POLARIS METALS PTY LTD and VALUER GENERAL

Link copied
Case Copied 80 min read

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT: VALUATION OF LAND ACT 1978 (WA)

CITATION:   POLARIS METALS PTY LTD and VALUER GENERAL [2023] WASAT 105

MEMBER:   JUDGE H JACKSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

DR S WILLEY, SENIOR MEMBER

MISS K BINGHAM, SESSIONAL MEMBER

HEARD:   17, 18 OCTOBER AND 29 NOVEMBER 2022; AND 13 JUNE 2023

DELIVERED          :   10 NOVEMBER 2023

FILE NO/S:   DR 217 of 2021

BETWEEN:   POLARIS METALS PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

VALUER GENERAL

Respondent


Catchwords:

Valuation of land - Crown leases - Remote land - Mining use - Highest and best use - 'Strategic' land - Luton principle - Valuation methodology - Income capatilisation methodology - No directly comparable rents - Comparison of rents - Role of Tribunal

Legislation:

Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)
Mining Act 1978 (WA)
Mining Regulations 1981 (WA), Sch 2
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(2)
State Administrative Tribunal's Rules 2004 (WA), r 39B(6)
Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), s 4(1)(b)(vii)(I), s 18, s 24, s 32, s 32(1), s 32(3), s 33, s 33(1)

Result:

The unimproved value of the subject land as at 1 August 2019 was $2,081,250

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : M Mckenna & Ms R Kenny
Respondent : C Ide

Solicitors:

Applicant : Gilbert + Tobin
Respondent : State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in decision:

101 Collins Street Pty Ltd v City of Melbourne (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Batty J, 2 April, 1996)

AMP Life Ltd and Valuer-General [2011] WASAT 8

Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer- General (No 2) (2006) 148 LGERA 408

Avila and Main Roads Western Australia [2023] WASAT 79

Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541

Brisbane City Counsel v Valuer-General (Qld) (1978) 140 CLR 41

Bronzel v State Planning Authority (1979) 21 SASR 541; (1973) 32 LGRA 170

Capaldo v Capaldo [2011] SASCFC 115

Chevron Australia Pty Ltd and Valuer-General [2019] WASAT 7

Commissioner of State Revenue v OZ Minerals Ltd [2013] WASCA 239; (2013) 46 WAR 156

Duffy v The Minister for Planning [2003] WASCA 294

Fenton Nominees Pty Ltd v Valuer General (1981) 27 SASR 258

Hill v Commissioner of Highways (1966) 13 LGRA 369

ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council (2008) 20 VR 447; [2008] VSCA 180

J B Investments Pty Ltd and Valuer General [2006] WASAT 55

Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Pty Ltd (1981) 48 LGRA 409

Lenz Nominees Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Main Roads [2012] WASC 6; (2012) LGERA 58

Luton v Valuer-General (1971) 23 LGRA 180

McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [2013] WASCA 135

McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [No 7] [2011] WASC 223

Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v Valuer General's Department [1994] NSWLEC 98

Pyman v Valuer-General [2016] SACAT 1

Sheath v Valuer-General (1963) 10 LGRA 20; (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 415

Tetzner v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd [1958] AC 50

Trandos & Ors v Western Australia Planning Commission [2007] WASCA 346

Western Australian…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read POLARIS METALS PTY LTD and VALUER GENERAL and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] WASAT 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Polaris Metals Pty Ltd and the Valuer General of Western Australia were the parties involved in this case, which was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The dispute centred on the valuation of a remote piece of land with mining potential, specifically determining the highest and best use of the land and the appropriate valuation methodology. The case required the court to decide on the correct valuation approach, particularly whether the income capitalisation methodology was suitable given the lack of directly comparable rents. Additionally, the court had to consider the role of the Valuer General's review process and the potential for the valuation to be deemed unfair, unjust, or inequitable.

The court was required to address whether the Valuer General Act allowed for the valuation of the same piece of land by two alternative methods that could yield significantly different values, without specifying which method should be selected. The court also needed to determine whether the right to object to an unfair, unjust, or inequitable valuation created a discretion for either party or the Tribunal to depart from the correct valuation as determined by the court. Furthermore, the court had to consider the implications of the Luton principle and how it applied to the valuation of the subject land.

In dismissing the appeal, Brinsden J held that it was absurd to construe the Valuer General Act in a way that would allow for two different valuation methods to yield significantly different values without specifying which should be chosen. The court found that the correct valuation of the land was $2,081,250 as of the date of valuation, and that no discretion arose simply because this sum was much greater than the previously determined valuation. The court concluded that the right to object to a valuation did not create a discretion to depart from the correct valuation, and no such discretion existed in this case. The court ordered that the valuation of the subject land as at the date of valuation be $2,081,250.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In dismissing a further appeal to the Full Court, Brinsden J held that it was an absurdity to construe the LVA so as to allow the same piece of land 'to be valued by either of two alternative methods and yielding such proportionately different values' without providing as to which is to be selected when that occurs.[276][276] Valuer-General v Western Mining Corporation Ltd [1989] WASC 124 at [8] and [12]. Kennedy J and Walsh J agreed with Brinsden J's reasons. It is not necessary for us to determine the metes and bounds of each of the terms used in s 32(3) of the VLA. It is sufficient for present purposes to find, and on the basis of Ladies Hosiery as well as J B Investments we do so find, that the right to object that a valuation is unfair, unjust and/or inequitable does not create a discretion in either the respondent or the Tribunal on review to depart from what it concludes is the correct valuation. Put another way, our finding that the UV of the Subject Land as at DOV is $2,081,250 is the end of the matter. No discretion then arises simply because that sum is much greater than the UV previously determined. In our view that proposition needs only be stated to be accepted. If it were otherwise, a question would exist as to when the discretion might arise; surely it would not arise upon any change in value, so how much of a change would give rise to the discretion – 10%, 100%, 1000%? - and what matters might be relevant to the exercise of the discretion. That last point puts the matter beyond doubt in the present case because no evidence was put before us that either party submitted should be relied upon in the exercise of the discretion, should it exist. For the above reasons, we find that the UV of the Subject Land as at DOV is $2,081,250. An order will be made to that effect. We will hear from the parties as to the need for any ancillary orders.