Sec. 96 of the Crown Lands Act1884 provides inter alia that every lease under the Act shall be liable to forfeiture upon breach of any condition
Griffith C.J.,
Barton and O’Connor J J.
annexed to the lease.
Sec. 98, sub-sec. (i.) provides that no such lease other
than a special lease shall confer any right to sub-let the leased land for other than grazing purposes or to prevent the entry and removal of material by authorized persons ; and sub-sec. (iii.) provides that no lease shall prevent any authorized persons from cutting or removing timber from the land under lease, conditional leases being excepted from the sub-section as regards taking or removing timber or other material for building purposes. Sec. 133 provides that any person cutting timber other than firewood not for sale from any Crown lands shall be liable to a penalty, and that no lessee under the Act shall obstruct any authorized person from entering them. Regulations made under the Timber Licenses Act provide for the issue of licences or permits to cut and remove timber from Crown lands, subject to the proviso that in the case of land under conditional lease a special authority from the Minister or Forest Officer is necessary.
The respondent, the holder of certain conditionally purchased and con ditionally leased lands, entered into an agreement to lease to the appellant the lands so held, with the right to cut and remove timber, and the right to construct a tramway across the lands for the removal of timber.
In a suit by the appellant for a specific performance of this agreement;
168 HIGH COURT
[1906.
H. C. OF A. Held, following Bauk of Australasia v. Breillat, 6 Moo. P.C.C., 15'2, that,
1906.even if the agreement were unlawful or invalid or incapable of enforeement as to the conditional lease, the appellant would have been entitled to specific per
L angley
formance as to the conditional purchases ; but
V.
F oster.Held, further, that the agreement, so far as it related to the conditionally leased land did not necessarily import any illegal action, but was capable of being construed as an agreement by the respondent to give, so far as he law fully…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Langley v Foster [1906] HCA 28
Case
[1906] HCA 28
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Langley (the plaintiff) sought specific performance of an agreement for a lease against Foster (the defendant). The dispute concerned a lease of land under the *Crown Lands Act* (N.S.W.) which contained a condition that the land be used solely for grazing purposes. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached this condition by sub-leasing the land for purposes other than grazing, thereby rendering the agreement illegal and unenforceable. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the agreement for a lease was rendered illegal and therefore unenforceable due to the defendant's alleged breach of the condition restricting the use of the land to grazing. This required the Court to consider the effect of the *Crown Lands Act* (N.S.W.) and its regulations on the validity of such an agreement, particularly when a breach of a statutory condition was alleged.
The Court reasoned that the *Crown Lands Act* imposed a statutory condition on the lease that the land be used only for grazing. A sub-lease for purposes other than grazing constituted a breach of this condition. The Court held that an agreement to lease land for a purpose that contravened a statutory prohibition or condition was illegal and could not be enforced by specific performance. The intention of the parties to use the land for purposes other than grazing, or the actual use for such purposes, would render the agreement void as against public policy and statutory intent.
Consequently, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for specific performance, finding that the agreement was unenforceable due to its illegality.