Local Government (N.S.W.)—Council—Books of account—Right of elector to inspect—No method of inspection prescribed—Taking of notes—Permission—Refusal by council's servant—"As prescribed"—Local Government Act 1919 (N.S.W.), ss. 215, 217, 218(m).

Decisions

August 9.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
MCTIERNAN J. These appeals were brought with the special leave of this Court and were heard together. The orders appealed from were made by Kinsella J. in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. They are orders affirming the dismissal by a magistrate of three informations alleging offences under s. 217 of the Local Government Act 1919 (N.S.W.). The orders were made on special cases stated by the magistrate. The substance of the magistrate's findings of fact are that the respondent, Pryor, the Town Clerk of the Council of the City of the Blue Mountains, did not permit the appellant, who was an elector of the council, to take notes from a book of account which he inspected at the council's office, and that on subsequent occasions both Woodward and Hunt, who were respectively Deputy Town Clerk and City Treasurer, did not permit the appellant to inspect the same book at the council's office. The words of s. 217 are as follows: "Any member or servant of the council who does not permit any elector to make any inspection authorized by or under this Act shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds". The questions which arose before Kinsella J. were: whether the inspection sought by the appellant was authorized by s. 215 fo the Local Government Act; and if so, whether it was an offence under s. 217 not to permit an elector, while making an inspection of a book of account, to take notes from it? The latter question arose only on the case stated in relation to Pryor. The learned judge decided the first question in the affirmative, and the second he would have answered, if it arose, in the same way. In the result he decided that it was not an error on the part of the magistrate to dismiss all the informations. (at p357)

2. The words of s. 215 on which the appellant relied to authorize the inspection which he sought are as follows: "Any elector may at the council's office inspect the books of account and the report of the auditor or of an inspector of local government accounts without fee as prescribed". No provision has been made pursuant to the words "as prescribed" by ordinance or otherwise. The question arises whether, nevertheless, s. 215 gives a complete right to inspect books of account and the report of the auditor or of the local government inspector. The word "prescribed" is defined by s. 4 of the Act to mean "prescribed by or under this Act". Section 4 provides also that the words "'By or under' or 'under', in relation to an…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Downey v Pryor

Details

AGLC: Downey v Pryor [1960] HCA 49
Case: [1960] HCA 49
Decision Date: 9 August 1960

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this appeal were Downey, the appellant, and Pryor, the respondent. The dispute concerned the respondent's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in finding that the respondent had failed to establish that the appellant's negligence caused the respondent's injuries. This involved a consideration of the causal link between the appellant's driving and the respondent's subsequent physical and psychological harm.

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, found that the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence regarding causation. Their Honours held that the evidence, when properly considered, established that the appellant's negligent driving was a causative factor in the respondent's injuries. The court applied the principles of causation in negligence, focusing on whether the appellant's conduct materially contributed to the respondent's loss. The court determined that the trial judge had placed undue emphasis on the respondent's pre-existing psychological condition, rather than assessing the impact of the accident itself.

The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the judgment of the trial court be set aside, and the matter be remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a new trial on the assessment of damages.

Orders