JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: HAMPTON -v- BHP BILLITON MINERALS PTY LTD [No 2] [2012] WASC 285
CORAM: EDELMAN J
HEARD: 22-24 MAY 2012
DELIVERED : 9 AUGUST 2012
FILE NO/S: CIV 2292 of 2011
BETWEEN: NEVILLE CHARLES HAMPTON
First Plaintiff
NANCY EDITH LUMSDEN
Second PlaintiffAND
BHP BILLITON MINERALS PTY LTD
First DefendantMITSUI-ITOCHU IRON PTY LTD
Second DefendantITOCHU MINERALS & ENERGY OF AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Contract - Construction - Clause in long term contract for sale of land providing that if the employee ceases to be employed by the Company then the Purchaser may elect to terminate this Agreement no later than the effective date the Employee ceases to be in the Company's employ - Meaning of provision that 'if the Purchaser fails to make such election then the Purchaser shall on the last day on which the Purchaser was entitled to do so be deemed to have made such election and this Agreement shall be terminated' - Whether 'election to terminate' means 'election to affirm' - 'Rule' in Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418
Contract - Affirmation - Whether contract affirmed by conduct - Whether compliance with formal requirements of letter or notice
Contract - Implied terms - Whether a term can be implied for reasonable notice - Implied term cannot contradict express term of the contract
Contract - Implied terms - Whether a term can be implied requiring the defendants to 'act reasonably in respect to their dealings with the plaintiffs' - Nature of implied terms of reasonableness - Content of implied term said to be that the defendants could not take advantage of automatic termination of contract - No such implied term exists - No breach of any such implied term
Equity - Unconscionable conduct - Elements of equitable doctrine - Requirement of special disability not proved - Requirement of unconscientious taking advantage of any special disability not proved - Transaction fair, just and reasonable
Trade practices - Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AA - Meaning of 'unconscionable conduct in the unwritten law' - Whether three elements satisfied
Trade practices - Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AB - Unconscionable conduct - Mere reliance by defendants upon their contractual rights under a contract which is objectively beneficial to the plaintiffs is not unconscionable - No unconscionability arising from statements concerning the operation of the contract to one of the plaintiffs which were not misrepresentations and which were not relied upon by the plaintiffs
Equity - Relief against forfeiture - Unavailability of relief against forfeiture unless termination of contract arises from the exercise of a party's power to terminate - Relief against forfeiture unavailable when plaintiffs have no interest to restrain from forfeiture due to termination of contract - Circumstances would not lead to relief against forfeiture
Torts - Trespass - Elements of tort of trespass - Requirement of occupation or control over land prior to alleged trespass before…
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- Case
- [2012] WASC 285
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the termination clause did not mean that failing to elect to terminate the agreement resulted in affirmation of the contract. The court also found that no term for reasonable notice could be implied as it would contradict the express terms of the contract. Regarding unconscionable conduct, the court ruled that the defendants' reliance on their contractual rights was not unconscionable, as it was objectively beneficial to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had no interest to restrain from forfeiture, making relief against forfeiture unavailable. Lastly, the court determined that there was no trespass as the defendants occupied the property with consent.
The court's reasoning led to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that the defendants had exercised their right to terminate the contract properly and that no term for reasonable notice could be implied. The court also held that the defendants did not engage in unconscionable conduct and that relief against forfeiture was not available to the plaintiffs. Finally, the court found that there was no trespass as the defendants occupied the property with consent. The court dismissed all claims brought by the plaintiffs, with each party to bear their own costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the circumstances which I have explained above it cannot be said that the failure of the defendants to call any witnesses in response to Mr Hampton's last minute evidence was that 'the most natural inference is that the [defendants] feared to do so'.[48][48] The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239 [1022] (Owen J); Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389, 418 ‑ 419 (Handley JA). Counsel for the plaintiffs also asserted, in apparent reliance upon the 'rule' in Browne v Dunn,[49] that it is not open to the defendants to challenge Mr Hampton's accounts of the two meetings at the Housing Office by alleging that there is no contemporaneous account of those events or that Mr Hampton is unreliable.[50][49] Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67.[50] Plaintiffs' closing submissions [229] ‑ [230]. This submission misunderstands the 'rule' in Browne v Dunn. The principle is one of fairness; the court has a broad discretion as to how to respond to any breach of the 'rule'.[51] In any event there is no unfairness in the challenge by the defendants to the reliability of the evidence of Mr Hampton or their challenge to whether the two meetings occurred (although I have concluded that they did).[51] Burke v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 49 [181] ‑ [182] (Buss JA, Martin CJ & Mazza JA agreeing); The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239 [1036] (Owen J); R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677, 688 ‑ 689 (Gleeson CJ). The tenor of the cross‑examination of Mr Hampton was to the effect that his evidence concerning the two meetings was not reliable. Indeed, in relation to the second meeting, it was put to Mr Hampton that in neither his witness statement in the Fair Work Australia proceedings, nor in his affidavit in support of the interlocutory injunction, had he mentioned the second visit to the Housing Office.[52] Mr Hampton had understood the line of questioning as raising a dispute concerning whether the second visit to the Housing Office occurred. He said '[t]he meeting that I say happened, happened'.[53][52] ts 154 ‑ 155.[53] ts 154 (Mr Hampton). In summary, the findings on this point which I have set out at [36] ‑ [37] are the only conclusions of fact and inferences which can be drawn based upon an 'actual persuasion that the fact does … exist'.[54][54] Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 246 [55] (McDougall J, McColl & Bell JJA agreeing). The first question in this case was when Mr Hampton's employment with BHPBIO ceased. Counsel for Mr Hampton and Ms Lumsden suggested that the date of termination of Mr Hampton's employment was not the date of the Dismissal Meeting (16 July 2010) but was the later date of 5 August 2010 when payment in lieu of notice was made. There were difficulties caused by the manner in which this question was raised. First, Mr Hampton's employer, BHPBIO, was not a party to these proceedings but had been a party to proceedings in Fair Work Australia where it was held that Mr Hampton had been dismissed on 16 July 2010 and that the dismissal was not 'harsh, unjust or unreasonable'.[55][55] Hampton v BHP Billiton Pty Ltd [2011] FWA 3335.