JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: TIANQI LITHIUM KWINANA PTY LTD -v- MSP ENGINEERING PTY LTD [No 2] [2020] WASCA 201
CORAM: BUSS P
MURPHY JA
MITCHELL JA
HEARD: 8 SEPTEMBER 2020 & SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS 9, 16 & 23 OCTOBER 2020
DELIVERED : 3 DECEMBER 2020
FILE NO/S: CACV 84 of 2020
BETWEEN: TIANQI LITHIUM KWINANA PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
MSP ENGINEERING PTY LTD
Respondent
FILE NO/S: CACV 85 of 2020
BETWEEN: TIANQI LITHIUM KWINANA PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
MSP ENGINEERING PTY LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MASTER SANDERSON
Citation: MSP ENGINEERING PTY LTD -v- TIANQI LITHIUM KWINANA PTY LTD [2020] WASC 251
File Number : CIV 1319 of 2020, CIV 1318 of 2020
Catchwords:
Contracts - Construction contracts - Dispute between principal and contractor under construction contracts - Contractor's application for summary judgment in respect of certified payment claims - Where principal contended proceedings were required to be stayed pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA) - Where primary court refused to grant stay
Contracts - Arbitration agreement - Whether primary court ought to have ordered stay under s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA) - Whether proceedings brought in 'a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement'
Contracts - Proper construction of contracts - Where arbitration clause is expressed not to prejudice the right of a party to 'institute proceedings to enforce payment due under the Contract' - Whether reference to 'proceedings to enforce payment due' is to proceedings which are capable of summary determination - Whether primary court erred in failing to find that the claim was not capable of summary determination - Whether triable issue raised before primary court
Legislation:
Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA), s 1C, s 2, s 4, s 7(1), s 7(2), s 8, s 8(1), s 9, s 17
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
CACV 84 of 2020
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | J K Taylor SC |
| Respondent | : | G R Donaldson SC |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Clayton Utz |
| Respondent | : | Squire Patton Boggs |
CACV 85 of 2020
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | J K Taylor SC |
| Respondent | : | G R Donaldson SC |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Clayton Utz |
| Respondent | : | Squire Patton Boggs |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Algons Engineering Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (1998) 14 BCL 215
Amcor Packaging (Aust) Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 253
Aquatec‑Maxcon Pty Ltd v Minson Nacap Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 18; (2004) 8 VR 16
Bayside Civil & Drainage Pty Ltd v Marinestar Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 17
Black Box Control Pty Ltd v TerraVision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219
Bulkbuild Pty Ltd v Fortuna Well Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 173
Cape Lambert Resources Ltd v MCC Australia Sanjin Mining Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 66; (2013) 298 ALR 666
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- Case
- [2020] WASCA 201
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the proceedings were in respect of a matter subject to an arbitration agreement and, if so, whether the primary court erred in refusing to stay the proceedings. The court also needed to interpret the arbitration clause in the contract to ascertain whether the claim for payment was capable of summary determination under the clause. The court examined whether the claim was an action to enforce payment due under the contract, as expressed in the arbitration clause, and whether such an action could be summarily determined.
The court held that the primary court did not err in refusing to stay the proceedings. The court found that the matter before the primary court was not solely about the enforcement of payment due under the contract but involved broader issues such as the validity of the certified payment claims and the applicability of liquidated damages. The court concluded that the claim was not capable of summary determination and that a triable issue was raised before the primary court. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the primary court's decision.
The court made no orders regarding costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Sections 8 and 9 of the Arbitration Act provide:8.Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court (cf. Model Law Art 8)(1)A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement must, if a party so requests not later than when submitting the party's first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.(2)Where an action referred to in subsection (1) has been brought, arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made, while the issue is pending before the court.9.Arbitration agreement and interim measures by court (cf. Model Law Art 9)It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court to grant the measure. By s 2, the term 'interim measure' has the meaning in s 17(2). By s 17(1) of the Arbitration Act, unless the parties agree otherwise, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant 'interim measures'. By s 17(2), an 'interim measure' is any temporary measure (whether in the form of an award or other form) by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award which finally determines the dispute, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to:(a)maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute (ie, broadly speaking, an interlocutory injunction);(b)take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself (ie, broadly speaking, an order for the preservation of the integrity of the arbitral process);(c)provide a means for preserving assets, out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied (ie, broadly speaking, a Mareva injunction); and(d)preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute (ie, broadly speaking, an Anton Piller order). For the purposes of s 8(1) of the Arbitration Act, a party 'so requests' a referral to arbitration by the making of a stay application.[52][52] CPD Contractors Pty Ltd v Celsus Pty Ltd (fka SA Health Partnership Nominees Pty Ltd) [2017] FCA 1620; (2017) 353 ALR 84 [90] ‑ [91], [108] ‑ [109]; Gilgandra Marketing Co-Operative Ltd v Australian Commodities & Marketing Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1209 [52]; The Property People v Housing New Zealand Ltd (1999) (HC) 14 PRNZ 66 [24]; Nearmap Ltd v Spookfish Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1790 [50] ‑ [51]. Section 8(1) invites attention to whether the proceedings before the court are brought in 'a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement'. In determining this question, it is necessary to first identify the subject matter of the controversy which falls for determination in the proceedings before the court.[53] The 'matter' to be determined in a proceeding is to be ascertained by reference to the subject matter of the dispute in the curial proceeding and the substantive, although not necessarily the ultimate, questions for determination in the proceeding. The scope of the matter is to be ascertained from the pleadings and from the underlying subject matter upon which the pleadings, including the defence, are based.[54] As Tanning Research and Rinehart illustrate, the character of a matter in which an action is brought as a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement may arise from the nature of the defence to the claim in the curial proceedings as well as the nature of the claim in the curial proceedings.[53] Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien [1990] HCA 8; (1990) 169 CLR 322, 350 - 351; Rinehart v Hancock [67].[54] See Recyclers of Australia Pty Ltd v Hettinga Equipment Inc [2000] FCA 547; (2000) 100 FCR 420 [18]; Tanning Research (343 - 344), (351 - 354); Flint Ink NZ Ltd v Huhtamaki Australia Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 166; (2014) 44 VR 64 [31] ‑ [34], [88]; Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 77 [125] - [135].