JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2007] WASCA 226
CORAM: STEYTLER P
McLURE JA
BUSS JA
HEARD: 2, 3 & 4 MAY 2007
DELIVERED : 29 OCTOBER 2007
FILE NO/S: CACV 64 of 2006
BETWEEN: MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :TEMPLEMAN J
Citation :MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2006] WASC 82
File No :CIV 1550 of 1997
Catchwords:
Appeal - Town planning - Reservation and acquisition of land - Valuation - Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA) s 36(2b) - Statutory emanation of Pointe Gourde principle - Disregarding effects on value attributable to the Scheme - Steps - Approach to zoning and development potential of land at valuation date - Where trial judge excluded expert evidence led by landowner
Legislation:
Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA), s 36(2b)
Result:
Various findings of the trial judge set aside
Further submissions required as to the manner of disposition of the appeal
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr B W Walker SC & Dr J T Schoombee & Ms K L Hafford
Respondent: Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms D E Quinlan
Solicitors:
Appellant: Ilberys Lawyers
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Brown v Churchill [2006] WASCA 17; (2006) 31 WAR 246
Fidler v Port Stephens Council [1998] NSWLEC 193
Fletcher Estates (Harlescott) Ltd v Environment Secretary [2000] 2 AC 307
Housing Commission of New South Wales v San Sebastian Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 19
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638
Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2004] WASCA 149; (2004) 29 WAR 273
Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2006] WASC 82
Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub‑Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332
Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 438
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418
Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 386; (2006) 151 LGERA 186
Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 251; (2005) 63 NSWLR 407
The Crown v Murphy (1990) 64 ALJR 593
University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481
Wattle Park Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 6 SASR 69
Wilson v Liverpool Corporation [1971] 1 All ER 628
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….5
Issues arising in the appeal
Section 36(2b) of the Scheme Act
The retrial
Background to and development of the Scheme
Evidence accepted by the trial judge concerning the suitability of the Mount Lawley land for development
Evidence of likely zoning absent the Scheme
Evidence given by Dr Davies, Dr…
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- Case
- [2007] WASCA 226
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory language and context, considering the distinction between a neutral planning decision and a step in the process. The court noted that the New South Wales legislation, which had been referred to by Mount Lawley, allowed for the zoning of land as a neutral planning decision that was not a step in the Scheme. However, under the Western Australian legislation, the reservation of the Mount Lawley land and the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land were integral parts of the Scheme itself, rather than individual steps within it. This meant that the court could not find that the same planning decisions would have been made prior to the valuation date. The court also highlighted that the trial judge had excluded expert evidence led by Mount Lawley, which further complicated the valuation process.
The court ultimately concluded that the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land was not a step in the process for the purposes of section 36(2b) of the Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA). The court set aside various findings of the trial judge and required further submissions on the manner of disposition of the appeal. This decision clarified the application of the Pointe Gourde principle in Western Australia and the distinction between neutral planning decisions and steps in the process under the relevant legislation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Various findings of the trial judge set aside
Further submissions required as to the manner of disposition of the appeal
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The question of what is a 'step in the process' in this kind of context has since been discussed in a number of cases. Relatively recently, in Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 251; (2005) 63 NSWLR 407 [85] (Walker No 1) Basten JA (with whom Beazley JA and Stein AJA agreed), said that the 'lesson of … San Sebastian … is that no narrow view should be taken of steps which may affect the value of land'. However, he added that 'it is necessary to distinguish between conduct which constitutes a proper exercise of planning powers irrespective of the ultimate resumption and a use of planning powers in pursuit of a proposed resumption'. We have said that in this appeal we are required by the agreement of the parties, taken with their decision not to challenge the determination in the first appeal, to treat the Scheme as comprising Amendment 950/33 in addition to Amendment 879/33. The Scheme is consequently to be taken (as it was at the retrial) as including both the reservation of part of the Mount Lawley land and the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land. It also follows from the agreement of the parties in this respect, consistently with the approach adopted by the court in the first appeal, that they accept that the Scheme is the particular amendments (879/33 and 950/33) and that it is only the effect on value of those amendments that must be disregarded and not that of those amendments and any other amendments to the same effect that might, absent the particular amendments, have been made to the MRS. This means that this court is not required to ignore the reservation of the Mount Lawley land and/or the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land as an available planning option (which, if there had been such a requirement, would have precluded a finding that part of the Mount Lawley land would or might in any event have been reserved or that the Ellenbrook land would or might in any event have been upzoned). It is important to mention, in this respect, that the appellant's case, at the retrial and in this appeal, was that the Ellenbrook land would have been zoned urban by the valuation date. This was important because there was evidence that the upzoning of Ellenbrook was a necessary, but not determinative, factor in any upzoning of the Mount Lawley land (neither party contended that the value of the Mount Lawley land was less than its rural value). However, it does not follow that, because the Scheme is the particular amendments, it is open to the court to make a finding on the balance of probabilities that the same planning decision or decisions would have been made and given effect to (that is, the Mount Lawley land reserved or the Ellenbrook land upzoned) prior to the valuation date. The amendments giving effect to the reservation of part of the Mount Lawley land and the upzoning of the Ellenbrook land amount to the Scheme itself, not to a step in the Scheme. This materially distinguishes s 36(2b) from the New South Wales statutory scheme considered in the New South Wales cases relied on by the appellant including Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 438 and Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 386; (2006) 151 LGERA 186 (discussed later in these reasons). As we shall explain, under the New South Wales legislation the zoning of the relevant land can be a neutral planning decision which is not a step in the Scheme and the zoning is never the equivalent of the Scheme under s 36(2b).