HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
DEVENISH v. JEWEL FOOD STORES PTY. LTD.
9 April 1991
Trade Practices
Trade Practices—Conduct in concert—Conduct hindering or preventing acquisition of goods by third person from fourth person—Concerted conduct in withholding milk supplies to supermarket operator—Whether hindering or preventing acquisition of that milk by customers from supermarket operator—Whether direct effect required—Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s. 45D(1)(b).
Decisions
MASON C.J. This appeal raises an important point of construction concerning s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the Act"), the constitutional validity of which was considered by this Court in Actors and Announcers Equity Association v. Fontana Films Pty. Ltd. (1982) 150 CLR 169. Section 45D(1)(b) provides:
"Subject to this section, a person shall not, in concert with a second person, engage in conduct that hinders or prevents the supply of goods or services by a third person to a fourth person (not being an employer of the first-mentioned person), or the acquisition of goods or services by a third person from a fourth person (not being an employer of the first-mentioned person), where - ... (b) the fourth person is a corporation and the conduct is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the effect, of causing -
(i) substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth person or of a body corporate that is related to that person; or
(ii) a substantial lessening of competition in any market in which the fourth person or a body corporate that is related to that person supplies or acquires goods or services."2. As is at once evident from the complexity of the section, it is susceptible of a variety of distinct and different applications (see Actors Equity, per Gibbs C.J. at p 179, Stephen J. at pp 189-190, Mason J. at pp 200-201 and Brennan J. at p 219). In this appeal, it was argued that the appellants engaged in conduct which constituted a hindering of the acquisition rather than the supply of goods. It is necessary to describe the appellants' conduct in a little detail so that the relevant "persons" and their interrelationship for the purposes of the section may be identified.
3. The first appellants are all New South Wales milk vendors who, according to a zoning system, sell pasteurized milk in designated regions of New South Wales to retail distributors such as supermarkets. As a result of this system of regulation, a vendor in a designated region is the only conduit for the supply of New South Wales milk in that region. As far as the supply of New South Wales milk is concerned, that vendor has a regional monopoly. No two New South Wales milk vendors overlap in terms of their sales region. The second appellant is the Amalgamated Milk Vendors Association Inc. which is incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (N.S.W.).
4. The respondent conducts a chain of supermarkets…
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- Case
- [1991] HCA 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent's conduct in advertising the sale of a business, which included representations about its profitability and turnover, constituted misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. Specifically, the court had to determine if the representations made were false or misleading, and if so, whether the applicant had suffered loss or damage as a consequence of relying on those representations.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, found that the representations made by the respondent regarding the business's profitability and turnover were indeed misleading. The court applied the principles established in cases such as *Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd*, emphasizing that conduct is misleading if it leads a reasonable person into error. The court reasoned that the advertising material, when viewed as a whole, created a false impression of the business's financial performance, and that the applicant had reasonably relied on these representations when deciding to purchase the business. Consequently, the applicant had suffered loss and damage.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Federal Court and remitting the matter to the Federal Court of Australia for determination of the quantum of damages to be awarded to the applicant.
Background
Background to the litigation
This appeal before the High Court of Australia arose from an application initially brought in the Federal Court of Australia by Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd against the milk vendors and the Amalgamated Milk Vendors Association Inc. Jewel Food Stores, a supermarket chain, sought an order restraining the appellants from engaging in conduct that hindered or prevented the supply of milk to the respondent or the acquisition of milk by customers from the respondent. The Federal Court, by majority, found that the appellants had engaged in conduct that hindered the acquisition of milk by customers from the respondent in contravention of s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The majority order restrained the appellants from engaging in such conduct, but Spender J. dissented on the basis that the appellants' conduct did not amount to hindering or preventing the acquisition of milk by customers from the respondent. The appellants appealed to the High Court against the decision of the Full Court, challenging the majority's interpretation of s.45D(1)(b). The appeal to the High Court was heard by Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ. The central issue before the Court was whether the conduct of the appellants in withholding their milk from Jewel Food Stores constituted conduct which hindered or prevented the acquisition of milk by customers from Jewel Food Stores, as required by s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The Court found that the appellants' conduct did not amount to hindering or preventing the acquisition of milk by customers from Jewel Food Stores, and thus did not contravene s.45D(1)(b). The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Court were set aside.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the scope of s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and whether it applies to conduct that indirectly hinders or prevents acquisition of goods by third persons from a fourth person?
2. Does s.45D(1)(b) require conduct to directly hinder or prevent acquisition of goods by third persons from a fourth person, or is indirect hindrance sufficient?
3. Is there a basis for distinguishing between primary and secondary boycotts in the interpretation of s.45D(1)(b)?
4. What is the proper construction of the phrase "hinders or prevents" in s.45D(1)(b) and whether it includes indirect hindrance or prevention?
5. Whether the conduct of the appellants hindered or prevented the acquisition of milk by customers of the respondent from the respondent.
Held
1. The court concluded that s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 applies to conduct that indirectly hinders or prevents acquisition of goods by third persons from a fourth person. The appeal was dismissed.
2. The court determined that s.45D(1)(b) does not require conduct to directly hinder or prevent acquisition of goods by third persons from a fourth person; indirect hindrance is sufficient. The appeal was dismissed.
3. The court found that there is no basis for distinguishing between primary and secondary boycotts in the interpretation of s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974. The appeal was dismissed.
4. The court held that the proper construction of the phrase "hinders or prevents" in s.45D(1)(b) includes indirect hindrance or prevention. The appeal was dismissed.
5. The court concluded that the conduct of the appellants hindered or prevented the acquisition of milk by customers of the respondent from the respondent. The appeal was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court in Devenish v. Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd addressed several key issues regarding the scope and application of s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974, focusing on whether the conduct of the appellants constituted a breach of this section. The Court held that the conduct in question did not amount to a contravention of s.45D(1)(b).
First, the Court considered the scope of s.45D(1)(b) and whether it applies to conduct that indirectly hinders or prevents acquisition of goods by third persons from a fourth person. The Court found that s.45D(1)(b) does not require conduct to directly hinder or prevent acquisition of goods; indirect hindrance is sufficient to constitute a breach of the section. The Court rejected the argument that s.45D(1)(b) should be narrowly construed to only cover direct hindrance or prevention, emphasizing that the section is designed to broadly protect corporations from anti-competitive practices.
Second, the Court examined whether there is a basis for distinguishing between primary and secondary boycotts in the interpretation of s.45D(1)(b). The Court held that there is no legislative intent to confine the operation of s.45D(1)(b) to secondary boycotts, and that the section should be given its full scope and effect without importing external notions of primary and secondary boycotts.
Third, the Court considered the proper construction of the phrase "hinders or prevents" in s.45D(1)(b) and whether it includes indirect hindrance or prevention. The Court determined that "hinders or prevents" should be given its ordinary meaning and that indirect hindrance is within the scope of the section. The Court rejected the argument that the section requires direct hindrance or prevention, finding that such a narrow interpretation would be inconsistent with the remedial and protective purposes of the Trade Practices Act.
Lastly, the Court addressed whether the conduct of the appellants hindered or prevented the acquisition of milk by customers of the respondent from the respondent. The Court concluded that the appellants' conduct in withholding supplies of milk from the respondent did not amount to conduct that hindered or prevented the acquisition of milk by the respondent's customers. The Court held that the mere unavailability of milk due to the appellants' conduct did not constitute a hindrance or prevention of acquisition within the meaning of s.45D(1)(b). The Court emphasized that more than mere unavailability is required to establish a breach of the section; there must be conduct that directly impedes the purchase of goods from the respondent by its customers.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that s.45D(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 applies to conduct that indirectly hinders or prevents the acquisition of goods by third persons from a fourth person, and that indirect hindrance is sufficient to constitute a breach of the section. The Court's broad interpretation of the phrase "hinders or prevents" and its rejection of the need for direct hindrance or prevention reflects the remedial intent of the Act. However, in this specific case, the Court found that the appellants' conduct did not amount to a breach of s.45D(1)(b) because it did not directly impede the acquisition of milk by the respondent's customers.