FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Four Colour Graphics Australia Pty Ltd v Gravitas Communications Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 224
ORDERS
NSD 1300 of 2016 BETWEEN: FOUR COLOUR GRAPHICS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 109 833 589)
Applicant
AND: GRAVITAS COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 168 559 804)
Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application dated 8 November 2016 be refused.
2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application.
3.The proceeding be listed for a case management…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 224
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centered on the interpretation of the arbitration clause within the context of the agreements between the parties. The court needed to ascertain the scope of the arbitration clause and whether the specific claims made by Four Colour, particularly those concerning the termination of a contract for services and the associated damages, were covered by the arbitration agreement. The court also had to consider the general principles of contract interpretation, including the objective test of what a reasonable person would understand the terms to mean, and whether the arbitration clause should be interpreted liberally.
The court held that the arbitration agreement did not cover the specific claims made by Four Colour. The arbitration clause was found to be limited to disputes about the interpretation or application of the contract or its provisions. The court rejected the argument that the clause should be interpreted broadly to include all disputes "about" the contract. It concluded that the damages claim for the loss of a monthly fee income due to the termination of the contract for services did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the application for the referral to arbitration was refused.
The court ordered that the interlocutory application be refused and that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the application. Additionally, the proceeding was to be listed for a case management hearing on a specified date.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application dated 8 November 2016 be refused.
2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application.
3. The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing on 13 April 2017 at 9.30 am.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The claim for damages is for the loss of a monthly fee income of $10,375.00. The claim is based upon the allegation that the contract for services was terminated without proper cause.SCOPE OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT The approach to construction of arbitration clauses is no different from the construction of any other contractual provisions: Rinehart v Welker [2012] NSWCA 95 at [115]. Thus, the following general principles, stated by the plurality in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [40], apply: It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.(footnotes omitted) Under Australian law, there is no legal presumption in favour of arbitration. That is to say, in construing arbitration agreements, courts will not presume that a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause unless the court can be persuaded otherwise: Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 at [41] (“Walter Rau”); Tridon at [123] (Austin J); TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 553 at [17]-[20] (Hargrave J). Nevertheless, some courts have taken a “liberal approach” to the construction of arbitration clauses, whereby “words capable of broad and flexible meaning will be given liberal construction and content”: Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 157 FCR 45 at 87-88 [164]-[165] (Allsop J); see also Walter Rau at [41]-[42] (Allsop J) (noting, however, that the liberal approach “does not entitle one to give the words in question meaning which they do not bear”). The tendency to adopt a liberal approach to the interpretation of an arbitration clause which is couched in general words does not apply with equal force where specific areas of dispute are identified in the clause: cf. Vetreria Etrusca SRL v Kingston Estate Wines Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 75 at [21].“about” In this case, the arbitration agreement identifies two broad cases of disputes that fall within its scope. They are disputes “about”:(1)the interpretation of “this contract or any of its provisions”; and(2)the application of “this contract or any of its provisions”. On behalf of Gravitas, Ms Edwards of counsel submitted that the relevant disputes extend to disputes “around and connected with the use to be made of and the meaning to be given to the contract” based upon the proposition that the word “about” should be construed similarly to, but wider than, phrases like “arising out of” and “in connection with”: cf John Holland Pty Ltd v Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 451 at [69]; Paper Products Pty Ltd v Tomlinsons (Rochdale) Limited [1993] FCA 346; (1993) 43 FCR 439 at 444 to 446. Ms Edwards suggested that cl 10 extends to disputes “about … this contract or its provisions”. I do not accept these submissions. The word “about” simply identifies the subject matter of the disputes covered by the arbitration agreement, namely, the interpretation or application of the relevant contract or any of its provisions. It does not extend the ambit of the clause beyond that subject matter. “this contract”