H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd & Anor v Frederick John Von Stanke & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

H STANKE & SONS PTY LTD & ANOR v FREDERICK JOHN VON STANKE & ORS

[2007] SASC 51

Reasons of Judge Lunn a Master of the Supreme Court

20 February 2007

PROCEDURE

Pleadings under R 46A - degree of particularity required - fair notice to other parties - when pleading of further material facts to be ordered under R 46A.09(1) - pleading of evidence R 46A.02(b) - pleading of conclusions from unparticularised facts - pleading of statutory provisions relied upon R 46A.03(d).

WILLS, PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION - OTHER MATTERS

Application to remove executor for alleged misconduct or neglect of duty held beyond power unless done through an application to revoke the probate.

H STANKE & SONS PTY LTD & ANOR v FREDERICK JOHN VON STANKE & ORS
[2007] SASC 51

Reasons on the plaintiff’s application to strike out the defence of the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant’s application to strike out the contribution notice of the 2nd defendant.

  1. JUDGE LUNN: These applications raise a number of issues about the proper interpretation and application of R 46A which governs the pleadings in this action. It is convenient to commence with a survey of the relevant provisions of R 46A.

    PLEADING UNDER R 46A.

  2. Although it was not the approach taken by Besanko J in Marini v MLH Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd, 2 December 2004, Judgment no [2004] SASC 400, unreported (“Marini’s case”), the proper resolution of the issues of pleading in these applications are best dealt with by interpreting R 46A as a new, and in some respects radical, method of pleading. While there are some similarities and analogies to the previous pleading rules, R 46A is essentially an innovation in pleading and not merely variations tacked on to the old pleading rules. Its interpretation should principally come from the construction of its terms and not from the application of cases decided on the superseded rules of pleading.

  3. The purpose of civil pleadings, whatever system is used, is to provide a structure for the action designed to promote a just outcome and to give the parties “fair notice of the case to be made against them at trial thereby minimising the risk of injustice resulting from surprise”: Williams v Australian Tele-communications Commission (1988) 52 SASR 215 at 216; Marini’s case above at [13]. As stated in R 2.01 of the 1987 Rules the purpose of the rules, including R 46A, is “establishing orderly procedures for the conduct of litigation in the Court and of promoting the just and efficient determination of such litigation”. The primary focus of R 46A is the conduct at a future time of a fair trial between the parties. Essential to achieving that fairness is that well in advance of the trial both the Court and the other parties are made sufficiently aware of the cases to be made by the respective parties at the trial so that all can be properly…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd & Anor v Frederick John Von Stanke & Ors involved a dispute concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence and the need for further particulars in pleadings. The case was heard in a court of law, the specifics of which were not mentioned in the text.

The central legal issues revolved around the application of Rule 46A.02(b) and Rule 46A.05(2)(c) of the relevant procedural rules. The plaintiffs argued that the second defendant's reliance on similar fact evidence should be struck out as it was merely a pleading of evidence, and not the pleading of material facts. The plaintiffs also argued that various parts of the second defendant's defence were conclusory statements without the necessary material facts to support them. The court had to determine whether these objections were valid and whether the pleadings should be amended accordingly.

In its reasoning, the court noted that Rule 46A.02(b) barred the pleading of evidence, but not the pleading of material facts. The court held that material facts pleaded under Rule 46A.05(2)(c) could not merely be the pleading of evidence, and that any conflict between Rule 46A.02(b) and Rule 46A.05(2)(c) should be resolved in favour of the more specific provision, which is Rule 46A.05(2)(c). The court also held that the pleading of conclusions from unparticularised facts did not necessarily render the pleading objectionable, and that the need for further particulars would depend on the circumstances of the case and the context of the pleading. The court concluded that the pleadings should not be struck out, but that the second defendant should be required to provide further particulars where necessary.

No final orders were mentioned in the text.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

A good illustration of the operation of (2)(c) is in relation to similar fact evidence. In subparagraph 31.3 of the defence (see [25] below) a different transaction was pleaded between similar parties which the 2nd defendant seeks to rely upon on the issues of what common assumptions there may have been between the parties in their mutual dealings. Such similar fact evidence would be admissible at the trial as being logically probative of a matter in issue: Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 543. The plaintiffs’ counsel did not suggest that such evidence would not be admissible. His argument was that it was merely the pleading of evidence and so should be struck out. His position was that the 2nd defendant did not have to give any notice by its pleading to the plaintiffs of its intention to make this property transaction part of its case at trial. However, this is contrary to the intent and purpose of (2)(c). A fair and expeditious trial requires that parties should have made discovery of documents on this issue and should have ready at the trial their witnesses and arguments about it. If the issue is only first raised at the trial when the 2nd defendant leads the evidence, there is a serious potential for injustice and an adjournment of the trial. Subr (2)(c) applies to similar fact evidence where the pleading of its subject matter is necessary for fairness to the other parties.Pleading of conclusions from unparticularised facts. Mr Wells QC made a number of objections that various parts of the defence were merely statements of a conclusion without the pleading of the necessary material facts to support that conclusion. While particular instances will be dealt with later a number of general comments need to be made. Many pleadings are mixed assertions of fact and law, eg an agreement was made, a person was an agent, etc. Whether further facts need to be pleaded depends on the circumstances of the case and the context of the pleading. It may be an instance of where the generality of the pleadings operates as an inner limit on the evidence which can be adduced in support of it, as discussed above at [12]. Usually the pleading of a mixed assertion of fact and law is not struck out as being objectionable, and whether an interlocutory order will be made for further material facts will depend in part on whether substantial prejudice can be established under R 46A.09(1). On several occasions counsel for the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant asked a rhetorical question in denigrating a particular part of the 2nd defendant’s pleading of “How can I plead to that?” The question must mean plead according to R46A, which is very different from pleading under the old rules. The only issues the responding pleader has to address are whether anything needs to be stated in compliance with R 46A.05(2)(a)-(e). The answering pleading only needs to deal with the degree of particularity in the pleading: if further material facts are subsequently pleaded it will be by way of amendment which gives the pleader the opportunity to address in an amended responding pleading those new material facts. If the pleading under consideration is intelligible and relevant, there should usually be no dilemma in formulating any necessary appropriate responding pleading.Application to strike out defence of 2nd defendant – unclean hands defence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Whether an interlocutory order will be made at a particular stage of an action for the pleading of more material facts under (2)(c) is in part discretionary. The Court can take into account, if it be the case, that the opposing party has not as yet filed its responding pleading. (There is no equivalent in R 46A of R46.16(1) about particulars before defence.) The Court may well consider that the pleadings should be closed before issues under (2)(c) relating to the conduct of the trial are addressed so that they can be assessed in the light of what has been admitted and otherwise pleaded. Where the pleadings have not closed the significant prejudice for R 46A.09(1) would be directed primarily to the prejudice in filing a responding pleading, but that is likely to be very rare. In determining whether an appropriate stage of the action has been reached for any interlocutory order to be made under R 46A.09(1) the Court can take into account whether the pleading party should have the benefit of discovery from the other parties , and possibly under R 60 against strangers to the action, before being required to put forward its final pleading under (2)(c): ETSA v Union Insurance Co Ltd, Perry J 9 July 1997, Judgment no S 6241; Chapman v Conservation Counsel of SA Inc, Debelle J, 27 November 1998, Judgment no S 6973, unreported. Pleading of Evidence. Mr Wells QC for the plaintiffs submitted that much of what is pleaded in the defence was objectionable as being the pleading of evidence contrary to R46A.02(b) (which is quoted above). He relied principally upon the decision of Crossman J re Dependable Upholstery Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 741. There Crossman J said:….. The important question is whether the respondents to the summons, the directors, are entitled to the particulars given to them by para 1 of the order: “of the facts relied upon in support of the” two allegations that the two dividends were paid out of capital. ….. Ord 19, r 4, which is the material rule, ….. says:‘Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.’Then RSC Ord 19, r 5, provides for the form of pleading. Rule 6 is:“In all cases in which the party pleading relies upon any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.”I think that this case would come within the words “Where the party pleading relies on breach of trust.” It seems to me that that rule means that where such particulars as are required to be stated in the pleading are not stated in the pleading, an order should be made that those further particulars shall be given. One is thrown back on rule 4 to see what in fact is required by “in the pleading.” There I find:“Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence.”In the present case the material fact on which the applicant, the official receiver, relies, is the alleged fact that each of the two dividends was in fact paid wholly out of the capital of the company. But it is suggested by ….. the directors that you have to go behind that allegation and find out the allegations or facts upon which that statement is based. It seems to me if one begins there, I do not know where one would end in the particulars which would have to be ordered; because the fact that each of the dividends was paid wholly out of the capital of the company is the fact on which each party relies in the claim or defence. The facts which lead up to that are, in my view, really the evidence of the fact that the dividends were in fact paid wholly out of the capital of the company. It seems to me, as the first piece of evidence of that, that the court might be asked again to order something which leads up to that piece of evidence, and so on ad infinitum. But the main point, to my mind, which I feel compels me to come to the conclusion that this order ought not to have been made, is that the payment of these dividends wholly out of the capital of the company is a fact, and the fact upon which the parties pleading relying for claim or defence. I do not think in these circumstances I ought to make an order, in the general terms made by this order, that the liquidator shall give particulars of the facts relied on in support of the allegation, that is to say, facts relied upon in support of the material fact. The facts relied upon in support of that can, to my mind, only mean the evidence which leads one to the conclusion that that is the fact.This decision is distinguishable on the wording of the rules which were being applied, and is an example of why R 46A should not be viewed merely as a variation of the previous pleading practice. R 46A.02(b) refers to the pleading of the “material facts relied upon”. I do not consider that this is confined to material facts pleadable under R 46A.05(2)(b), but also extends to material facts pleaded under (2)(c). Both R46A.05(2)(b) and (c) require the pleading of the “material facts”, but material facts directed to different purposes. Thus any material facts properly pleaded under (2)(c) cannot merely be the pleading of evidence which is barred by R 46A.02(b). That subrule by its terms only bars the pleading of evidence which goes beyond the pleading of the material facts. Insofar as any pleading under (2)(b) or (2)(c) could be categorised as the pleading of evidence it is not barred by R 46A.02(b). (In one sense all pleading of material facts can be viewed as the pleading of evidence). What was said by Crossman J does not address the specific requirements of (2)(c). Alternatively, if there is a conflict between R 46A.02(b) and R 46A.05(2)(c), subr (2)(c) should prevail as being a more specific provision than the general R 46A.02(b). Mr Wells QC also relied upon East-West Airlines Operations Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 49 ALR 323, but that is distinguishable for similar reasons based on the particular provisions of R 46A.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established