with respect to such accident have been commenced within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury, or, in case of death, within six months from the time of death Provided that (b) the failure to commence proceedings within the period above specified shall not be a bar to the maintenance of such proceedings if it is found that the failure was occasioned by mistake, absence from New South Wales, or
Held, by Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ. (Griffith C.J. dissenting), (1) that where proceedings for compensation have not been commenced for a longer period than the six months above specified, the period in respect of which an excuse is required is that period of six months, and that any delay after the expiration of that period and before the commencement of proceedings can- not be taken into consideration; (2) that the "mistake" referred to in that section includes a mistake of law, or of mixed law and fact, as well as mistake of fact, and a mistake having been established no question of the
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales: Murray v. Baxter, 13 S.R. (N.S.W.), 602, reversed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
An action was on 10th September 1913 instituted in the District Court at Sydney by Emily Murray, administratrix of the estate of James Murray, deceased, against Sarah Elenor Baxter, Harold Baxter and Alexander Watt, executrix and executors of James Baxter, deceased, in which the plaintiff alleged that James Murray had been a workman within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1910, and as such had been employed by James Baxter in an employment to which that Act applied that in the course of such employment Murray had met with an accident arising out of such employment which resulted in his death; and that the dependents of Murray were at the time of his death wholly dependent on his earnings and were then resident in New South Wales whereby the plaintiff, as such administratrix, became and was entitled to compensation from the defendants.
The plaintiff claimed £400.
The accident in question happened on 1st May 1912 and James Murray died on the same day.
One of the defences taken was that proceedings for the recovery of compensation were not taken within six months after the death of James Murray. The District Court Judge found that there was a reasonable excuse for the delay in
A. commencing proceedings, and he found a verdict…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Murray v Baxter [1914] HCA 78
Case
[1914] HCA 78
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Emily Murray, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, had brought a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1910 against the respondents, the executors of her husband's former employer. The dispute arose because proceedings for compensation were not commenced within the six-month period stipulated by the Act following the workman's death.
The central legal issues before the High Court were: (1) whether the "failure to commence proceedings within the period above specified" in section 12(b) of the Act referred only to the initial six-month period or to the entire period of delay before proceedings were actually commenced; and (2) whether the "mistake" referred to in section 12(b) included mistakes of law, or only mistakes of fact.
The High Court, by a majority decision, held that the "failure" referred to in section 12(b) concerned only the initial six-month period, and any delay beyond that period did not need to be excused. Furthermore, the Court determined that the term "mistake" in the section was not restricted to mistakes of fact but encompassed mistakes of law, or mixed law and fact. The majority reasoned that the legislative intent was to provide a broad excuse for delays occasioned by genuine mistakes, and that to restrict "mistake" to only factual errors would unduly limit the remedial purpose of the provision. The Supreme Court's decision was reversed, and the appeal was allowed.