Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2007] WASCA 226

CORAM:   STEYTLER P

McLURE JA
BUSS JA

HEARD:   2, 3 & 4 MAY 2007

DELIVERED          :   29 OCTOBER 2007

FILE NO/S:   CACV 64 of 2006

BETWEEN:   MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :TEMPLEMAN J

Citation  :MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2006] WASC 82

File No  :CIV 1550 of 1997

Catchwords:

Appeal - Town planning - Reservation and acquisition of land - Valuation - Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA) s 36(2b) - Statutory emanation of Pointe Gourde principle - Disregarding effects on value attributable to the Scheme - Steps - Approach to zoning and development potential of land at valuation date - Where trial judge excluded expert evidence led by landowner

Legislation:

Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA), s 36(2b)

Result:

Various findings of the trial judge set aside
Further submissions required as to the manner of disposition of the appeal

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr B W Walker SC & Dr J T Schoombee & Ms K L Hafford

Respondent:     Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms D E Quinlan

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Ilberys Lawyers

Respondent:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Brown v Churchill [2006] WASCA 17; (2006) 31 WAR 246

Fidler v Port Stephens Council [1998] NSWLEC 193

Fletcher Estates (Harlescott) Ltd v Environment Secretary [2000] 2 AC 307

Housing Commission of New South Wales v San Sebastian Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 19

Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2004] WASCA 149; (2004) 29 WAR 273

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2006] WASC 82

Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub‑Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565

Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332

Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 438

Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418

Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 386; (2006) 151 LGERA 186

Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 251; (2005) 63 NSWLR 407

The Crown v Murphy (1990) 64 ALJR 593

University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481

Wattle Park Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 6 SASR 69

Wilson v Liverpool Corporation [1971] 1 All ER 628

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….5

Issues arising in the appeal
Section 36(2b) of the Scheme Act
The retrial

Background to and development of the Scheme
Evidence accepted by the trial judge concerning the suitability of the Mount Lawley land for development
Evidence of likely zoning absent the Scheme
Evidence given by Dr Davies, Dr…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 226
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd (Mount Lawley) appealed against the decision of the Western Australian Planning Commission (the respondent) in relation to the valuation of 320 hectares of land reserved for parks and recreation. The dispute centred around the value of the reserved portion of the Mount Lawley land, which had been rezoned for urban deferred development and reserved for parks and recreation, following an amendment to the Metropolitan Region Scheme. The appeal involved the interpretation of section 36(2b) of the Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA) and the application of the Pointe Gourde principle, which requires the disregard of effects on value attributable to the Scheme. The key issue before the court was whether the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land, which was owned by another party, constituted a 'step in the process' of the Scheme for the purposes of section 36(2b). Mount Lawley argued that the upzoning was not a step in the process and should not be disregarded, while the respondent contended that it was.

The court examined the statutory language and context, considering the distinction between a neutral planning decision and a step in the process. The court noted that the New South Wales legislation, which had been referred to by Mount Lawley, allowed for the zoning of land as a neutral planning decision that was not a step in the Scheme. However, under the Western Australian legislation, the reservation of the Mount Lawley land and the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land were integral parts of the Scheme itself, rather than individual steps within it. This meant that the court could not find that the same planning decisions would have been made prior to the valuation date. The court also highlighted that the trial judge had excluded expert evidence led by Mount Lawley, which further complicated the valuation process.

The court ultimately concluded that the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land was not a step in the process for the purposes of section 36(2b) of the Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA). The court set aside various findings of the trial judge and required further submissions on the manner of disposition of the appeal. This decision clarified the application of the Pointe Gourde principle in Western Australia and the distinction between neutral planning decisions and steps in the process under the relevant legislation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Various findings of the trial judge set aside

Further submissions required as to the manner of disposition of the appeal

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This appeal and cross‑appeal concern the value of the reserved portion of 320 hectares of land (the Mount Lawley land) comprising Lot 46 and part of Lot 47 Maralla Road and Lexia Avenue, located to the west of a recently developed suburb known as Ellenbrook, in the City of Swan. The Mount Lawley land is some 22 kilometres north of the City of Perth on the Swan Coastal Plain. The land, which is close to the northern extremity of a corridor identified between 1987 and 1990 for expansion of the Perth metropolitan area, is owned by the appellant, Mount Lawley Pty Ltd (Mount Lawley). The Mount Lawley land consists of a sandy dryland or upland area containing banksia trees and interspersed wetlands classified as lakes under the Environmental Protection (Swan Coastal Plain Lakes) Policy 1992 (Lakes EPP). The land is bounded on the west by state forest. Its eastern boundary abuts some 745 hectares of land that was owned by Sanwa Vines Pty Ltd (Sanwa). The land to the south of the Mount Lawley land (some 563 hectares in all) was owned by a statutory corporation operating as a state housing body, Homeswest. That land, in turn, lay to the west of 580 hectares of land owned by Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (Multiplex). In the late 1980s Homeswest and Sanwa formed a company known as Ellenbrook Management Pty Ltd (Ellenbrook Management). That company proposed to develop the land owned by Homeswest and Sanwa as a new suburb to be known as Ellenbrook (Ellenbrook Project). Mount Lawley was initially to be involved in the development. However, it subsequently withdrew from it. The Ellenbrook Project was ultimately successful. In the early stages of its implementation the land to be developed (Ellenbrook land) was rezoned from rural to urban deferred. This was done by way of an amendment to the Metropolitan Region Scheme (MRS). This was Amendment 879/33 to the MRS which was gazetted on 16 October 1992. That amendment also effected the reservation of 301 hectares of the Mount Lawley land for parks and recreation. Another 8 hectares or so of the Mount Lawley land (CAH land) was reserved for a controlled access highway. The unreserved portion of the Mount Lawley land (some 11.9 hectares on Lot 47) was rezoned, by Amendment 879/33, to urban deferred. The Mount Lawley land had, until then, been zoned rural. The reservation of the 301 hectares for parks and recreation was made for the purpose of protecting and preserving significant wetlands and associated vegetation on that land. It is, for the purposes of the appeal, common cause between the parties that 175 hectares of the reserved land consisted of drylands, that 75 hectares consisted of wetlands (or lakes) and that the remaining 50 hectares consisted of drylands that were likely to be required by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) to be used as protective or 'buffer' zones around the wetlands, if development occurred on adjacent dryland areas. In December 1995 the appellant applied to the respondent for approval to begin development of earth works for urban development and sand mining on the Mount Lawley land. As had been anticipated, the development application was refused. On 13 February 1996 the appellant claimed compensation for injurious affection in respect of its land. It was entitled to do so by virtue of s 11(1) of the now repealed Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA) (Town Planning Act). That section provides that any person whose land is injuriously affected by the making of a town planning scheme shall (if the claim is brought within the specified time) 'be entitled to obtain compensation in respect thereof from the responsible authority'.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question of what is a 'step in the process' in this kind of context has since been discussed in a number of cases. Relatively recently, in Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 251; (2005) 63 NSWLR 407 [85] (Walker No 1) Basten JA (with whom Beazley JA and Stein AJA agreed), said that the 'lesson of … San Sebastian … is that no narrow view should be taken of steps which may affect the value of land'. However, he added that 'it is necessary to distinguish between conduct which constitutes a proper exercise of planning powers irrespective of the ultimate resumption and a use of planning powers in pursuit of a proposed resumption'. We have said that in this appeal we are required by the agreement of the parties, taken with their decision not to challenge the determination in the first appeal, to treat the Scheme as comprising Amendment 950/33 in addition to Amendment 879/33. The Scheme is consequently to be taken (as it was at the retrial) as including both the reservation of part of the Mount Lawley land and the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land. It also follows from the agreement of the parties in this respect, consistently with the approach adopted by the court in the first appeal, that they accept that the Scheme is the particular amendments (879/33 and 950/33) and that it is only the effect on value of those amendments that must be disregarded and not that of those amendments and any other amendments to the same effect that might, absent the particular amendments, have been made to the MRS. This means that this court is not required to ignore the reservation of the Mount Lawley land and/or the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land as an available planning option (which, if there had been such a requirement, would have precluded a finding that part of the Mount Lawley land would or might in any event have been reserved or that the Ellenbrook land would or might in any event have been upzoned). It is important to mention, in this respect, that the appellant's case, at the retrial and in this appeal, was that the Ellenbrook land would have been zoned urban by the valuation date. This was important because there was evidence that the upzoning of Ellenbrook was a necessary, but not determinative, factor in any upzoning of the Mount Lawley land (neither party contended that the value of the Mount Lawley land was less than its rural value). However, it does not follow that, because the Scheme is the particular amendments, it is open to the court to make a finding on the balance of probabilities that the same planning decision or decisions would have been made and given effect to (that is, the Mount Lawley land reserved or the Ellenbrook land upzoned) prior to the valuation date. The amendments giving effect to the reservation of part of the Mount Lawley land and the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land amount to the Scheme itself, not to a step in the Scheme. This materially distinguishes s 36(2b) from the New South Wales statutory scheme considered in the New South Wales cases relied on by the appellant including Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 438 and Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 386; (2006) 151 LGERA 186 (discussed later in these reasons). As we shall explain, under the New South Wales legislation the zoning of the relevant land can be a neutral planning decision which is not a step in the Scheme and the zoning is never the equivalent of the Scheme under s 36(2b).