Robinson v Institute for Aboriginal Development Inc - [2010] NTMC 58

CITATION: Robinson v Institute for Aboriginal Development Inc [2010] NTMC 058
PARTIES: MICHAEL ROBINSON
v

INSTITUTE FOR ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT INC

TITLE OF COURT:   WORK HEALTH COURT
JURISDICTION:   Worker Health
FILE NO(s):   20940006
DELIVERED ON:   17 September 2010
DELIVERED AT:   Darwin
HEARING DATE(s):   3 August 2010
JUDGMENT OF:   Ms Sue Oliver SM
CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS COMPENSATION – Failure to bring claim within time prescribed by    s 104(3) of the Workers Rehabilitation & Compensation Act – no power to extend time limits for bringing the proceedings
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Worker:   Mr O’Loughlin
Employer:   Mr Crawley
Solicitors:
Worker:   Halfpennys
Employer:   Cridlands
Judgment category classification:           A
Judgment ID number:   [2010] NTMC 058
Number of paragraphs:   41

IN THE WORK HEALTH COURT
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
No. 20940006
[2010] NTMC 058

BETWEEN:
MICHAEL ANTHONY ROBINSON

Worker
AND:
INSTITUTE FOR ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT INC

Employer

REASONS FOR DECISION
(Delivered 17 September 2010)
Ms Sue Oliver SM:

By application dated 23 November 2009 the worker has applied for an order in respect of a claim for compensation under Part V of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act.
The worker seeks a declaration that those proceedings are not barred for failure to make the claim within the time limit set by s 104(3) of the Act.

Steps and time limits applicable to the bring of a claim for compensation before the Work Health Court

The bringing of a claim for compensation under the Act and the responses to a claim by an employer are governed by strict procedural steps and time limitations. In Maddalozzo v Maddrick (1992) FLR 159 at 162 Mildren J described the statutory scheme as a “minefield of time limitations” and in Prime v ColliersInternational (NT) Pty Ltd [2006] NTSC 220, his Honour observed that with the introduction of mediation as a pre condition to making an application to the Work Health Court that the “pathway” to the Court is longer and more tortuous than ever. Understanding the scheme is not assisted by the fact that the “pathway” is not dealt with by way of sequential provisions in the Act.
The first step is a requirement that notice of the relevant injury has, as soon as practicable, been given to or served on the worker's employer (s 80). Proceedings for recovery of compensation are not maintainable unless notice of the injury is given before the worker has voluntarily left the employment in which he or she was injured (s 182(1)) and within six months after the occurrence of the injury or, in the case of a disease, the incapacity arising from the disease; or in the case of death, within six months after advice of the death has been received by the claimant. The worker’s claim was made on or about 29 May 2001 for an injury alleged to have been sustained on or about 12 May 2001. Once a claim for compensation is received, an employer is required to make a decision either accepting liability for the compensation, deferring the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2010] NTMC 58
Decision Date: 17 September 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiffs, represented by Robinson, sought compensation from the Institute for Aboriginal Development Inc (the Institute) under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the Institute, their employer, had failed to provide safe working conditions, leading to injuries. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiffs argued that the Institute had breached its duty of care, resulting in their injuries, and that they had been unable to bring their claim within the prescribed time limit due to circumstances beyond their control.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs' failure to bring their claim within the time limits prescribed by section 104(3) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act could be excused. The court needed to determine if the plaintiffs' delay was excusable and if the court had the power to extend the time limits for bringing proceedings. The plaintiffs argued that they had been unaware of the existence of their cause of action until after the statutory period had expired and that their delay was due to circumstances beyond their control.

The court held that the plaintiffs' failure to bring their claim within the prescribed time limit was not excusable. The court found that the plaintiffs had known or ought to have known of their cause of action and the relevant time limits for bringing proceedings. The court further held that it did not have the power to extend the time limits for bringing proceedings under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. The court found that the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred and dismissed the proceedings.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim and awarded costs to the Institute. The court held that the plaintiffs' delay in bringing their claim was not excusable and that the court did not have the power to extend the time limits for bringing proceedings. The court found that the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred and dismissed the proceedings with costs to the Institute.

Orders