Hillier v Pivot Nutrition Pty Ltd - [2000] TASSC 100

SC[2000] TASSC 100

CITATION: Hillier v Pivot Nutrition Pty Ltd [2000] TASSC 100

PARTIES:  HILLIER, Marcus
  v
  PIVOT NUTRITION PTY LTD

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 13/1999
DELIVERED ON:  27 July 2000
DELIVERED AT:  Launceston
HEARING DATE/S:  30 June 2000
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford J

CATCHWORDS:

Workers Compensation - Proceedings to obtain compensation - Claim and delay in making claim - Excuses for delay - Reasonable cause - Injury and death of worker - Seven year old dependant son's claim for compensation - Mother and solicitor unaware of entitlement to claim - Whether son's failure to claim within six months occasioned by reasonable cause - Whether delay after expiration of time limit may be considered.
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s38(1).
Murray v Baxter (1914) 18 CLR 622; McDonald v Co-Operative Motors Ltd 57/1971; applied.

Quinlivan v Portland Harbour Trust [1963] VR 25; Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34; Roles v Pascall & Sons [1911] 1 KB 982; Green v Hansen and Yuncken [1923] VLR 688; Richardson v Dodderidge [1960] Tas SR 25, referred to.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [137]

Workers Compensation - Proceedings to obtain compensation - Appeals and stated cases - Other matters - Tasmania - Powers of judge on appeal - Power to make order or determination which ought to have been made by Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal.
Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), rr693(7), 704.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [170]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  R W Pearce
             Respondent:  A M Quinn
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Douglas & Collins
             Respondent:  Dobson Mitchell & Allport

Judgment ID Number: [2000] TASSC 100
Number of paragraphs: 26

Serial No 100/2000
File No LCA 13/1999

MARCUS HILLIER v PIVOT NUTRITION PTY LTD

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CRAWFORD J
27 July 2000

The appellant claims to be the infant son of the late Leslie John Baxter who was killed when crushed by a truck while he was working for the respondent on 13 January 1995. The appellant was born on 29 September 1987 and was therefore seven years old at the time. He claimed compensation for the death of his father under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, s67, upon the basis that he was a dependant child of the deceased. However, he did not make his claim for compensation within the six months time limit of s32(1)(b). He referred to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal a dispute between him and the respondent relating to his failure to do so and sought a determination under s38(1) that his failure to make the claim within time did not affect the validity of his claim.

The reference was dated 18 November 1998 and filed with the Tribunal on 20 November 1998. A hearing was conducted on 31 March 1999 and on 20 May 1999 the Commissioner published reasons for determining that the appellant's failure to claim within time was not occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause. The reference was dismissed. The appellant…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2000] TASSC 100
Decision Date: 27 July 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this appeal, Marcus Hillier, the infant son of the late Leslie John Baxter, sought to claim compensation for his father's death under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. The claim was made beyond the six-month statutory limit, raising the issue of whether this delay could be excused due to reasonable cause. The primary legal issue was whether the failure to claim within the stipulated period could be justified by reasonable cause, particularly considering the circumstances of the infant's age and the lack of awareness of the claim by both the mother and the solicitor.

The court examined the facts surrounding the delay, noting that neither the infant's mother nor his solicitor were aware of the entitlement to claim compensation or the time limit for such claims. The Commissioner of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal had dismissed the claim, finding no reasonable cause for the delay. However, the court found the Commissioner's determination to be erroneous, particularly in misapplying the law regarding reasonable cause and mistake. The court highlighted that the Commissioner misunderstood the nature of the claim and improperly applied legal precedents concerning reasonable cause.

The court concluded that the infant's failure to claim within the prescribed period was indeed occasioned by reasonable cause, primarily due to his age and the lack of awareness by his mother and solicitor. The court quashed the Commissioner's order and determined that the appellant's claim was valid despite the delay. This decision underscores the importance of assessing each case on its unique circumstances rather than rigidly applying legal precedents without consideration of the specific facts.

Orders