Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd v Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, GORDON, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ

LAUNDY HOTELS (QUARRY) PTY LIMITED  APPELLANT

AND

DYCO HOTELS PTY LIMITED ATF THE PARRAS
FAMILY TRUST & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Limited v Dyco Hotels Pty Limited

[2023] HCA 6

Date of Hearing: 9 December 2022
Date of Judgment: 8 March 2023

S125/2022

ORDER

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2.The orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 21 December 2021 be set aside and, in their place, order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

3. Within 28 days of the date of these orders, the respondents repay to the appellant the whole of any sum paid by the appellant to the respondents under or in accordance with Order 2(b) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 21 December 2021 (the deposit and interest thereon).

4. If, within 14 days of the date of these orders, the parties agree upon the amount of further interest to be paid by the respondents to the appellant on the sum referred to in Order 3 of these orders, the parties are to file a minute of consent and the respondents are to pay the appellants that further sum of interest forthwith. Failing agreement, the issue and calculation of interest be remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

J T Gleeson SC with L G Moretti for the appellant (instructed by JDK Legal)

N C Hutley SC with C D Freeman and E C Dunlop for the respondents (instructed by A.C. Comino & Associates)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, GORDON, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ.   This appeal involves a contractual dispute arising from the effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic in Australia. The issue is one of contractual construction. Under a contract for the sale and purchase of the property and assets of a hotel business, the Vendor was contractually obliged from the contract date until Completion to "carry on the Business in the usual and ordinary course as regards its nature, scope and manner". During that period, the operation of the business was restricted by a public health order in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic. The question raised by this appeal is whether, while operating on the restricted basis required by the public health order, the Vendor was "ready, willing and able to complete and ... not in default" at the time the Vendor served a notice to complete.

  2. As these reasons will explain, the Vendor was "ready, willing and able to complete" and was not in default of its contractual obligations at the time it served the notice to complete. The Vendor was obliged to carry on the Business in the manner it was…

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Details
Case
[2023] HCA 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a dispute between Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (the appellant) and Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd (the respondent) arising from a contract for the sale and purchase of a hotel business. The central issue was whether the vendor, Dyco Hotels, had breached a contractual obligation to carry on the business in its usual and ordinary course, particularly in light of public health orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the vendor was obliged to carry on the business in the manner conducted at the time of the contract to the extent that it remained lawful, and consequently, whether the vendor was "ready, willing and able to complete and ... not in default" at the time it served a notice to complete. The Court of Appeal had found that the vendor was not entitled to issue the notice to complete because it could not comply with the contractual obligation due to supervening illegality, leading to a repudiation of the contract by the vendor.

The High Court, by majority, allowed the appeal. The Court reasoned that the contractual obligation to carry on the business in the "usual and ordinary course as regards its nature, scope and manner" did not require the vendor to act unlawfully. Instead, it required the vendor to conduct the business in the usual and ordinary way to the extent that it was lawful to do so. The imposition of public health orders did not render the vendor unable to comply with this obligation, as the vendor continued to operate the business lawfully within the restrictions. Therefore, the vendor was not in breach of the contract and was entitled to serve the notice to complete.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and ordered that the appeal to that court be dismissed. The respondents were ordered to repay the deposit and interest to the appellant, with further provisions for the calculation of additional interest.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2. The orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 21 December 2021 be set aside and, in their place, order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

3. Within 28 days of the date of these orders, the respondents repay to the appellant the whole of any sum paid by the appellant to the respondents under or in accordance with Order 2(b) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 21 December 2021 (the deposit and interest thereon).

4. If, within 14 days of the date of these orders, the parties agree upon the amount of further interest to be paid by the respondents to the appellant on the sum referred to in Order 3 of these orders, the parties are to file a minute of consent and the respondents are to pay the appellants that further sum of interest forthwith. Failing agreement, the issue and calculation of interest be remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, GORDON, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ
In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the primary judge (Darke J) concluded that the contract had not been frustrated[9], and cl 50.1, properly construed, required the Vendor to "carry on the Business in the usual and ordinary course" as far as it remained possible to do so in accordance with law. It followed that the Vendor was not in breach of cl 50.1[10]. Accordingly, the Vendor was entitled to serve the notice to complete, which was effective to make the time for completion essential[11]. As the Purchaser failed to complete, the Vendor was entitled to terminate the contract and was able to seek damages for loss of the bargain[12].[9]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 20 BPR 41,403 at 41,426 [112].[10]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 20 BPR 41,403 at 41,420 [84], 41,421 [88].[11]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 20 BPR 41,403 at 41,426 [113]-[114].[12]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 20 BPR 41,403 at 41,426-41,427 [115], 41,427 [117]-[118], 41,429 [129].The Court of Appeal's decision The Purchaser appealed. The Purchaser alleged that the primary judge misconstrued cl 50.1 and ought to have held that from the coming into force of the first public health order the Vendor was unable to comply with cl 50.1 and, thereby, was not entitled to issue the notice to complete or to terminate when the Purchaser failed to comply with that notice. Accordingly, the Vendor's purported termination constituted a repudiation of the contract, which was accepted by the Purchaser. There was no appeal against the primary judge's conclusion that the contract was not frustrated. The Purchaser also did not allege that the Vendor was in breach of cl 50.1. Rather, the Purchaser's case on appeal was that as the Vendor could not comply with cl 50.1, the Vendor was not ready, willing and able to complete the contract, and therefore could not serve the notice to complete or terminate for the Purchaser's failure to complete. A majority of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Bathurst CJ and Brereton JA) allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary judge. Bathurst CJ concluded that cl 50.1 was not to be construed as if the Vendor's obligation to "carry on the Business in the usual and ordinary course as regards its nature, scope and manner" was limited to the extent permitted by law[13]. Bathurst CJ therefore considered that the public health order made on 23 March 2020 was a supervening event rendering the Vendor's compliance with cl 50.1 illegal[14]. By analogy to cases involving the enforceability of contracts during wartime restrictions[15] and covenants in leases[16], his Honour considered that the supervening illegality suspended the relevant contractual obligation in cl 50.1[17]. His Honour concluded that cl 50.1 was an essential term with which the Vendor could not comply at the time it served the notice to complete. The purported termination relying on the Purchaser's failure to comply with the notice to complete, accordingly, involved a repudiation of the contract by the Vendor[18]. Brereton JA agreed with Bathurst CJ[19], but also considered that the Vendor was in breach of cl 50.1 at the time it purported to serve the notice to complete[20]. [13]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 349-350 [51]-[52].[14]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 351 [60], 353-354 [73].[15]Arab Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) [1954] AC 495 and Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728, cited in Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 351 [62]-[63].[16]Canary Wharf (BP 4) T1 Ltd v European Medicines Agency (2019) 183 ConLR 167, Gerraty v McGavin (1914) 18 CLR 152, Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd [1945] AC 221 and John Lewis Properties plc v Viscount Chelsea [1993] 2 EGLR 77, cited in Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 352-353 [65]-[71].[17]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 352 [66].[18]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 354 [77].[19]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 371 [143].[20]Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundy Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd (2021) 396 ALR 340 at 372 [147].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, GORDON, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ