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Doonan v Beacham

Doonan v Beacham

Case [1953] HCA 38 16 June 1953

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87 CLR 346

RESPONDENT. PLAINTIFF, Negligence-Sufficiency of case to go to jury-Running down case-Particulars of

negligence specifying several items of negligence-Evidence warranting a finding that defendant guilty of negligence in the respect stated in either one or other of items-But not in respect stated in any one particular item separately. June 15, 16.

Although a plaintiff in an action for negligence must make out his allega- tions of negligence within the limits of the particulars he has given, yet, if on the whole of the evidence which is properly admissible the jury can properly find that the damage was caused by negligence which must have taken some form falling within the scope of the particulars, it is no answer to the plaintiff's claim that the evidence does not enable the jury to find that the accident was due to any particular one of the causes itemised in the particulars.

The function of particulars in an action for negligence discussed. Decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Full Court)

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

On 3rd April 1952, Margaret Campbell Beacham commenced an action, as plaintiff, in the Supreme Court of Victoria against William J. Doonan, as defendant. The plaintiff claimed the sum of £5,000 damages for negligence. The statement of claim, SO far as material was as follows: (1) On or about 9th August 1951 the plaintiff was struck down by a motor truck driven by the defendant whilst walking at the intersection of Flinders and Swanston Streets, Melbourne. (2) The collision was due to the negligent driving of the defendant. Particulars of negligence :-(a) driving at an

87 CLR 347

excessive speed under the circumstances; (b) failing to keep any or any proper lookout; (c) driving on the wrong portion of the roadway; (d) failing to observe the plaintiff on the roadway; (e) failing to slow down or stop when danger arose; (f) failing to apply the brakes at all or in time to avoid the collision.

By his defence to the statement of claim, delivered 9th April 1952, the defendant admitted the allegations contained in par. 1, denied those contained in par. 2, and pleaded contributory negligence.

The plaintiff replied joining issue and claiming that even if she was negligent, which she denied, the defendant could by the exercise of reasonable and proper care have avoided the collision.

The action was tried on 19th November 1952 before Lowe J. and a jury. The plaintiff's case consisted of oral evidence and certain of the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's interrogatories. The oral evidence may be summarised as follows :-the collision occurred at about half past one in the afternoon of a fine day, when the visibility was good and the road surface dry. The plaintiff, who was seventy-one years of age, came out of Prince's Bridge Station on the footpath on the southern side of Flinders Street and walked along the footpath in a westerly direction to the inter- section of Flinders Street…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Doonan v Beacham

Details

AGLC: Doonan v Beacham [1953] HCA 38
Case: [1953] HCA 38
Decision Date: 16 June 1953

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The plaintiff, Margaret Campbell Beacham, had sued the defendant, William J. Doonan, for damages for negligence after being struck by the defendant's motor truck at a Melbourne intersection. The plaintiff alleged the collision was due to the defendant's negligent driving, providing particulars including excessive speed, failure to keep a proper lookout, driving on the wrong portion of the roadway, failing to observe the plaintiff, failing to slow down or stop when danger arose, and failing to apply brakes in time. The defendant admitted the collision but denied negligence and pleaded contributory negligence.

The legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff's evidence did not establish negligence in respect of any single particular itemised in the statement of claim. The plaintiff's case relied on her own evidence and the defendant's answers to interrogatories, as the defendant elected not to call evidence. The plaintiff testified she was struck from behind while crossing Swanston Street with a green light, and the defendant's answers indicated he was making a left turn and struck her while she was on the eastern side of the street.

The High Court, by majority, held that the trial judge's approach was erroneous. The Court reasoned that while a plaintiff must prove negligence within the scope of the particulars provided, it is not necessary for the jury to be able to identify the precise cause of the accident from the specific items listed. If, on the whole of the admissible evidence, the jury can reasonably infer that the damage was caused by negligence falling within the general ambit of the particulars, then a case for the jury has been made out. The function of particulars is to define the scope of the negligence alleged, not to create separate, distinct issues, each requiring a separate finding.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Full Court of Victoria which had ordered a new trial. The Court found that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer negligence on the part of the defendant, even if the exact nature of that negligence could not be pinpointed to a single particular.

Orders