Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2006] WASC 82

CORAM:   TEMPLEMAN J

HEARD:   13-23 FEBRUARY, 27 FEBRUARY­29 MARCH, 3­4 APRIL 2006

DELIVERED          :   12 MAY 2006

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1550 of 1997

BETWEEN:   MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Respondent

Catchwords:

Town planning - Reservation and acquisition of land - Appropriate basis of valuation - Whether time between reservation and acquisition determinative of possible zoning - Utility of expert knowledge gained after date land acquired - Whether environmental significance precludes development potential - Extent of development potential - Whether landscape an integrated whole precluding development potential - Price payable by hypothetical purchaser - Whether premium for development potential - Whether interest payable

Legislation:

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 116(1)
Environmental Protection (Swan Coastal Plain Wetlands) Regulations 1991 (WA)
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA), s 31(d)
Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 55, s 56, s 56(1), s 56(1)(a)
Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA), s 34, s 36(2b)
Public Works Act 1912 (NSW), s 124
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 32

Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA), s 14(2)(ba)

Result:

Value set at $4,000,000
Interest payable

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr W S Martin QC & Mr P L Harris

Respondent:     Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms L E Christian

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Ilberys

Respondent:     State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Adelaide Clinic Holdings Pty Ltd v Minister for Water Resources (1988) 65 LGRA 410

Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (1999) 74 ALJR 209

Broken Bay Peninsular Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 [1997] NSWLEC 165

D & C Dwight v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd [1995] NSWLEC 72

Davey v Minister of Agriculture (1979) (1) SA 466 (N)

F & J Cauchi v Blacktown City Council [1993] NSWLEC 183

Hillstead v The Queen [2005] WASCA 116

Housing Commission (NSW) v San Sebastian Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 196

Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGCIA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2004) 29 WAR 273

Overton Investments Pty Ltd v The Department of Urban Affairs & Planning [1998] NSWLEC 67

Petar Rukavina v The Council of the City of Wagga Wagga [1993] NSWLEC 29

Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub‑Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565

Royal Sydney Golf Club v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1957) 97 CLR 379

Scarfone v Blacktown City Council [2004] NSWLEC 114

Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 438

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (1907) 5 CLR 418

Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (2005) 141 LGERA 243

The Minister v Matford Nominees Pty Ltd [1973] 2…

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Details
Case
[2006] WASC 82
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, challenging the valuation of land that had been reserved and subsequently acquired by the Western Australian Planning Commission. The central dispute was the appropriate basis for valuing the land for compensation purposes, considering factors such as the time elapsed between reservation and acquisition, the utility of expert knowledge gained post-acquisition, the environmental significance of the land, and the potential for development. The Court was tasked with determining whether the environmental significance of the land precluded its development potential, the extent of this potential, and whether the landscape should be viewed as an integrated whole that precludes development. Additionally, the Court needed to establish whether the price payable by a hypothetical purchaser should include a premium for development potential and if interest should be payable on the compensation.

The Court of Appeal meticulously examined the legal principles established in Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd, which emphasised the importance of asking the right questions when determining the value of land for compensation purposes. The Court held that the trial judge's failure to consider the existing zoning and its impact on the land's value was a critical error. The Court of Appeal found that the value of the land, with all its inherent characteristics, must be considered in its physical location and the surrounding developments. The inherent characteristics of the land, such as environmental significance, can diminish its value or constrain an increase in value, independent of any resumption proposal. The Court concluded that the diminution in value was due to the inherent characteristics of the land, not the proposed resumption.

Based on the Court's reasoning, it ordered a retrial to correctly assess the land's value. The Court highlighted that the maintenance of the industrial/waterfront zoning was a relevant matter that was not considered. The Court stressed that the value of the land should be assessed based on its physical location, surrounding developments, and inherent characteristics, including social preferences and environmental factors. The trial judge was directed to disregard the zoning only if the refusal to rezone was part of the proposal to acquire the land for the public purpose or a step in the carrying out of that public purpose. The Court of Appeal's decision underscored the necessity of a thorough and principled approach to land valuation in compensation cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The failure of the trial Judge to ask the relevant question in Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (2005) 141 LGERA 243 ("Walker"), led the Court of Appeal to order a retrial. The land the subject of Walker, which was located on the Sydney Harbour foreshore, had been used for industrial purposes for many years. In 1989, the then owner, Caltex, applied to have the land rezoned so as to permit residential development. The local authority consistently opposed any such rezoning. It maintained the industrial zoning, with the apparent intention that any change of use should result in most of the land becoming public open space. Although the State Government did resume the land for that purpose in 2002, this represented a change in its position. The Government had intervened in 1992 and 1995 to support the use of a significant part of the land for residential development. The trial Judge rejected the proposition that the subject land should be valued on the basis of its existing zoning with such allowance as might be appropriate for the prospects of a rezoning for residential purposes. Instead, his Honour treated the land as if it had been rezoned, on the basis that the failure to do so was a matter to be "disregarded": [69]. Basten JA (with whom Beazley JA and Stein AJA agreed) held that the assumption of rezoning made by the trial Judge:"… could only be justified if the refusal of the council to rezone was itself part of the proposal to acquire the land for the public purpose for which it was acquired or a step in the carrying out of that public purpose. As a matter of principle, the approach adopted did not ask that question and is wrong". (at [81]) At [60] Basten JA held that:"as a matter of principle, [the trial Judge] could not disregard the maintenance of the industrial/waterfront zoning … until the proposal for the relevant public purpose for which the land was resumed became known, if that planning decision was made for proper purposes, regardless of whether the land would ever be resumed. There is no factual finding that that was not the case: it was a relevant matter to be considered and was not considered." Then, at [63]:"Land may have a characteristic which diminishes its value, or constrains an increase in value. The value of the land, with all its inherent characteristics, will depend on its physical location, whether there are surrounding developments and a host of other considerations, including social preferences and environmental factors." His Honour then gave an example:"One may take, by way of example, an hypothetical block of land on the outskirts of an expanding city. The land in question is low‑lying, but is surrounded by higher ground. All the land is available for residential development, but the higher ground is developed first because it is seen as more attractive to potential purchasers. The low‑lying ground is then identified as part of a flood plain and is found to be subject to inundation after heavy rain. The local council rezones the land to prohibit residential development. The land is capable of commercial development so long as it is drained and the level is raised. A development application is required to be accompanied by an environmental impact statement. Preparation of that statement identifies that portion of the flood plain as having special conservation significance. Accordingly, the council imposes constraints which prevent any significant development and brings the area to the attention of the State authority responsible for environmental protection. The limitations imposed by the council drastically reduce the potential uses of the land and hence its market value. Because of the conservation significance of the site, it is later resumed by the State authority for the public purpose of environmental protection.In this example, whether or not the restrictions on development imposed by the council have a remote or a close connection with the ultimate resumption, the diminution in the commercial value of the land flows from an inherent characteristic which had the potential to have that effect before any resumption was proposed. It was not the proposed resumption which lowered the value of the land, but the inherent characteristic.It is, of course, true to say that land will only be resumed in circumstances where it suits the needs of the acquiring authority. Thus, in Perry's case, the precise route of the upgraded highway no doubt depended upon the physical characteristics of the land in different corridors. The difference is that the public purpose in that case existed without reference to those characteristics. In the hypothetical case, it was the characteristic of the land which gave rise to the particular public purpose."