Bautista v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bautista v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1114

Appeal from: Bautista v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 702; (2017) 318 FLR 205
File number: NSD 626 of 2017
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 27 July 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for partner visa – appeal against dismissal by Federal Circuit Court of application for judicial review of Tribunal decision – where Tribunal sent appellant a letter pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) – where Tribunal extended period during which to respond to s 359A letter in accordance with s 359B(4) and reg 4.18A(4) and calculated the last day for response as 21 August 2014 – where appellant responded on 22 August 2014 – revocation of offer to attend hearing at the Tribunal under s 360 of the Act for failure to respond to s 359A letter within statutory time limit – effect of s 363A of the Act – whether Tribunal miscalculated length of prescribed further period under s 359B(4) of the Act– whether Tribunal erred by not conducting a hearing in accordance with s 360 of the Act

MIGRATION – requirements for s 359A letter – whether the Tribunal failed to give the appellant clear particulars of information it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review – degree of particularity required in s 359A letter

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – interpretation of s 359B(4) of the Act –– interaction of s 359B(2) and s 359B(4) of the Act, and regs 4.17 and 4.18A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) – whether primary Judge erred in interpretation of reg 4.18A(4) – validity of reg 4.18A(4) of the Regulations – whether reg 4.18A(4) led to manifest arbitrariness or a result inconsistent with the intention of s 359B(4) of the Act – effect of invalidity of regulation prescribing statutory time limit – whether power under the Act is dependent on existence of prescription by regulation – whether time requirement can be read into s 359B(4) in the absence of prescription by regulation

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 357A, 359A, 359A(1), 359A(1)(a), s 359A(4)(c), 359B, 359B(2), 359B(3), 359B(4), 359C(2), 360, 363A, 379C, 379C(5), 412(1), Pt 5 Div 5

Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth)

Migration Legislation Amendment Regulation 2013 (No 1) (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.16(1), 4.17, 4.17(4), 4.18A(1), 4.18A(4), 4.18A(4)(a), 4.18A(4)(b)(i), 4.31

Liquor Act 1982 (NSW) (repealed) s 148(1)

Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) (repealed) s 215

Liquor Regulation 1983 (NSW) (repealed) reg 29

Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 1998 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 1998 (Cth)

Explanatory Statement, Migration Legislation Amendment Regulation 2013 (No 1) (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) [2016] FCA 196; (2016) 337 ALR 647

Bautista v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 702; (2017) 318 FLR 2015

Bermingham v Corrective…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1114
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bautista, the appellant, sought review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse her application for a permanent partner visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed her application for judicial review of the decision. The appellant appealed to the High Court. The central issue was whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had miscalculated the statutory time period for the appellant to respond to a letter pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant submitted that the Tribunal had erred by not conducting a hearing in accordance with s 360 of the Act because the Tribunal had miscalculated the length of the prescribed further period under s 359B(4) of the Act. The appellant also submitted that the Tribunal had failed to comply with the requirements of s 359A of the Act in respect of the information which it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The primary Judge found that the Tribunal had not misinterpreted the relevant sections of the Act and the Regulations. The primary Judge found that the appellant's proposed interpretation of reg 4.18A(4) was incorrect and that the Tribunal had correctly calculated the length of the prescribed further period under s 359B(4) of the Act. The primary Judge also found that the Tribunal had complied with the requirements of s 359A of the Act in respect of the information which it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court, set aside and remitted the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for reconsideration according to law, and ordered the Minister to pay the appellant's costs in the appeal and the application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) in Bautista v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 702; (2017) 318 FLR 205 be set aside.

4. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) in relation to the Appellant’s application for review be set aside and remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

5. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs in the appeal and the application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ultimately, the Tribunal reaffirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the appellant’s permanent visa on 31 October 2014 (the Tribunal’s second decision).APPLICATION FOR REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT The appellant filed an application to review the Tribunal’s second decision in the Federal Circuit Court on 28 November 2014. In the application, as was later amended, the appellant relied upon the following grounds of review: 1.The Tribunal’s failed to complete its jurisdiction by not conducting a hearing under s360 of the Act.Particulars Either:(a)The Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of the term “14 days after the person receives notice of the extended period”; or(b)The Tribunal acted unreasonably in notifying the Applicant of the extension before the original period had expired; or(c)Regulation 4.18A(4) of the Migration Regulations 1994 is an invalid exercise of the regulation making power because it is inconsistent with s359B(4) which permits the Tribunal to extend the original prescribed for a prescribed further period, that is, a period in addition to the original period. 2.The Tribunal failed to comply with the requirements of s359A in respect of the information which it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. ParticularsThe Tribunal, at paras [57] to [60], relied on information that was contained in allegations provided to the Department in June and July 2003. This information was not exempt from the provisions of s359A. In the s359A notice sent to the Applicant on 29 July 2014 the Tribunal gave particulars on the July allegations, but not of the June allegations.(Errors in original.) In relation to the first ground of review, the primary Judge found at [49]-[50] that the appellant’s argument was not made out. The primary Judge found that the Tribunal had not misinterpreted the relevant sections of the Act and the Regulations. The primary Judge rejected the appellant’s proposed interpretation of reg 4.18A(4), which, if accepted, would have meant that the Tribunal was not able to retract the invitation to attend a hearing. Instead, the primary Judge founds as follows:27.The plain language of s.359B(2) of the Act and reg.4.17(4) of the Regulations on one hand, and s.359B(4) of the Regulations [sic] and reg.4.18A of the Regulations on the other, is that the two regulations are directed to two separate concepts and circumstances. Regulation 4.17(4) is the prescription relevant to s.359B(2). Regulation 4.18A(4) of the Regulations, is the prescription relevant to s.359B(4) of the Act. The meaning of the plain language of each is reinforced by the respective headings which the applicant has reproduced in his written submissions (at [13]).“4.17 Prescribed periods – invitation to comment or give additional information (Act, s359B(2))…4.18A Prescribed periods – invitation to comment or give additional information (Act, s359B(4)).”28.I agree with the Minister’s submission that the applicant’s argument conflates, if not confuses, the two separate concepts of a “prescribed period” (s.359B(2) and reg.4.17(4)), which the Tribunal is obliged to provide when it initially makes the invitation pursuant to s.359A, and the “prescribed further period” (s.359B(4) and reg.4.18A(4)), which applies if the applicant asks for, and is given, an extended period for that purpose.29.Section 359B(2) of the Act obliges the Tribunal to give an applicant the “prescribed period” (reg.4.17(4) of the Regulations), within which to respond to an invitation pursuant to s.359A of the Act. Section 359B(4) of the Act separately provides that the initial period may be extended for a further period as described by reg.4.18A(4) of the Regulations. As is made clear in reg.4.18A(4)(a) of the Regulations, that “extended period” commences when the person receives notice of it, and ends “14 days after the day the person receives notice of the extended period” (reg.4.18A(4)(b)(i) of the Regulations).30.The applicant’s argument relies on a reading of reg.4.18A(4) which ignores the provision of reg.4.18A(4)(a) as to the commencement date of the “extended period”. That is, the “extended period”, as is made plain at reg.4.18A(4)(a) of the Regulations, commences when the person “receives notice” of the extended period.31.The applicant seeks to read into the relevant provision words that are not there. She argues that reg.4.18A(4) of the Regulations in effect, should be read as being that the extended period commences at the point the initial period has ended. That reading is contrary to the plain language of reg.4.18A(4)(a) of the Regulations.32.In all, the Tribunal may extend the initial period “for a prescribed further period” (s.359B(4) of the Act), and that period, irrespective of what is separately said at reg.4.17(4) of the Regulations, which is only relevant to s.359B(2) of the Act, commences when the person receives notice of the extended period of (reg.4.18A(4)(a) of the Regulations). …(Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In summary the Minister submits:·The combined effect of s 359B(4) and reg 4.18A(4) is clear and unambiguous. ·Where a visa-claimant is granted an extension of time in which to respond to a s 359A invitation, the visa-claimant will have 14 days to respond, with time commencing to run from the day after he or she is taken to have received the invitation under s 379C of the Act. ·In the circumstances of this case the appellant was notified on 7 August 2014 that an extension of time had been granted for her to respond, which would expire on 21 August 2014. As the appellant did not respond until 22 August 2014, she lost her right to attend an oral hearing because of the operation of s 359C(2). ·Section 363A of the Act would prevent the Tribunal from allowing the appellant to attend a hearing, because that entitlement had been lost. ·The primary Judge’s characterisation of s 359B(2) and reg 4.17(4) operating together, and s 359B(4) and reg 4.18A(4) operating together but separately from the two former provisions, was correct. ·The appellant’s submission relying on the meaning of “further” in s 359B(4) should not be accepted. This is because the “further period” is not prescribed by s 359B(4) and the section is silent on how the period is to be calculated.ConsiderationLegislative framework Part 5 Div 5 of the Act deals with reviewable decisions under the legislation, including provisions empowering the Tribunal to obtain information it considers relevant, and to invite the visa applicant to give information: s 359. Section 359A of the Act provides, inter alia, that the Tribunal must give the visa applicant particulars of information the Tribunal considers would be the reason (or part thereof) for affirming the decision under review, and invite the visa applicant to comment or respond to it. At material times s 359A provided:359A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal(1)Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must:(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and(c)invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.(2)The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:(a)except where paragraph (b) applies—by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or(b)if the applicant is in immigration detention—by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.(3)The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 359AA.(4)This section does not apply to information:(a)that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or(b)that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or(ba)that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or(c)that is non‑disclosable information.