Mellor v Australian Postal Corporation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mellor v Australian Postal Corporation [2009] FCA 504

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from and application for review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – pre-existing medical conditions – applicant suffered pain while at work – no change to underlying pathology – whether Tribunal failed to appreciate that pain can constitute an aggravation for the purposes of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to appreciate that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition can be an injury for the purposes of the Act – whether Tribunal assumed that there must be a change to underlying pathology for employer to be liable – Tribunal found that work contributed to pain but that effect was not material – whether question of materiality is directed to the effect of an aggravation – whether matter should be remitted to Tribunal

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 14

Asioty v Canberra Abattoir Proprietary Limited (1989) 167 CLR 533 referred to
Comcare v Canute (2005) 148 FCR 232 cited
Comcare v Sahu-Khan (2007) 156 FCR 536 considered
Commonwealth of Australia v Beattie (1981) 35 ALR 369 considered
Federal Broom Company Pty Limited v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626 considered
Tippett v Australian Postal Corporation (1998) 27 AAR 40 considered

THOMAS MELLOR v AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

NSD 1933 of 2008

BENNETT J
19 MAY 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1933 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY DR I ALEXANDER, MEMBER
BETWEEN:

THOMAS MELLOR
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 MAY 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

1.The parties are to confer and submit proposed orders to give effect to these reasons within 7 days, including proposed orders as to costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1933 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY DR I ALEXANDER, MEMBER
BETWEEN:

THOMAS MELLOR
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE:

19 MAY 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. From July 1998 to September 2007 the applicant, Mr Mellor, performed the duties of either a mail sorter or a postal delivery officer as an employee of the first respondent (‘Australia Post’).  He claimed compensation from Australia Post under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the SRC Act’) for various conditions and impairment, including:

    ·Lower back pain;

    ·Injury to lower back and thoracic spine;

    ·Skin cancer;

    ·Permanent impairment because of a back condition of the thoracic and lumbar spine;

    ·Permanent impairment due…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 504
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Mellor v Australian Postal Corporation, the applicant, Mr Mellor, sought a review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which found that his employment with Australia Post had not materially contributed to the aggravation of his back conditions, and thus did not qualify as an "injury" under the relevant legislation. The Tribunal determined that while his employment caused pain which temporarily made his conditions symptomatic, it did not materially aggravate the underlying pathology. Australia Post argued that the Tribunal had misunderstood the legal criteria for what constitutes an "aggravation" of a condition in a material degree, contending that the Tribunal should have concluded no aggravation had occurred. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the statutory definition of "injury" and "aggravation" in assessing Mr Mellor's claim.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation of the statutory terms. It noted that the Tribunal was referred to an incorrect summary of a previous case, Beattie, which may have influenced its findings. However, the court held that the Tribunal's ultimate conclusions were not affected by this misreference, as it did not persuade that the pain experienced constituted a material aggravation of the underlying conditions. The court emphasised that the statutory requirement of materiality qualifies the word "ailment" and is not negated by the presence of temporary pain or discomfort. It concluded that the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and that there was no basis to remit the matter back for reconsideration.

The court's decision affirmed the Tribunal's findings and rejected Australia Post's submissions. The applicant's appeal was dismissed, and the parties were directed to confer and submit proposed orders within 7 days, including costs. This decision underscores the importance of correctly applying statutory definitions and the potential consequences of misinterpreting case law in administrative tribunal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to confer and submit proposed orders to give effect to these reasons within 7 days, including proposed orders as to costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BENNETT J
For present purposes, the relevant part of the definition of “injury” is the reference to “disease”, which, in turn, is defined as an ailment or an aggravation of an ailment to which the employee’s employment contributes in a material degree. On the Tribunal’s findings, Mr Mellor’s employment did not affect the underlying pathology of his back conditions but, in causing pain, it rendered the back conditions temporarily symptomatic, or irritated them (Macquarie Dictionary, definition of “aggravate”). Pain may constitute an aggravation of an ailment or injury (Beattie).The Tribunal’s conclusions on aggravation and materiality In the case of each of Mr Mellor’s thoracic kyphoscoliosis and lumbar spine, the Tribunal concluded that the requirement of materiality was not satisfied. This was because the Tribunal did not accept that a temporary increase in symptoms represented an aggravation of the thoracic spine condition in a material degree and found that the temporary aggravation of the lumbar spine condition meant that the contribution to the lower back condition was not sufficiently significant to meet the threshold of “in a material degree”. Australia Post submits that the requirement of materiality qualifies the word “ailment” in the expression ‘the aggravation of any such ailment; being … an aggravation [of any such ailment] that was contributed to in a material degree by the employee’s employment’. I do not accept this to be the case. It is also inconsistent with the discussion of materiality in Canute and Sahu-Khan, although neither of those cases directly considers the issue raised in the present case. Australia Post submits that Parliament would not have intended that the Commonwealth be liable for any aggravation of disease regardless of how insignificant that aggravation might be. However, s 4 does not give effect to such an intention. Further, Australia Post points out that the Tribunal was referred to Tippett v Australian Postal Corporation (1998) 27 AAR 40, which inaccurately summarised the joint judgment of Evatt and Sheppard JJ in Beattie as stating that an injury will be aggravated if the experience of the injury is increased or intensified. In fact, their Honours said that ‘it is enough to say that pain brought on by work activity may constitute an aggravation’ (emphasis added). Australia Post submits that this may well have influenced the Tribunal to make findings that pain and discomfort in Mr Mellor’s thoracic and lumbar regions constituted temporary aggravations, notwithstanding its reservations made apparent by the qualifications indicating that the Tribunal was not persuaded that the pain in each case actually amounted to aggravations of the underlying ailments. Australia Post submits that I should draw the conclusion that, had the Tribunal been aware of the correct statement in Beattie, it would have concluded that no aggravation had occurred and that Mr Mellor was not suffering from work-aggravated diseases in his thoracic and lumbar spines. It follows, in Australia Post’s submission, that I should come to that conclusion and not remit the matter to the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BENNETT J

Full text does not contain this section.