Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stirling Harbour Services Pty Limited (ACN 008 767 600) v Bunbury Port Authority [2000] FCA 1381

TRADE PRACTICES – natural monopoly - exclusive licence arrangement for provision of towage services in the Port of Bunbury – whether entry into the licence agreement with the successful tenderer has the purpose, or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition – primary judge correctly applied the test of whether, on consideration of the likely state of future competition in the market ‘with and without’ the impugned conduct, the conduct has a proscribed anti-competitive purpose or effect

TRADE PRACTICES - contestable market theory – whether, in a natural monopoly market, there exist competitive forces that derive from credible threats of entry, rather than from the number of actual contestants – primary judge’s finding that the market was, at most, only weakly contestable was supported by the evidence – primary judge correctly took account of factors which operated as disincentives to entry, in determining the extent of contestability –there was no error in the primary judge’s finding that the threat to the applicant of entry by competitors, was insufficiently credible to exert an effective control over its prices – the fact that details of the agreement were to be negotiated with the preferred tenderer, did not detract from the price and level of service which resulted from the competitive tender process – there was no evidence that a particular less restrictive proposal was likely to have been adopted by the respondent, were it not for the calling of tenders for the exclusive licence – primary judge was correct in concluding that the respondent was exercising regulatory, not market power

APPEALS  )
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE              ) – further evidence – whether a Federal Court appeal is an appeal stricto sensu or is by way of rehearing – effect of recent High Court authorities - whether further evidence may be adduced on appeal, in relation to matters which have occurred since the delivery of judgment – court not satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result, had it been available at the trial – importance of public interest in the finality of litigation

Bunbury Port Authority Act1909 (WA)
Port Authorities Act 1999 (WA) ss 5, 30, 32, 34, 35, 35(4), 35(5)
Trade Practices Act1974 (Cth) ss 2, 2B, 2C, 45, 46, 471
Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) ss 27, 28(1)(b)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 36
Family Law Act1975 (Cth) s 93A(2)

Queensland Wire Industries Pty Limited v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Limited (1989) 167 CLR 177 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Limited (1999) 166 ALR 410 cited
Dandy Power Equipment Pty Limited v Mercury Marine Pty Limited (1982) 64 FLR 238 cited
Outboard Marine Australia Pty Limited v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Limited (1982) 44 ALR 667 cited
Sodastream Limited v Electronics (Broken Hill) Pty Limited (1985) 60 ALR 427 cited
John S Hayes and Associates…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1381
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd (the appellant) brought an appeal against the Bunbury Port Authority (the respondent). The appellant challenged the decision of the primary judge, who held that the grant of an exclusive licence to a respondent company for towage services in the Port of Bunbury was not anti-competitive. The appellants sought to introduce further evidence regarding events that occurred after the original judgment was delivered, including the identity of the preferred tenderer, the nature and extent of expected price reductions, and the most recent draft of the proposed licence agreement. The primary legal issue was whether the Federal Court of Australia could consider new evidence introduced after the judgment under appeal, in light of the principle that appeals are not rehearings but stricto sensu.

The court examined the applicable legal principles and previous case law on the power of the Federal Court to receive further evidence on appeal. It noted that while some previous decisions limited the scope of s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act to matters occurring prior to trial, other High Court decisions suggested that the power could include matters occurring after judgment. The court concluded that the latter view was correct, emphasising the broad powers conferred on the appellate tribunal to make any order it sees fit and to take further evidence for the purposes of an appeal.

The court ultimately held that the appeal was dismissed with costs, finding no error in the primary judge’s conclusion regarding the grant of the exclusive licence. The court found that the appellants had not demonstrated any grounds for the admission of further evidence, and that the appeal was not a rehearing of the case. The court’s decision to dismiss the appeal with costs underscores the importance of adhering to the established legal principles governing the reception of further evidence on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Further, the grant of the exclusive licence is not to prevent entry, eliminate or damage a competitor or prevent competitive conduct. The purpose of the tender process is to create competition for the market of a kind that allows all interested parties to participate. We agree with the primary judge’s conclusion that, in any event, BPA is not offering an exclusive licence for any of the proscribed purposes under s 46. No error has been demonstrated in relation to his Honour’s conclusion.Further evidence The appellants apply pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that the Court should receive further evidence. The further evidence sought to be adduced is in relation to matters which have occurred since the delivery of judgment, namely the identity of the preferred tenderer, the nature and extent of the price reductions expected to flow from the grant of the exclusive licence, and the most recent available draft of the proposed licence agreement for the provision of towage services in the Port of Bunbury. It was held in Duralla Pty Limited v Plant (1984) 2 FCR 342 that appeals to this Court are not by way of rehearing, but are in the nature of appeals stricto sensu. That decision has been followed on a number of occasions: Petreski v Cargill (1987) 18 FCR 68 at 77-78; Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher (1992) 35 FCR 359 at 369; Teoh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 49 FCR 409 at 419, per Lee J; Dynasty Pty Limited v Coombs (1995) 59 FCR 122 at 129; Hornet Aviation Pty Limited v Ansett Australia Limited (1995) 16 ACSR 445 at 450; White v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 232 at para 19; Foyster v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2000] FCA 1254 at para 16. Some of these decisions – Petreski v Cargill, Hornet Aviation, White at para 22 and (semble) Foyster – draw the conclusion that the power conferred by s 27 of the Federal Court Act to receive further evidence on appeal (see O 52 r 36) applies to matters occurring prior to trial but not led at the trial, rather than to matters occurring after judgment. If those cases are correctly decided, events occurring after the judgment under appeal has been given cannot be taken into consideration in determining what that judgment ought to have been. Although Duralla Pty Limited v Plant has been followed without being questioned since 1984, after it was decided there have been two decisions in the High Court upon the basis of which an attack on its reasoning could be mounted: Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson [No 2] (1990) 170 CLR 267, and CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172. In Re Coldham at 272, powers conferred on an appellate tribunal to “make such order as it thinks fit” and to “take further evidence for the purposes of an appeal under this section” were held by Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ (in their joint judgment) to be “strong indications that the appeal … was by way of rehearing.” Those features of the appeal there under examination are replicated by s 28(1)(b) and s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. Furthermore, their Honours’ reasoning (also at 272, and at 274-275) is directly contrary to the view that any “further evidence” cannot include evidence of matters which had occurred after the decision under appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established