H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Frederick John Von Stanke

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

H STANKE & SONS PTY LTD & ANOR v FREDERICK JOHN VON STANKE & ORS

[2007] SASC 282

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Sulan

25 July 2007

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - PLEADINGS - GENERALLY

CONTRIBUTION NOTICES

Plaintiffs claim beneficial interest in land held by various defendants and consequential orders - contribution notice seeks relief against first defendant arising from his conduct relating to the administration of estates - whether questions or issues arising on contribution notice are substantially similar to those arising in the action - whether questions or issues arising on contribution notice should be determined as between all parties to the action.

Contribution notice seeks removal of first defendant as trustee of the assets of the estate - whether defendant is acting as executor or trustee - question is one of fact.

PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS - DECLARATIONS

Contribution notice seeks declarations that the first defendant is unfit to act in the role of executor or trustee - whether declaratory relief is available in these circumstances - whether appropriate to preclude prayer for relief seeking declaratory relief at this stage of proceedings.

Supreme Court Act 1935 s 27, s 31; Trustee Act 1936 s 4(1), s 36; Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 27, 37.01, 37.05, 37.07, 37.09; Trustees Act 1962 - 1978 (WA); Supreme Court Rules 2006 r 205, referred to.
Canyon (Australia) Pty Ltd & Ors v Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg & Ors [2004] SASC 36; Imagecolor (SA) Pty Ltd (In Liq) & Anor v Curtis & Ors [2000] SASC 316; J N Taylor Holdings (In Liq) & Ors v Bond & Ors (No 13) (Debelle J, 15 September 1995, unreported); J N Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Liq) & Anor v Bond & Ors (1993) 59 SASR 432; Kenny v Gumpl (Debelle J, 14 January 1997, unreported); Mullett & Anor v Gabriel & Anor (1989) 52 SASR 330; Porteous v Rinehart (1998) 19 WAR 495; Mulvaney v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [2004] SASC 166, applied.
Starmaker (No 51) Pty Ltd v Majda & Ors [2005] SASC 234, distinguished.
Re Burford; Burford v Clifford [1932] 2 Ch 122, discussed.
Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221; Harper v Gray & Walker [1985] 2 All ER 507; H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd & Anor v Frederick John von Stanke & Ors [2007] SASC 51; H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd & Anor v Frederick John von Stanke & Ors [2007] SASC 130; Morgan v MacRae [2007] NSWSC 1017; O'Sullivan v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd [2007] NSWSC 383; Pope v DRP Nominees Pty Ltd & Ors (1999) 74 SASR 78; Stott v West Yorkshire Road Car Co Ltd & Anor [1971] 3 All ER 534; Williams v Williams [2005] 1 Qd R 105, considered.

H STANKE & SONS PTY LTD & ANOR v FREDERICK JOHN VON STANKE &…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 282
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Frederick John Von Stanke, the primary issue revolves around the validity of an Amended Contribution Notice filed by the second defendant in relation to the third defendant’s estate. The court was tasked with determining whether the notice complied with Rule 37.07(1)(c) of the 1987 Rules, which pertains to the determination of any question or issue that is substantially the same as those arising between the plaintiff and a defendant. The second defendant argued that the issues arising from the notice were not substantially the same as those between the plaintiffs and any of the defendants, thus the notice should be struck out. This appeal and subsequent application were part of a broader litigation concerning the estates of Fred and Gwen Von Stanke, with John Von Stanke acting as the executor of Fred’s estate.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Amended Contribution Notice satisfied the criteria set out in Rule 37.07(1)(c) of the 1987 Rules. Specifically, the court had to determine if the issues raised in the notice were substantially the same as those arising between the plaintiffs and any of the defendants. The second defendant argued that these issues were not substantially the same, and therefore, the notice should not have been accepted. The court also had to consider whether it had the power to make the declaration sought by the second defendant regarding the first defendant’s fitness to act as executor and trustee.

The court reasoned that, although the second defendant’s arguments regarding the issues being substantially the same were valid, the primary concern was whether the court could make the declaration sought by the second defendant. The court held that while the jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief is broad, it is limited by certain contra-indicative circumstances. In this case, the declaration that the first defendant was unfit to act as executor would not produce any foreseeable consequences because the second defendant did not seek removal of the first defendant via revocation of the probate or any other means. The court concluded that the declaration, by itself, could not have any effect beyond potentially invoking principles of res judicata and issue estoppel in any subsequent probate action. Thus, the court decided that it would not make the declaration sought by the second defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I note at this point that the only parties present at the appeal and applications were the first defendant and the second defendant. The third defendant was not represented. John was therefore represented only his capacity as the executor of Fred’s estate, notwithstanding that the Amended Contribution Notice is directed simply to John and makes reference in paragraph 1 to both his executorial and personal capacities. I will comment further on the significance of this fact later in these reasons. For convenience, I will refer to John as “the first defendant” in these reasons, as that was the capacity in which he was represented.Appeal against orders and judgment of the Master On 8 May 2007, the first defendant filed a notice of appeal against the orders and judgment of the Master made on 20 February and 19 April 2007. The notice of appeal disclosed four grounds of appeal. On 11 April 2007, the Full Court heard an appeal by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the Master of 20 February 2007. The notice of appeal filed by the plaintiffs appealed some aspects of the decision of 20 February 2007 that are common to the present appeal. The decision of the Full Court, which was delivered on 4 July 2007, resolved several of the grounds of appeal disclosed by the first defendant in its notice. Consequently, the appeal before me proceeded only on the fourth ground of appeal, as that was the only ground of appeal that was not resolved by the judgment of the Full Court. The fourth ground of appeal stated:4. The Learned Master:4.1erred in holding that any of the question (sic) or issues relating to the Amended Contribution Notice were substantially the same as those arising between the Plaintiffs and any of the Defendants for the purpose of r 37.07(1)(c) of the 1987 Rules;4.2ought to have held that the issues or questions arising from the from the (sic) Amended Contribution Notice were not substantially the same as those arising between the Plaintiffs and any of the Defendants; and4.3ought to have held that the Amended Contribution Notice did not comply with r 37.07(1)(c) of the 1987 Rules and should be struck out. Rule 37.07 of the 1987 Rules provides:(1) A defendant within 7 days of filing the defence may without leave issue a contribution notice in Form 14 against any person who is already a defendant or a third or subsequent party to the action claiming:(a) An entitlement to contribution or indemnity;(b) Relief related to or connected with the original subject matter of the action and substantially the same as some other relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff; or (c) The determination of any question or issue relating to or connected with the original subject matter which is substantially the same as some question or issue arising between the plaintiff and a defendant and which should also be properly determined as between other parties. It was not in dispute between the parties that the Amended Contribution Notice did not satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 37.07(1)(a) or (b). The question before the Master, which was in issue in the appeal before me, was whether the second defendant’s Amended Contribution Notice satisfied the requirements of paragraph 37.07(1)(c). Reasons of the Master

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Subject to the qualifications later in these reasons, I give leave to the second defendant to amend further her Amended Contribution Notice to seek the removal of the first defendant as trustee pursuant to s 36 of the Trustee Act. Does the Court have power to make the declaration sought in paragraph 74.4? In paragraph 74.4 of her proposed Further Amended Contribution Notice, the second defendant seeks a declaration that the first defendant is unfit to act in the office of executor or trustee of the estates of Fred or Gwen. I note that the proposed Further Amended Contribution Notice does not seek the removal of the first defendant as executor of either estate. Counsel for the second defendant stated:Mrs O’Meara submits that in the present proceedings the court should make a declaration that the first defendant is unfit to carry on in the office of executor and trustee of the estate because we wish to have that issue finally determined in these proceedings and the effect of a declaration of course is that the matter cannot be relitigated, that stands for all time as the statement of the court with respect to these litigants and that is what is important for Mrs O’Meara, to know that there will be no revisiting of this issue, rather that there is a res judicata there. Counsel drew an analogy between that view and the circumstances of J N Taylor Holdings in which the applicant was seeking to have the insurer joined to the action so that res judicata and issue estoppel would be available to them and there would be no need to revisit the issue in subsequent proceedings. He relied upon s 31 of the Supreme Court Act, which provides:31 – Declaratory OrdersNo action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the court shall have power to make binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not. Counsel for the second defendant also referred to the decision of J N Taylor Holdings (In Liq) & Anor v Bond & Ors,[33] in which King CJ stated “the jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief is very wide” and went on to state that: The court’s power to grant such relief is “only limited by its own discretion”, and the boundaries of judicial power [references omitted]. [33] (1993) 59 SASR 432. However, King CJ did go on to indicate that the discretion was limited by certain “contra-indicative circumstances”, including that the determination of the question would “produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties”. Counsel for the second defendant submitted that none of King CJ’s examples of circumstances contra-indicative applied here. Counsel for Mrs O’Meara submitted that “in the context of the present proceedings, the Court should make a declaration that the first defendant is unfit to act in the office of executor and trustee of the estates”. The first defendant is currently executor of both estates. The only way in which he can be removed as executor is via revocation of the probate which has been granted to him. At this stage, the second defendant does not seek removal of the first defendant via revocation of the probate or any other means. A declaration that the first defendant is unsuitable to act in the office of executor, by itself, can therefore have no effect, beyond enlivening principles of res judicata and issue estoppel in any subsequent probate action.