Ahmed v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AHMED & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 708
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Migration Review Tribunal (now Administrative Appeals Tribunal) – whether the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied reg.2.41 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) or failed to take into account relevant matters or breached s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.97(c), 103, 107, 109, 359AA, 359A, 360

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.2.41

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd & Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; [2012] HCA 56
Davison v State of Queensland (2006) 226 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 21
Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 32; [1991] HCA 7
Jankovic v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 56 FCR 474
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248; [2010] FCAFC 145
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX & Anor (2009) 238 CLR 507; [2009] HCA 31
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Senthilnathan Tharmalingam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 537
Shu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 791
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; [2007] HCA 35
SZGIY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) FCAFC 68
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415; [2009] FCAFC 46
Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 319 ALR 181; [2015] HCA 15
First Applicant: MD SHOHEL AHMED
Second Applicant: SHAMIM ARA
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 3147 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Barnes
Hearing date: 19 June 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 7 April 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr L Karp
Solicitors for the Applicants: Parish Patience
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Reilly
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

  1. The name of the Second Respondent be amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

  2. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3147 of 2013

MD SHOHEL AHMED

First Applicant

SHAMIM ARA

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) dated 21 November 2013 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent to cancel the First Applicant’s Subclass 880 visa.

  2. The Tribunal also found that it had no jurisdiction in relation to the Second Applicant as she had not made a valid application for review. While…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 708
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerned an appeal by Mr. Ahmed against a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The core of the dispute revolved around the Minister's discretion to cancel Mr. Ahmed's visa under section 109 of the relevant Act. The matter was heard by Judge Barnes of the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Minister had adequately considered the prescribed circumstances set out in regulation 2.41 of the Act, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for exercising the discretion to cancel a visa. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Minister engaged in an "active intellectual process" and gave "genuine" consideration to each of these prescribed circumstances, as required by established case law.

Judge Barnes' reasoning, drawing on precedent from the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court, established that a decision-maker must actively consider prescribed circumstances. While the weight given to each circumstance is generally for the decision-maker to determine, a failure to give any weight to a factor of great importance, or a dismissal of a consideration as irrelevant without genuine consideration, can lead to an inference that the factor was not taken into account at all. The court noted that a decision-maker is entitled to briefly consider a matter of little practical relevance, but if a factor appears relevant and is given only cursory consideration, it may be inferred that it was not genuinely taken into account. The court also acknowledged that some factors may be critical or fundamental to the decision-making process, while others may not be.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As the Full Court of the Federal Court stated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248; [2010] FCAFC 145 at [57]-[60]:57. Section 109(1)(c) of the Act obliges the Tribunal to “have regard to” the prescribed circumstances set out in reg 2.41. The consideration of those prescribed circumstances is thus a jurisdictional prerequisite to the exercise of the Ministerial discretion to cancel a visa under s 109. In order to comply with that prerequisite, the decision-maker must engage in what has been described as “an active intellectual process” in which each of the prescribed circumstances receives his or her “genuine” consideration: Tickner at 462 (per Black CJ) and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [105] (p 540) (per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).58. In the absence of any statutory or contextual indication of the weight to be given to factors to which a decision-maker must have regard, it is generally for him or her to determine the appropriate weight to be given to them: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41 (per Mason J). The failure to give any weight to a factor to which a decision-maker is bound to have regard in circumstances where that factor is of great importance in the particular case may support an inference that the decision-maker did not have regard to that factor at all. 59. Similarly, a decision-maker does not take into account a consideration that he or she must take into account if he or she simply dismisses it as irrelevant. On the other hand, it does not follow that a decision-maker who genuinely considers a factor only to dismiss it as having no application or significance in the circumstances of the particular case will have committed an error. A decision-maker is entitled to be brief in his or her consideration of a matter which has little or no practical relevance to the circumstances of a particular case. A court would not necessarily infer from the failure of a decision-maker to expressly refer to such a matter in its reasons for decision that the matter had been overlooked. But if it is apparent that the particular matter has been given cursory consideration only so that it may simply be cast aside, despite its apparent relevance, then it may be inferred that the matter has not in fact been taken into account in arriving at the relevant decision: Elias v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 845; (2002) 123 FCR 499 at [62] (p 512) (per Hely J). Whether that inference should be drawn will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.60. In some cases it may be apparent that amongst the factors to which a decision-maker is bound to have regard, there is one factor (or perhaps more than one) which is critical or fundamental to the making of the decision in question. This was true of the particular matter referred to by Mason J in The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 69; (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 338. As his Honour’s reasons in The Queen v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 32; (1979) 180 CLR 322 at 329 show, the relevant statutory provisions may make clear that a particular factor is “a fundamental matter for consideration”. But the converse is also true. The relevant statutory provisions may show that a particular matter to which a decision-maker must have regard is not fundamental to the decision-making process in the sense discussed by his Honour: see, for example, Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 389; (2001) 109 FCR 152 at [57] (p 164) (per Sackville J). (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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