Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 48 min read

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      SYDNEY HARBOUR FORESHORE AUTHORITY v WALKER CORPORATION PTY LTD [NO. 2] [2006]  NSWCA 386

FILE NUMBER(S):
40227/06

HEARING DATE(S):               27 and 28 November 2006

DECISION DATE:     21/12/2006

PARTIES:
Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority - Appellant
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Handley JA Beazley JA Basten JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          LEC 30024/03

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Talbot J

COUNSEL:
B. Walker SC/A. Galasso SC – Appellant
D. Jackson QC/J Webster SC/I. Hemmings - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
Deacons - Appellant
Minter Ellison - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
JUST TERMS COMPENSATION – Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 56(1)(a) – meaning of “the proposal” – land zoned for industrial use – whether land should have been treated as zoned for residential use – whether zoning authority’s decision to maintain existing zoning to prevent land being developed in a manner inconsistent with a possible future use constituted part of “the proposal to carry out the public purpose”: – resuming authority did not have proposal to acquire land at time of the rezoning authority’s decision – whether decision to maintain zoning caused decrease in value of land

LEGISLATION CITED:
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), ss 26, 27
Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), ss 55, 56
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW), s 57
Public Works Act 1912 (NSW), s 124

DECISION:
(1)  Allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and orders of the Land and Environment Court delivered and made on 4 April 2006
(2)  Remit the matter to the Land and Environment Court for assessment of the market value of the land, according to law.

JUDGMENT:

- 33 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40227/06
LEC 30024/03

HANDLEY JA
BEAZLEY JA
BASTEN JA

21 December 2006

SYDNEY HARBOUR FORESHORE AUTHORITY v WALKER CORPORATION PTY LTD [NO. 2]

On 26 September 2002, the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (“the Authority”) acquired an area of land at Ballast Point on Sydney Harbour from Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (“Walker Corporation”).  The acquisition was preceded by an announcement by the Government on 19 February 2002 of its intention to acquire the Ballast Point site.  At the time of acquisition, the land was zoned industrial under the Leichhardt Local Environment Plan 2000 (“the 2000 LEP”).  The land would have had a higher value, if it had been zoned residential, which it never was.  Previously, on 6 February 1992, Leichhardt Council sought funds from the Commonwealth and State Government to acquire the land and identified Council’s first priority for the site as being “open space”.  However no funds were forthcoming and the site remained zoned for industrial use until its acquisition.

Proceedings for the assessment of compensation under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation Act) 1991 (NSW) (“the Acquisition Act”) were commenced by Walker Corporation in the Land and Environment Court (“the LEC”).  On 9 July 2004, the LEC…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 386
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the assessment of just terms compensation under the *Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991* (NSW) following the compulsory acquisition of land by the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority. The dispute centred on whether the land, zoned for industrial use, should have been valued as if it were zoned for residential use, and whether the zoning authority's decision to maintain the existing industrial zoning, in light of a potential future public purpose, constituted part of the "proposal to carry out the public purpose" for the purposes of the Act.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was to determine the correct approach to valuing the land, specifically whether the trial judge erred in valuing the land on the assumption that a rezoning to residential use had occurred, rather than assessing the prospect of such a rezoning from the perspective of a hypothetical purchaser. This involved considering whether the refusal to rezone, or the decision to maintain the existing zoning, was itself part of the acquiring authority's proposal to carry out the public purpose for which the land was acquired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had erred by valuing the land on the assumption that rezoning had occurred, rather than assessing the chance of rezoning and any decline in value attributable to statutory considerations. The Court clarified that the refusal of a council to rezone, or the decision to maintain existing zoning, would only be considered part of the "proposal to carry out the public purpose" if it was a step in that proposal or if the council was acting in concert with the acquiring authority. The matter was remitted to the Land and Environment Court for a redetermination of the market value of the land.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and orders of the Land and Environment Court delivered and made on 4 April 2006; (2) Remit the matter to the Land and Environment Court for assessment of the market value of the land, according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In other respects, conciseness has led to elision. Thus, at [36] in the second judgment, his Honour stated:“I agree with the applicant’s submission that it can be said that I have already included the element of risk of achieving a rezoning which the Court of Appeal has found to be necessary as follows:-(i) For development potential permitting 69 units – zero risk.(ii)For development potential permitting 138 units – risk of 25-30%.”However, this was a calculation of “development potential” on an assumption that “the land had been zoned residential”: first LEC judgment at [147]. It was in relation to this assessment that this Court, on the first appeal, identified error in the following terms at [81]:“Instead of seeking to assess, from the perspective of the hypothetical purchaser, the chance of a rezoning, and noting any decline which could be attributed to the statutory considerations in s 56(1)(a), the trial judge valued the land on the assumption that the rezoning had in fact taken place. That assumption could only be justified if the refusal of the council to rezone was itself part of the proposal to acquire the land for the public purpose for which it was acquired or a step in the carrying out of that public purpose.”Challenge to first appeal judgment By way of a notice of contention, Walker Corporation sought to uphold the second LEC judgment on the basis that: “Market value is to be assessed, not upon the basis of what the hypothetical purchaser would consider to be the chance of a rezoning permitting residential development, but on the fact (as already found by the Court below) that a rezoning permitting residential development would have occurred by the date of compulsory acquisition but for the intention to carry out the public purpose for which the land was acquired.” That contention cannot be supported in its terms: as noted above, the “intention” of the Council did not constitute “the proposal to carry out” the public purpose for which the land was acquired; nor did the Council carry out the public purpose. Nor was it acting in concert with the State Government, which did not adopt such a proposal prior to February 2002. Walker Corporation sought support from statements in Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) [2005] NSWLEC 438. The question identified in that case at [7] was as follows:“The current proceedings raise for consideration the development potential of the acquired land and the other adjoining lands which it is claimed have been affected by the road proposal. At the original hearing the parties accepted that that potential depends upon whether or not, but for the proposal to construct the bypass, the land acquired and the adjoining land would have been zoned for urban purposes.”However, following the decision of this Court on the first appeal, it appears that the questions were reformulated as follows at [10] and [11].“In determining the market value of the resumed land at the date of acquisition disregarding the increase or decrease in value, if any, caused by the carrying out of, or the proposal to carry out the development of the by-pass:1.Was the zoning, or the failure to change the zoning, of that part of the land zoned 7(c) Environment Protection (Water Catchment) caused by the proposal to carry out the development of the by-pass?2.If so, what was the prospect of zoning or rezoning that land to either 2(a) Living Area, 2(b) Village or 1(a1) Rural, had it not been zoned 7(c) Environment Protection (Water Catchment)?3.Accepting that the zoning of that part of the resumed land zoned 9(a) (Main Roads Proposed) was a step in the proposal to carry out the development of the by-pass what was the prospect of zoning or rezoning that land to either 2(a) Living Area or 2(b) Village or 1(a1) Rural, had it not been zoned 9(a)?4.As an alternative to question 2, at the date of acquisition, would the land have been zoned 2(a) Living Area, 2(b) Village or 1(a1) Rural had it not been zoned 7(c) Environment Protection (Water Catchment)?5.As an alternative to question 3, at the date of acquisition, would the land have been zoned 2(a) Living Area or 2(b) Village or 1(a1) Rural had it not been zoned 9(a)?The parties agreed questions 2 and 3 should be answered out of concern that the decision in Walker Corporation required consideration of questions different from previous approaches to these matters which are reflected in questions 4 and 5.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established