JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: VALUATION OF LAND ACT 1978 (WA)
CITATION: POLARIS METALS PTY LTD and VALUER GENERAL [2023] WASAT 105
MEMBER: JUDGE H JACKSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
DR S WILLEY, SENIOR MEMBER
MISS K BINGHAM, SESSIONAL MEMBER
HEARD: 17, 18 OCTOBER AND 29 NOVEMBER 2022; AND 13 JUNE 2023
DELIVERED : 10 NOVEMBER 2023
FILE NO/S: DR 217 of 2021
BETWEEN: POLARIS METALS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
VALUER GENERAL
Respondent
Catchwords:
Valuation of land - Crown leases - Remote land - Mining use - Highest and best use - 'Strategic' land - Luton principle - Valuation methodology - Income capatilisation methodology - No directly comparable rents - Comparison of rents - Role of Tribunal
Legislation:
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)
Mining Act 1978 (WA)
Mining Regulations 1981 (WA), Sch 2
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(2)
State Administrative Tribunal's Rules 2004 (WA), r 39B(6)
Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), s 4(1)(b)(vii)(I), s 18, s 24, s 32, s 32(1), s 32(3), s 33, s 33(1)
Result:
The unimproved value of the subject land as at 1 August 2019 was $2,081,250
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | M Mckenna & Ms R Kenny |
| Respondent | : | C Ide |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Gilbert + Tobin |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision:
101 Collins Street Pty Ltd v City of Melbourne (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Batty J, 2 April, 1996)
AMP Life Ltd and Valuer-General [2011] WASAT 8
Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer- General (No 2) (2006) 148 LGERA 408
Avila and Main Roads Western Australia [2023] WASAT 79
Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541
Brisbane City Counsel v Valuer-General (Qld) (1978) 140 CLR 41
Bronzel v State Planning Authority (1979) 21 SASR 541; (1973) 32 LGRA 170
Capaldo v Capaldo [2011] SASCFC 115
Chevron Australia Pty Ltd and Valuer-General [2019] WASAT 7
Commissioner of State Revenue v OZ Minerals Ltd [2013] WASCA 239; (2013) 46 WAR 156
Duffy v The Minister for Planning [2003] WASCA 294
Fenton Nominees Pty Ltd v Valuer General (1981) 27 SASR 258
Hill v Commissioner of Highways (1966) 13 LGRA 369
ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council (2008) 20 VR 447; [2008] VSCA 180
J B Investments Pty Ltd and Valuer General [2006] WASAT 55
Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Pty Ltd (1981) 48 LGRA 409
Lenz Nominees Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Main Roads [2012] WASC 6; (2012) LGERA 58
Luton v Valuer-General (1971) 23 LGRA 180
McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [2013] WASCA 135
McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [No 7] [2011] WASC 223
Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v Valuer General's Department [1994] NSWLEC 98
Pyman v Valuer-General [2016] SACAT 1
Sheath v Valuer-General (1963) 10 LGRA 20; (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 415
Tetzner v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd [1958] AC 50
Trandos & Ors v Western Australia Planning Commission [2007] WASCA 346
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- Case
- [2023] WASAT 105
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to address whether the Valuer General Act allowed for the valuation of the same piece of land by two alternative methods that could yield significantly different values, without specifying which method should be selected. The court also needed to determine whether the right to object to an unfair, unjust, or inequitable valuation created a discretion for either party or the Tribunal to depart from the correct valuation as determined by the court. Furthermore, the court had to consider the implications of the Luton principle and how it applied to the valuation of the subject land.
In dismissing the appeal, Brinsden J held that it was absurd to construe the Valuer General Act in a way that would allow for two different valuation methods to yield significantly different values without specifying which should be chosen. The court found that the correct valuation of the land was $2,081,250 as of the date of valuation, and that no discretion arose simply because this sum was much greater than the previously determined valuation. The court concluded that the right to object to a valuation did not create a discretion to depart from the correct valuation, and no such discretion existed in this case. The court ordered that the valuation of the subject land as at the date of valuation be $2,081,250.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In dismissing a further appeal to the Full Court, Brinsden J held that it was an absurdity to construe the LVA so as to allow the same piece of land 'to be valued by either of two alternative methods and yielding such proportionately different values' without providing as to which is to be selected when that occurs.[276][276] Valuer-General v Western Mining Corporation Ltd [1989] WASC 124 at [8] and [12]. Kennedy J and Walsh J agreed with Brinsden J's reasons. It is not necessary for us to determine the metes and bounds of each of the terms used in s 32(3) of the VLA. It is sufficient for present purposes to find, and on the basis of Ladies Hosiery as well as J B Investments we do so find, that the right to object that a valuation is unfair, unjust and/or inequitable does not create a discretion in either the respondent or the Tribunal on review to depart from what it concludes is the correct valuation. Put another way, our finding that the UV of the Subject Land as at DOV is $2,081,250 is the end of the matter. No discretion then arises simply because that sum is much greater than the UV previously determined. In our view that proposition needs only be stated to be accepted. If it were otherwise, a question would exist as to when the discretion might arise; surely it would not arise upon any change in value, so how much of a change would give rise to the discretion – 10%, 100%, 1000%? - and what matters might be relevant to the exercise of the discretion. That last point puts the matter beyond doubt in the present case because no evidence was put before us that either party submitted should be relied upon in the exercise of the discretion, should it exist. For the above reasons, we find that the UV of the Subject Land as at DOV is $2,081,250. An order will be made to that effect. We will hear from the parties as to the need for any ancillary orders.