Kidd v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   KIDD -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2014] WASC 99

CORAM:   BEECH J

HEARD:   5-7 MARCH 2014

DELIVERED          :   26 MARCH 2014

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2882 of 2013

BETWEEN:   NEIL GRAEME KIDD AND THE PERSONS DETAILED IN SCHEDULE A TO THE WRIT OF SUMMONS

Plaintiffs

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
First Defendant

MINISTER FOR RACING AND GAMING
Second Defendant

BURSWOOD NOMINEES LTD
Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Contract - Government agreement - Proper construction - Agreement to be construed in accordance with principles of contractual construction - Whether additional land granted for the purposes of the agreement - Identification of purposes of the agreement - Proper construction of provision relating to 'other development' of site

Statutes - Statutory construction - Scope of provision exempting land from Metropolitan Register Scheme, local planning laws and by-laws

Legislation:

Casino (Burswood Island) Agreement Act 1985 (WA), s 4, s 7
Government Agreements Act 1979 (WA), s 3

Result:

Action dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiffs:     Mr D H Solomon & Ms L M Retallack

First Defendant             :     Mr A J Sefton & Mr D E Leigh

Second Defendant         :     Mr A J Sefton & Mr D E Leigh

Third Defendant           :     Mr J A Thomson SC & Mr L A Warnick

Solicitors:

Plaintiffs:     Solomon Brothers

First Defendant             :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Second Defendant         :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Third Defendant           :     King & Wood Mallesons

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99

Cape Lambert Resources Ltd v MCC Australia Sanjin Mining Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 66

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378

Chemeq Ltd v Shepherd Investments International Ltd [2007] WASCA 117

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337

Commissioner of State Revenue v Oz Minerals Ltd [2013] WASCA 239

Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Word Investments Ltd [2008] HCA 55; (2008) 236 CLR 204

Curtin University of Technology v Woods Bagot Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 449

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7

Epic Energy (Pilbara Pipeline) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2011] WASCA 228; (2011) 43 WAR 186

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v BHP Minerals Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 259

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 216; (2012) 45 WAR 29

Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216

K‑Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4; (2009) 237 CLR 501

McCourt v Cranston [2012] WASCA 60

Mineralogy Pty Ltd v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 69

Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 11; (2006) 228 CLR 529

Perpetual Custodians Ltd v IOOF Investment…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASC 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kidd v The State of Western Australia concerns a dispute over the interpretation and application of the Casino (Burswood Island) Agreement (Casino Agreement) made between the State of Western Australia and Burswood Management Ltd. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where the central issue was whether the State of Western Australia was entitled to additional land for the purposes of the Casino Agreement. This matter hinged on the interpretation of several clauses within the Casino Agreement, including the definition of "Site" and the provision relating to "other development" of the site.

The court was required to determine several key legal issues, including the proper construction of the definition of "Site" in the Casino Agreement and the scope of the provision exempting the site from certain planning laws and by-laws. The court also had to consider the extent to which surrounding circumstances could influence the interpretation of the Casino Agreement and whether the Casino Agreement granted additional land for the purposes of the agreement. These issues required careful analysis of the text of the Casino Agreement, the surrounding circumstances, and relevant legislative history and extrinsic materials.

In its reasoning, the court emphasised the importance of textualism in statutory and contractual construction, noting that the text of the statute or agreement is the surest guide to the intention of the parties or Parliament. The court applied the principles of statutory construction, as outlined in Curtin University of Technology v Woods Bagot Pty Ltd and Re Cock; Ex parte Diano, to determine the meaning of the Casino Agreement. The court held that the Casino Agreement did not grant additional land for the purposes of the agreement and that the scope of the exemption provision was limited to the original site as defined in the Casino Agreement. The court also held that surrounding circumstances could only be considered to the extent that they assisted in fixing the meaning of the language of the text and could not displace the meaning of the statutory text.

The court's final orders were that the State of Western Australia was not entitled to additional land for the purposes of the Casino Agreement and that the exemption provision did not apply to any land outside the original site as defined in the Casino Agreement. The court also held that the Casino Agreement did not grant any rights to develop the site beyond what was expressly permitted under the agreement. These orders provide clarity on the interpretation and application of the Casino Agreement and will likely have implications for future developments on the site.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts The facts were not in dispute. No witnesses were called. The parties tendered a statement of agreed facts and each party tendered documents in the trial bundle, which were received by consent, subject to some objections. In 1984, Parliament enacted the Casino Control Act 1984 (WA). Section 19 of that Act empowered the Minister for Racing and Gaming to enter into an agreement with respect to the construction and establishment of a new casino complex. Any such agreement would be enforceable if, and only if, ratified by an Act of Parliament: s 19(3). On 20 February 1985, the State of Western Australia made an agreement, known as the Casino (Burswood Island) Agreement (Casino Agreement), with West Australian Trustees Ltd as Trustee and Burswood Management Ltd as Manager. The third defendant in this action, Burswood Nominees Ltd, is the successor to West Australian Trustees Ltd. The Casino Agreement is scheduled to the Casino Act. The Casino Agreement is ratified and its implementation authorised by s 4 of the Casino Act. By s 4(3), the Casino Agreement operates and takes effect notwithstanding any other Act or law. Before the Casino Agreement was executed, development proposals had been submitted to the Minister by the Trustee and the Manager, and these development proposals had been approved in principle by the Minister. The proposals described in some detail the proposed Resort, including a casino, hotel, convention centre, theatre restaurant, exhibition centre, recreation facilities and other facilities. The proposals also referred to a proposed stage 2, that involved the construction of a second hotel. I will outline relevant provisions of the Casino Agreement later in these reasons. The Casino Agreement has been amended by 12 supplementary agreements set out in schedules to the Casino Act. There are two supplementary agreements of significance to the present case: the supplementary agreement of 1987 and the seventh supplementary agreement made in 1997. I will detail those agreements in section 4. The initial resort development was constructed in 1985 to 1986. It included the casino, a hotel, an indoor theatre and other facilities. The hotel, then known as the Burswood Island Hotel, opened in October 1987. Between 1988 and 1994, the Minister gave four approvals to four separate developments under the cl 13(1)(b) process:(1)by letter of 15 November 1988, the Minister issued consent for the proposal to build a multi‑level car park within the boundaries of the Site;(2)by letter of 20 July 1989, the Minister issued consent for the Manager's proposal to extend the casino building and casino gaming floor at the north eastern end of the casino building;(3)by letter of 15 October 1992, the Minister issued consent to the Trustee's proposal to modify the existing guest services area by the construction of two new offices immediately adjacent to the guest services area by extending through the wall of the casino building; and(4)in or about August 1994, the Minister issued consent for the Manager's proposal as it related to refurbish the international room and the other areas within the existing casino gaming premises, and rejected the Manager's proposal relating to the extension of the casino building.[2][2] See statement of agreed facts (SAF) 55 ‑ 58, 68 ‑ 69, 72 ‑ 73.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel agreed that nothing said in Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd[67] affects the need for ambiguity before regard may be had to surrounding circumstances. I proceed on that basis. I note that, in any event, I am satisfied that the scope or applicability of par (b) of the definition of Site, including the phrase 'for the purposes of this Agreement' is doubtful.[67] Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd [35]. There are limits on the extent to which surrounding circumstances can influence the proper construction of an instrument. Reliance on the surrounding circumstances must be tempered by loyalty to the text of the instrument.[68][68] Hancock Prospecting v Wright Prospecting [78]; Red Hill [121]. There are also limits on the kind of evidence which is admissible as background to construction of a contract, and the purposes for which it is admissible. Evidence of prior negotiations is admissible for some purposes but not for others. Insofar as such evidence establishes objective background facts known to the parties or the genesis, purpose or object of the transaction it is admissible. Insofar as it consists of statements and actions of the parties reflective of their actual intentions and expectations it is inadmissible. Such statements reveal the terms of the contracts which the party intended or hoped to make. They are superseded by, or merged into, the contract.[69] Questions as to the proper construction of s 7, and as to the definition of 'Site' when inserted in s 7 through the term 'the Resort Lands', are questions of statutory construction. The principles of statutory construction are well known. I apply the statement of principles in Curtin University of Technology v Woods Bagot Pty Ltd[70] and in Re Cock; Ex parte Diano.[71] I repeat the latter summary:In broad summary, the search is for the intention of Parliament expressed and embodied in the legislation. The starting point is the text of the statute. The text is the surest guide to legislative intention. The language of the statute should be interpreted taking into account its context, including any general purpose or policy of the relevant provisions that may be discerned. The consequences of an interpretation, and any perceived improbability of result, may be capable of assisting in choosing between constructional choices that are open on the language of the statute. The statute should be construed as a whole.In Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ emphasised the centrality of the text in statutory construction:'This court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text [Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Cmr of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 [47]; [2009] HCA 41]. So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself.'Martin CJ recently made observations to like effect in The Wilderness Society of WA (Inc) v Minister for Environment.A legislative purpose, discerned from the text and extrinsic material, assists in choosing between constructional choices that are open on the language of the statute; it cannot sustain a construction that is not available as a meaning of the language of the text.The application of the rules of construction involves the identification of a statutory purpose, which may appear from an express statement in the relevant statute, by inference from its terms and by appropriate reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose of a statute is not something which exists outside the statute. It resides in its text and structure, albeit it may be identified by reference to rules of construction.[70] Curtin University of Technology v Woods Bagot Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 449 [34] ‑ [41].[71] Re Cock; Ex parte Diano [2014] WASC 63 [29] ‑ [33].