alleged that Visy, Mr William Guthridge, the second appellant, and Mr Stephen Richards, the third appellant, attempted to induce a third party, Northern Pacific Paper Pty Ltd (‘NPP’), to contravene s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA. On 20 November 2000, the primary Judge dismissed the proceedings against the appellants: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2000) 186 ALR 731 (‘Primary Judgment’). The ACCC appealed his Honour’s judgment to the Full Court which allowed the appeal on 10 August 2001 and ordered that the matter be remitted to the primary Judge for the determination of pecuniary penalties: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 37 (‘Full Court Judgment’). An appeal to the High Court was dismissed on 8 October 2003: Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 1. Accordingly, the proceedings were re-listed before the primary Judge to consider what orders should be made and the question of what pecuniary penalties, if any, should be imposed pursuant to s 76(1) of the TPA: see [75] of the Full Court Judgment. However, before considering his Honour’s judgment in respect of pecuniary penalties, it is necessary to understand something about the nature of the proceedings and the judgments referred to above.Nature of the proceedings At all material times, Visy was a company engaged in, inter alia, the collection and processing of recyclable waste paper and cardboard for supply to its paper mills, including the acquiring of recyclable waste paper (including cardboard) in the Sydney metropolitan region. Mr Guthridge was appointed on 1 May 1996 as Visy’s national general manager and from that time had day-to-day management and control of Visy’s acquisition of recyclable waste paper. From March 1996 Mr Richards was Visy’s national operations manager and from the beginning of 1997 held the position of general manager for the ‘Northern Region’, an area that included New South Wales. At [22]-[23] of the Primary Judgment, the primary Judge commented on the nature of the industry in which Visy operated:‘Waste paper collected for recycling purposes is destined for companies which recycle the paper in their mills. In Australia, and especially in the Sydney metropolitan area, the two main recyclers are Visy and Amcor Ltd ("Amcor"). Some waste paper is, however, exported and export prices affect domestic prices. The waste paper collection industry comprises businesses which collect the waste paper from those who generate the waste. Collectors of waste supply recyclers or other collectors who, in turn, supply recyclers. The industry is somewhat unusual in that, although generators of waste paper may sell the waste to a collector, collectors are sometimes paid to remove waste paper or rubbish which contains a significant proportion of waste paper. The supplier may pay the collector, for example, when the supplier has relatively small amounts of waste paper available or the waste product is useful to recyclers only after being decontaminated. The persons from whom waste paper is collected are referred to in the industry as the "customers" of the collector, even when they pay the collector to remove the waste products.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Consistent with these principles, the appellants contended that the primary Judge’s discretion miscarried in that his Honour acted upon wrong principles, was mistaken as to the relevant facts and failed to take account of material considerations and the penalties were, in all the circumstances, excessive. There are two main aspects to their challenge: the first is based on the alleged misapplication of the reasoning of the Full Court in Universal Music; the second is based on alleged errors in his Honour’s findings as to the anti-competitive purpose and effect of the appellants’ conduct and the loss or damage that resulted from, or was likely to result from, the appellants’ conduct.Preliminary issue: evidence on penalty A preliminary issue in this appeal is whether the appellants are permitted to rely on evidence presented in the primary hearing. As indicated above (see [14] et seq), in the Penalty Judgment the primary Judge proceeded on the basis of the findings of fact recorded in the Primary Judgment together with additional findings based on evidence given at the penalty hearing. The appellants submitted that, in addition to the findings of fact referred to in [28] above, the primary Judge made a number of additional findings concerning the competitive purpose and effect of Visy’s conduct that were not supported by, and which were inconsistent with the evidence at trial. The ACCC submitted that the appellants could not rely on the evidence adduced at the trial but were confined to the findings of fact referred to in [28]. We do not accept the ACCC’s submission. In remitting the matter to the primary Judge for the determination of penalties, the Full Court was directing the primary Judge to do what, in the light of its decision, was necessary to complete the trial. As such the evidence that had been adduced at the primary hearing was before the Court. It was for the appellants, however, to make relevant submissions as to that evidence and the legal propositions they wished the Court to accept.The challenged findings The additional findings that the appellants claim are not supported by the evidence at the trial were said to be:(a)the non-competition clause would have had an anti-competitive effect on the market for the acquisition of waste paper and for the supply of waste paper removal services in the relevant market;(b)Visy’s conduct was not an ‘isolated transaction’;(c)the purpose and effect of the non-competition clause, if implemented, would have been to terminate the competitive activities of NPP in the relevant market, and that Visy sought to persuade NPP to accept the non-competition clause in order to bring NPP’s competitive activities to a halt;(d)there was considerable potential for NPP to make inroads into Visy’s customer base; and(e)NPP lost the opportunity to negotiate a contract with Visy that did not contain the non-competition clause. The appellants accepted that the primary Judge found at trial that the purpose of the relevant provision, if implemented, was to prevent NPP from acquiring goods from or supplying services to Visy’s customers. However, the appellants contended that such a finding is not synonymous with a finding that the purpose of the provisions was to terminate the competitive activities of NPP in the relevant market or, that Visy sought to persuade NPP to accept the non-competition clause in order to bring NPP’s competitive activities to a halt.

Decision

Reasons for decision

While Visy and NPP did not enter into any of the draft agreements, the ACCC alleged that in negotiating with NPP and, in particular, by proffering each of the six draft agreements Visy attempted to contravene s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA; and attempted to induce NPP to contravene s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA. The ACCC also alleged that, by their role in the negotiations with NPP, Mr Guthridge and Mr Richards attempted to induce NPP to contravene s 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA.THE PENALTY JUDGMENT On remittal to the primary Judge to consider the orders to be made, the only matters of substance in dispute between the parties were; first, the amount of any pecuniary penalty and secondly, one aspect of the order requiring Visy to implement a trade practices compliance program. The appellants only challenge his Honour’s orders in respect of pecuniary penalties. After outlining the history of the proceedings the primary Judge noted that the submissions of all parties had proceeded on the basis of the findings of fact recorded in the Primary Judgment and added that since some further evidence had been given at the penalty hearing, he would record additional findings that might bear on the appropriate penalties to be imposed. Those findings are set out at [14]-[18] of the Penalty Judgment, which we quote in full:‘First, as I found in [the Primary Judgment] at [162], the draft ECAs were developed with the assistance of Visy’s in-house lawyer, Mr Kaye, and Visy’s external legal advisers. Mr Kaye, who did not give evidence either at the trial or at the hearing on penalty, saw the non-competition clause in the draft ECAs but raised no objection to it. Mr Guthridge communicated with Mr Kaye concerning the draft agreements submitted to NPP, but Mr Kaye gave no indication that there might be a trade practices issue with respect to the non-competition clause. Mr Richards, who reported to Mr Guthridge, also had discussions with Mr Kaye, but again the latter did not suggest to Mr Richards that there was any legal problem with the non‑competition clause.Secondly, at the time the contraventions occurred, Visy provided staff with some training on trade practices issues. Mr Geminder gave evidence of training programs, but it must be said that his description was somewhat vague. However, it appears that Visy did issue a Trade Practices Compliance Manual which dealt, among other things, with the dangers of making agreements with competitors. The relevant section of the Manual pointed out that ‘[a]ll arrangements with competitors may substantially lessen competition. You should never make an arrangement with a competitor without advice from Visy Industries’ Legal Counsel’. The Manual advised staff to ‘avoid all contact with competitors or their employees other than contact approved by senior management or Visy Industries’ Legal Counsel. All necessary contact with competitors should be conducted in formal settings. If potential infringing behaviour is discussed you must formally state that Visy Industries will not participate and make a record of the meeting’.Other memoranda distributed to staff at about this time addressed trade practices issues in a general way. Thirdly, in each of the 1995/96 and 1996/97 financial years, Visy had an operating profit before tax exceeding $120,000,000. Visy’s net assets at that time exceeded $115,000,000. In the last financial year for which information is available (2002/03), Visy earned an operating profit before tax of approximately $174,000,000 and had net assets of about $69,000,000.Fourthly, after his retirement from Visy in 1998, Mr Guthridge conducted his own business as a consultant in the paper and tissue industry. However, by reason of business reverses in the 2002/03 financial year, his income was drastically reduced. According to Mr Guthridge, his income is presently in the order of $15,000 per annum and his net assets have been reduced to some $12,000.Fifthly, Mr Richards left Visy in February 2003. Since then, he has worked through his own company as a consultant in the waste and recycling industries. The evidence as to his financial position is incomplete, but his taxable income in 2002/03 was some $244,000, the bulk of which was apparently in the form of severance payments from Visy. Mr Richards and his wife jointly own assets worth slightly in excess of $800,000.’The penalty provision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 76(1A)(b) provides that the maximum penalty which may be imposed on a body corporate for each act or omission to which s 76(1) applies is $10 million. In the case of an individual, the maximum penalty is $500,000: s 76(1B).Primary Judge’s consideration The primary Judge identified the matters that should be taken into account in determining a pecuniary penalty as those mentioned in s 76(1) as well as those put forward by French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076 (CSR’). His Honour noted that French J’s list was endorsed by Burchett and Kiefel JJ in NW Frozen Foods Proprietary Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 (‘Frozen Foods’) at 292. Their Honours observed that the considerations in s 76(1) do not exhaust the content of ‘all relevant matters’ as referred to in s 76(1) and commented that in CSR French J added to the list of factors expressly mentioned in s 76 a checklist of matters to which judges have since frequently made reference. As set out in Frozen Foods at 292 that list is:· The size of the contravening company.· The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.· The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.· Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.· Whether the company had a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention;· Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention. Of particular relevance to this appeal is the primary Judge’s consideration of the significance to be attached to any legal uncertainly surrounding the application and operation of s 45(6) of the TPA. His Honour found that the draft ECAs were developed with the assistance of Visy’s in-house lawyer and Visy’s external legal advisors. His Honour stated at [33]:‘The present case is apparently one in which Visy’s legal advisers, although they saw and indeed presumably drafted or settled the non-competition clauses, did not appreciate that an attempt to secure NPP’s agreement to a non-competition clause would or might involve a contravention of s 45(2)(a) of the [TPA]. Be that as it may, there is no evidence that Visy received or acted on affirmative advice that its conduct, or that Mr Guthridge or Mr Richards, would not contravene the [TPA]. The evidence merely suggests that Mr Guthridge and Mr Richards were not informed by the lawyers that the draft agreements might contravene the TPA. The case is therefore not one in which Visy acted in the belief, supported by specific legal advice, that its conduct was not in breach of the [TPA].’ The primary Judge considered the judgment of the Full Court in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 131 FCR 529 (‘Universal Music’). In Universal Music, the Full Court was concerned with, inter alia, the adequacy of a penalty imposed by Hill J which his Honour had discounted by reference to the fact that the company in question, Universal, had been advised by its solicitors that the relevant conduct would not involve contravention of the TPA. Hill J found that the advice was unqualified ‘save for the fact that the advisers assumed (correctly) that the relevant market was for CDs rather than particular CDs’. Hill J also held that the question whether the relevant conduct contravened the TPA was ‘a most difficult one on which minds could differ and a question which had not been previously agitated in a court’; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 201 ALR 618 at [20]. While accepting that ignorance of the law is no excuse, Hill J expressed the view that existence of the legal advice obtained by Universal was clearly relevant to the penalty to be imposed, ‘so far as it makes clear that Universal did not deliberately engage in conduct it knew to be an offence’.